Opinion
Civil Action No. 05-CV-1562.
September 14, 2005
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss all of Plaintiffs' Title VII claims (Counts II and III). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 6, 2005, Plaintiffs Alonza Baker Jr., Gregory Jenkins, Roderick Washington, John McNeil, and Ernest Greenwood filed a complaint against Defendants City of Philadelphia ("City"), City of Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations ("Commission"), and Rachel Lawton, Acting Executive Director of the City of Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations ("Lawton"). Plaintiffs' Complaint contains four counts as follows: Count I, Plaintiffs against Defendants City and Commission for Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count II, Plaintiff Jenkins against Defendants City and Commission for Violation of Title VII — Race; Count III, Plaintiff Jenkins against Defendants City and Commission for Violation of Title VII — Retaliation; and Count IV Plaintiffs Washington and Jenkins against Defendant Lawton for Violation of the First Amendment.
With respect to Counts II and III, Plaintiff Jenkins filed his charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the EEOC issued a "right to sue" letter on January 11, 2005. Defendants now move to dismiss Counts II and III pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
II. DISCUSSION
Before an aggrieved party initiates a civil action for employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ( 42 U.S.C. § 2000e), he must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and must obtain from the EEOC a notice of his right to sue in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Burgh v. Borough Council of Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001); Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. And Medical Center, 165 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1999); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 925 (3d Cir. 1997). An employment discrimination charge "shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred (300) days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred" in a state such a Pennsylvania with an agency analogous to the EEOC. Otherwise, a plaintiff must file with the EEOC within one hundred eighty days (180) of the alleged act of discrimination.
In Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir. 1997), the Third Circuit held that the three hundred day and the one hundred eighty day time periods are akin to a statute of limitations. Therefore, if an aggrieved party fails to file a timely complaint, then he is precluded from judicial remedy.
In the instant case, because Plaintiff Jenkins failed to file a timely complaint with the EEOC, the Court cannot entertain his Title VII claims. Plaintiff Jenkins filed his charge of discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC on July 21, 2004. Jenkins alleged that the act of discrimination took place on August 7, 2003. Jenkins' three hundred day period within which to file his charge expired on June 3, 2004. Because Plaintiff Jenkins failed to file his charge in a timely manner, his claim is time-barred, and Counts II and III of the Plaintiffs' Complaint must be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III of Plaintiffs' Complaint is granted.
An appropriate order follows.