Baker v. City of Detroit

17 Citing cases

  1. Baker v. City of Detroit

    483 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Mich. 1979)   Cited 23 times
    In Baker, supra, Judge Keith found that the City of Detroit had engaged in intentional racial discrimination in its police department, at least until 1968.

    At intervals thereafter, the Board reviewed the continuing need for the program. See Memorandum Opinion and Order granting defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, released September 25, 1979, 483 F. Supp. 919. Defendants contend that the facts overwhelmingly support the defendants' determinations (1) that the Department had unlawfully discriminated against blacks in hiring and promotions; (2) that the Department's discrimination had damaging effects against not only black applicants and police officers but also against black residents of Detroit and on the Department's ability to police the City effectively; and (3) that the affirmative action promotional scheme was the only effective remedy to eradicate prior employment discrimination, to improve the Department's operational efficiency, and to repair police-citizen relations.

  2. Bratton v. City of Detroit

    704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983)   Cited 50 times
    In Bratton, this Court specifically upheld Judge Keith's finding that the Detroit Police Commission's determination that the police department had engaged in past intentional discrimination was sufficient to uphold the plan against constitutional attack.

    Baker v. City of Detroit, 458 F. Supp. 379 (E.D.Mich. 1978).Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 919 (E.D.Mich. 1979). The appellants have also objected to the district court's treatment of several issues addressed in its decision on the liability issues in Baker v. City of Detroit, supra, 483 F. Supp. 930 at 994-95, to wit: (1) the appellants claim that the court erred in finding that their rights under the Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act and Art. 1 Sec. 2 of the Michigan Constitution were not violated; (2) that the court erred in finding that the applicable collective bargaining agreement had not been violated since there had been no "refusal to bargain" within the terms of that agreement; and (3) that the court erred in finding that there had been no denial of due process since the city charter did not create a property right in public employment and that the Board had not violated the charter in any event.

  3. Raymond v. Renew Therapeutic Massage, Inc.

    CIVIL 18-13760 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2022)   Cited 1 times   1 Legal Analyses

    This district takes a “liberal” position on the pleading rules. See Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F.Supp. 919, 921 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983). Where courts do not require the use of “the magic words affirmative defense,” the focus, “[m]ost importantly,” is on “whether the Court and the parties were aware of the issues involved.

  4. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Marinemax of Ohio, Inc.

    408 F. Supp. 2d 526 (N.D. Ohio 2006)   Cited 17 times
    Concluding that affirmative defenses averring preemption and waiver through "actions and inactions" were sufficient; while plaintiff argued "it ha[d] no idea which claims are preempted . . . which actions waived which defenses" these were questions for discovery, not a basis for striking defenses

    However, this does not mean that they must be pleaded with particularity. See, e.g., Baker v. Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 919, 921 (E.D. Mich. 1979) aff'd on other grounds, sub nom Bratton v. Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983). Rather, a defendant's assertion of an affirmative defense is adequate when it gives the plaintiff fair notice of the defense.

  5. Mohilef v. Janovici

    51 Cal.App.4th 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 70 times
    Rejecting the argument that taking testimony under oath is a constitutional requirement of an administrative public nuisance hearing

    In contrast, the use of an oath is not of similar historical importance in administrative proceedings. (See, e.g., Brousseau v. United States (1981) 640 F.2d 1235, 1241-1242 [226 Ct. Cl. 199]; Baker v. City of Detroit (E.D.Mich. 1979) 483 F. Supp. 919, 928, affd. (6th Cir. 1983) 704 F.2d 878 mod. on rehg. 712 F.2d 222.) Accordingly, in Broussard v. Regents of University of California (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 636 [184 Cal.Rptr. 460], the First District Court of Appeal concluded that the due process clause did not mandate sworn testimony in an administrative hearing.

  6. Davis v. Sun Oil Company

    148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998)   Cited 105 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over RCRA citizen suits

    More important, what matters is not whether the magic words 'affirmative defense' appears in pleadings, but whether the Court and the parties were aware of the issues involved." Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 919, 921 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, vacated on rehearing, 712 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1983).

  7. Maker's Mark Distillery, PBC v. Spalding Grp.

    Civil Action 3:19-CV-00014-GNS-LLK (W.D. Ky. Mar. 5, 2024)

    , however, do not actually hold that a plaintiff can expressly raise a defense in a complaint or motion. In Baker v. City of Detroit,, 483 F.Supp. 919, 921-22 (E.D. Mich. 1979), the court held that a defense of good faith immunity was not waived because it was “inherent to their affirmative defenses”-that their actions were consistent with and intended to comply with the law-so they had “clearly set forth legal grounds for a claim of governmental immunity.” Id. at 921-22

  8. Desai v. Charter Commc'ns, LLC

    Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-459-DJH-DW (W.D. Ky. Dec. 27, 2016)

    (See, e.g., D.N. 62, PageID # 1004-05) And indeed it should have, as the plaintiffs' amended complaint identified the PowerPoint presentation as the source of the allegedly defamatory statements, and that presentation was in Charter's possession. (See D.N. 7, PageID # 50-51 ¶¶ 24-25; D.N. 53, PageID # 383) In short, it is hard to see what information Charter lacked that was necessary to timely assert the defense of qualified privilege; affirmative defenses need not be "pleaded with particularity." N.H. Ins. Co. v. MarineMax of Ohio, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (citing Baker v. Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 919, 921 (E.D. Mich. 1979)). The Court therefore concludes, as did Judge Whalin, that Charter has failed to establish good cause to modify the scheduling order.

  9. Dresser v. Cradle of Hope Adoption Center Inc.

    421 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (E.D. Mich. 2006)   Cited 15 times
    Discussing components of unfair prejudice

    That allegation is sufficient to provide the plaintiffs notice of the defense and entitle the defendant to offer evidence on it. See Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 919, 921 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (observing that "hypertechnicality in pleading requirements should be avoided. Thus, liberal pleading rules are equally applicable to the pleading of affirmative defenses") (quoting 2A Moore's Federal Practice Par. 8.27(3)).

  10. Mazur v. Young

    Case Number 05-10109-BC (E.D. Mich. Mar. 17, 2006)   Cited 2 times

    More important, what matters is not whether the magic words "affirmative defense" appears in pleadings, but whether the Court and the parties were aware of the issues involved.Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 919, 921 (E.D. Mich. 1979). In addition, there are exceptions to the rule requiring affirmative defenses to be pleaded.