Opinion
No. 131607.
April 13, 2007.
Appeal from the Reported below: 271 Mich App 174.
Summary Disposition April 13, 2007.
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated in Court of Appeals Judge O'CONNELL'S partial dissent, and we remand this case to the Livingston Circuit Court for entry of summary disposition in favor of the defendant superintendent pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).
I agree with reversal of the Court of Appeals judgment because the defendant superintendent is entitled to absolute governmental immunity from suit under MCL 691.1407(5) ("A judge, a legislator, and the elective or highest appointive executive official of all levels of government are immune from tort liability for injuries to persons or damages to property if he or she is acting within the scope of his or her judicial, legislative, or executive authority.").
KELLY and YOUNG, JJ. We join the statement of Chief Justice TAYLOR.
I fully concur in the decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and to remand the case for entry of an order dismissing plaintiff's claim. I would do so on the ground that plaintiff has failed to state a claim. To state a claim for tortious interference with a business relationship, a plaintiff must allege tortious interference by a third party. See Reed v Michigan Metro Girl Scout Council, 201 Mich App 10, 13 (1993); Dzierwa v Michigan Oil Co, 152 Mich App 281, 287-288 (1986). Here, defendant is not a third party to the business relationship at issue — plaintiff's employment as the school resource officer for Pinckney Community Schools. See Baker v Couchman, 271 Mich App 174, 193 n 3, 199-200 (2006) (O'CONNELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and dismissal is appropriate.
YOUNG, J. I join the statement of Justice MARKMAN.