Opinion
22-0242
03-01-2024
Eve Lynn Baker, Petitioner, v. Terry Lee Bizzle, Respondent
Argued September 13, 2023
On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas
OPINION
JOHN P. DEVINE JUSTICE
The issue in this divorce proceeding is whether the trial court rendered judgment in an email sent only to the parties' lawyers. The court of appeals held that it did not, and we affirm. "Generally, a judgment is rendered when the [court's] decision is officially announced orally in open court, by memorandum filed with the clerk, or otherwise announced publicly." A written or oral ruling shared only with the parties or their counsel in a nonpublic forum is not a public announcement of the court's decision and, therefore, does not constitute a rendition of judgment.
Garza v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 89 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002).
I. Background
After nearly twenty years of marriage, Eve Lynn Baker (Wife) and Terry Lee Bizzle (Husband) filed cross-petitions for divorce. Because no children were born of the marriage, the divorce action was limited to (1) termination of the marital relationship and (2) division of the marital estate. Each spouse alleged fault and no-fault grounds for divorce, and both sought a disproportionate share of community property.
The divorce action was tried to the bench on September 17, 2019. Following the close of evidence, the trial court informed the parties that a same-day ruling would not be possible and that the court would "e-mail the parties with the decision" at the end of the following week, at the earliest. The parties were initially excused, but at their request, the court orally rendered judgment in open court that "[t]he parties are divorced" "as of today" and "entry of the final decree of divorce will be ministerial in nature." The court's oral pronouncement did not, however, include the grounds on which divorce was granted or purport to divide the marital estate.
See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 6.001-.007 (authorizing courts to dissolve a marriage on satisfaction of statutory requirements), 7.001 (requiring a decree of divorce to include a just-and-right division of the parties' estate).
On October 4, the court sent the following email to the parties' attorneys:
Baker/Bizzle divorce ruling
Granted on the ground of insupportability
1) Neither party proved by clear and convincing evidence their claims for reimbursement.
2) H cashed out and used his two retirements without proving how much, if any, was separate.
3) W awarded the CD in the amount of $7,745[.]
4) Using wife's Exhibit 1, I believe the only items on the list that are not agreed to were those highlighted on a copy for the court. Those disputed items are awarded to W.
5) Each party keeps the motor vehicles in their possession and any debt thereon.
6) The TN house and its contents with any debts or liens thereon to H. House valued at $98,000[.]
7) The TX house with all contents except those specifically awarded to H. House valued at $217,000. Second mortgage of approximately $35,000 debt to wife.
8) The wife's $12,500 school loan is community debt; awarded to W.
9) H awarded all items listed on H Ex. 3 entitled H's “Requested items from Carrollton Residence”, except the Maytag washer & dryer.
10) Each party pays their own attorney's fees, and their own credit card debt, and any lien or other debt encumbering any item they were awarded.
[Wife's counsel] to prepare the Decree. If I have missed something, please visit between yourselves and designate one of you to send an email to me. Please do not send separate emails.
Thank you for your courtesy,
Judge Barnes
The court did not copy the court clerk on this email or otherwise submit it to the clerk for filing or entry in the record.
The email did not state a deadline for tendering the written decree, but two months of ostensible inaction prompted the trial court to twice warn the parties that the case would be dismissed for want of prosecution if the decree was not submitted by a certain date. Shortly after the second dismissal notice, Wife passed away on or about December 19, 2019.
A week later, Wife's counsel submitted a fourteen-page final divorce decree accompanied by a motion to sign. Husband responded with a plea in abatement and motion to dismiss, urging that Wife's death had mooted the proceedings and divested the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction before the court rendered judgment disposing of all contested issues. In support of abatement and dismissal, Husband asserted that (1) a cause of action for divorce does not survive if either spouse dies before rendition of judgment because divorce is "purely personal to the parties"; (2) the trial court did not render a full and complete disposition of the divorce action before Wife died; and (3) on her death, Wife ceased to have any interest in the divorce action.
See Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780, 784 (Tex. 2006) (noting that a cause of action that is "personal in nature typically does not survive" the death of either party); Jones v. Jones, 97 S.W.2d 949, 951 (Tex. [Comm'n Op.] 1936) (describing a divorce action as "purely personal to those parties"); see also Whatley v. Bacon, 649 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex. 1983) (after a party's death, "a divorce action and its incidental inquiries of property rights and child custody" is abated and must be dismissed); Garrison v. Tex. Com. Bank, 560 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("It is well settled that a cause of action for a divorce is purely personal and that the cause of action for a divorce terminates on the death of either spouse prior to the rendition of a judgment granting a divorce. A judgment to be final must dispose of all issues and parties in the case." (internal citations omitted)); cf. Tex. R. Civ. P. 150 (a cause of action that survives "may proceed to judgment" and need not be abated or dismissed if a party dies before the court's decision or a verdict "is rendered").
