Opinion
CIV-23-797-SLP
01-22-2024
XAVIER MONTRELL BAKER, Plaintiff, v. GEO LAWTON CORECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AMANDA MAXFIELD GREEN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis (without prepayment of fees), has filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1).United States District Judge Scott L. Palk referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and (C). (Doc. 4). As explained fully below, it is recommended that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against Defendant GEO Lawton Correctional Facility and the official capacity claim against Defendant Underwood. It is further recommended that the Court find Plaintiff has sufficiently stated an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Underwood in his individual capacity.
Citations to the parties' filings and attached exhibits will refer to this Court's CM/ECF pagination.
I. Overview of Complaint
Plaintiff is a state inmate currently confined at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary in McAlester, Oklahoma. (Doc. 1, at 4); see also Oklahoma Department of Corrections OK Offender, https://okoffender.doc.ok.gov/ (OK DOC# 770276). Plaintiff's claims stem from an alleged incident that took place on March 3, 2022, at which time Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Lawton Correctional Facility in Lawton, Oklahoma. (Doc. 1, at 6-7).
In Claim I, Plaintiff alleges that “between 12:00 to 4:00 PM hours C/O Underwood slammed [his] arm in the food tr[a]y slot” in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that this injured his arm. (Doc. 1, at Ex. 1). Plaintiff brings Claim I against Defendant GEO Lawton Correctional Facility and Defendant Underwood and seeks monetary damages in the amount of $100,000. (Doc 1, at 4, 6-7).
In Claim II, Plaintiff alleges denial of medical treatment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, claiming “all staff knew of this injury” alleged in Claim I, yet he “went 3 weeks without medical attention or without getting X-Rays.” (Id. at 7-8). Plaintiff brings Claim II against Defendant GEO Lawton Correctional Facility and seeks $150,000 in monetary damages. (Id. at 8).
II. The Court's Duty to Screen Prisoner Complaints
Federal law mandates the screening of each complaint in a civil action filed by a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity and each case in which the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a), 1915(e)(2). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
The court's review of a complaint under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) mirrors that required for reviewing a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court must accept Plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “review[s] the complaint for plausibility; that is, to determine whether the complaint includes enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A complaint fails to state such a claim when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint, however, are not assumed to be true; legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
“[A] pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that although courts construe pro se pleadings liberally, courts “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint”). Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific and is determined through a court's application of “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing Iqbal). “A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. The court, however, may not serve as Plaintiff's advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
III. The Court Should Dismiss Plaintiff's Official Capacity Claim Against Defendant Underwood.
In Claim I, Plaintiff sues Defendant Underwood in his official and individual capacities for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1, at 4, 6). In doing so, Plaintiff identifies Defendant Underwood as an employee of Lawton Correctional Facility, a private prison owned and operated by GEO Group, Inc. (Id. at 4). See also Geo Group, Inc. Website, Our Locations, Lawton Correctional Facility, https://www.geogroup.com/FacilityDetail/FacilityID/61 (last visited Jan. 22, 2024); Jaquez v. Lawton Corr. Facility, 2013 WL 5972413, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 8, 2013) (“Lawton Correctional Facility is a private prison facility owned and operated by Geo Group, Inc.”) (citation omitted). As an employee of a private prison, Defendant Underwood is not a state official, and an official capacity claim under § 1983 cannot be asserted against him. See Jones v. Barry, 33 Fed.Appx. 967, 971 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he [private prison] defendants are not state actors, and they do not have an ‘official capacity' ....”); Alamiin v. Patton, No. CIV-13-1001-F, 2016 WL 7217857, at *6 n.6 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 13, 2016) (holding in § 1983 suit against “employees of LCF, a private prison owned and operated by GEO Group Inc.,” that “[a]s employees of a private prison, they are not state officials, and official capacity claims cannot be asserted against them.”). As a result, the Court should dismiss with prejudice the official capacity claim against Defendant Underwood. See Miskam v. Sherrod, No. CIV-14-0646-HE, 2015 WL 4717105, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 7, 2015) (dismissing official capacity claims against private prison employees with prejudice).
IV. The Court Should Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims Against Defendant GEO Lawton Correctional Facility.
Plaintiff has named GEO Lawton Correctional Facility as a defendant in this action on both Claim I and II. (Doc. 1, at 4, 6-7). It is unclear whether Plaintiff intends to assert his claims against the Lawton Correctional Facility or GEO Group, Inc. (See Doc. 1, at 4) (naming “GEO Lawton Correctional Facility Corporation” as a Defendant).
To the extent Plaintiff intends to bring his claims against Lawton Correctional Facility, a “detention facility is not a person or legally created entity capable of being sued,” Aston v. Cunningham, 2000 WL 796086, at *4 n.3 (10th Cir. Jun. 21, 2000), and those claims should be dismissed. To the extent Plaintiff intends to bring his claims against GEO Group, Inc., they should likewise be dismissed. A private actor such as GEO cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely based on the actions of its employees. See Smedley v. Corrections Corp. of America, 175 Fed.Appx. 943, 946 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). To establish GEO's liability under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish three basic elements: (1) GEO has an official policy or custom; (2) that caused a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights; and (3) “was enacted or maintained with deliberate indifference to an almost inevitable” federal rights violation. Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 769-71 (10th Cir. 2013). “A challenged practice may be deemed an official policy or custom for [these] purposes if it is a formally promulgated policy, a well-settled custom or practice, a final decision by a municipal policymaker, or deliberately indifferent training or supervision.” Id. at 770. Here, Plaintiff has not identified an official policy or custom established by GEO in support of his claims. Rather, Plaintiff appears to challenge his specific alleged assault and the handling and outcome of his medical care. Such allegations are insufficient to state a claim against GEO. For these reasons, the Court should dismiss Defendant GEO Lawton Correctional Facility without prejudice from this action.
V. Plaintiff Has Sufficiently Stated An Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim Against Defendant Underwood in his Individual Capacity.
Plaintiff alleges that “between 12:00 to 4:00 PM hours C/O Underwood slammed [his] arm in the food tr[a]y slot” in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. 1, at 7). Plaintiff alleges that this injured his arm. (Doc. 1, at Ex. 1). Plaintiff brings this claim against Defendant Underwood in his individual capacity as well as his official capacity (dismissed above).
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from the use of excessive force. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (“We think the Eighth Amendment, which is specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in cases such as this one, where the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified.”).
[A]n excessive force claim involves two prongs: (1) an objective prong that asks if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation, and (2) a subjective prong under which the plaintiff must show that the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. An official has a culpable state of mind if he uses force maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, rather than in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 936-37 (10th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). Although Plaintiff's allegations are rather sparse, the undersigned finds they are sufficient to state a plausible claim against Defendant Underwood, when taken as true and construed, along with any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Slamming a person's arm in a (likely metal) food tray slot is objectively harmful, and it is difficult, without more detail, to infer how such an action would be related to a good faith effort to restore or maintain discipline. See e.g., Williams v. Woodson, 2016 WL 4539660, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 11658951 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2016) (finding that allegations that correctional officer repeatedly slammed the cell door tray flap on Plaintiff's arms were sufficient to state a claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Driver v. Novy, 2015 WL 9463180, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 28, 2015) (holding that allegations that correctional officer twisted his arm and slammed the tray flap against his arm were sufficient to state a claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
VI. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object.
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the undersigned recommends that the Court DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's claims against Defendant GEO Lawton Correctional Facility and DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE the official capacity claim against Defendant Underwood. The undersigned further recommends that the Court find Plaintiff has sufficiently stated an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Underwood in his individual capacity. The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of Court on or before February 12, 2024, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to file a timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives his right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation does not terminate the referral in the present case. ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2024.