On death, a deceased spouse's separate property and undivided one-half interest in the community estate vest immediately in the decedent's devisees or heirs at law, even as to jointly owned property. See Tex. Est. Code §§ 101.001-.002; Parr v. White, 543 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("Upon the death of [wife], her property passed immediately to her heirs at law and/or the beneficiaries of her Will as the case might be."); see also Tex. Est. Code § 201.003(c) (describing a deceased spouse's interest in the community estate as an "undivided one-half interest").
The central dispute was whether the trial court had rendered judgment fully resolving the divorce action before Wife died. Husband argued that the trial court had not, so signing the proposed divorce decree would be an untimely, and therefore void, rendition of judgment. Wife's counsel characterized the proposed decree as a "ministerial" memorialization of decisions the court had rendered on September 17 and October 4, which collectively disposed of all claims and finalized the divorce action before Wife's death. The trial court ultimately signed a modified version of Wife's proposed final decree, declaring the parties divorced on insupportability grounds and dividing the marital estate.
The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment that the postmortem divorce decree was void for want of subject-matter jurisdiction because the trial court had not rendered judgment completely resolving the divorce action before Wife died. In dismissing the case, the appellate court determined that neither the September 17 oral pronouncement nor the October 4 email "either standing alone or in combination" rendered a full, complete, and final rendition of judgment disposing of the divorce action before Wife's death. In addition to holding that the September 17 oral pronouncement was merely interlocutory, the court agreed with Husband that the language in the October 4 email did not express a present-as opposed to future-intent to render a full, final, and complete judgment. Among other things, the court found it notable that the email's "ten brief rulings" expressly "allowed for the possibility of further rulings and clarifications" if the trial court had "missed something." The opinion also referenced authority requiring a written rendition to be filed with the clerk, but the trial court's failure to file the email was not central to the court's analysis or disposition.
___S.W.3d___, 2022 WL 123216, at *7-8 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 13, 2022). Resolving the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, the court did not reach Husband's complaints about the property division. Id. at *7.
Id. at *7-8.
Id. at *3-4 (observing that neither the grounds for divorce nor the property division were delivered orally in open court and that the trial court had "orally reserved ruling on all property issues until a later date").
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *6.
On petition for review, Wife challenges the court of appeals' construction of the October 4 email and asserts that the marriage was dissolved when the trial court fully adjudicated the divorce action in either the October 4 email or through the combined force of the September 17 and October 4 rulings. In addition to urging the email's linguistic and substantive sufficiency to effectuate a present, full, and complete rendition of judgment, the petition contends that the trial court publicly announced its October 4 decision by emailing it to the attorneys of record, who then "acknowledged it." Further, or in the alternative, the petition contends that Husband's filing of the October 4 email as an exhibit to a post-judgment motion was a public announcement of the court's decision that "related back" to the date of the email.
Wife does not dispute that the trial court's September 17 oral pronouncement was interlocutory because the property division remained open at that time. See Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001; Ex parte Scott, 123 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Tex. 1939) (construing section 7.001's predecessor as mandating division of property in a divorce decree); R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Home Transp. Co., 654 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. 1983) (observing that a judgment is final only when it disposes of all issues before it and settles the controversy between the parties); Vautrain v. Vautrain, 646 S.W.2d 309, 315-16 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd) (holding that oral rendition of judgment terminating the marital relationship was "interlocutory" because it did not include a division of the marital estate).
II. Discussion
The issue presented is narrow: does the trial court's October 4 email qualify as a rendition of judgment?
Reducing a decision to final judgment has three phases: (1) rendition; (2) signing; and (3) entry. Rendition and signing are judicial acts that can, but need not, occur at the same time. Entry, on the other hand, is a clerical act undertaken by the clerk of the court.A judgment's "rendition" is "the judicial act by which the court settles and declares the decision of the law upon the matters at issue."Rendition of judgment requires a present act, either by spoken word or signed memorandum, that decides the issues on which the ruling is made. If the judge's words only indicate an intention to render judgment in the future or to provide guidelines for drafting a judgment, the pronouncement cannot be considered a present rendition of judgment.
Burrell v. Cornelius, 570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1978) ("The day a judge signs an order is frequently, perhaps usually, after the time the judgment is rendered and surely it is before the judgment is entered."); see Coleman v. Zapp, 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (Tex. 1912); Henry v. Cullum Co., 891 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, writ denied).
Burrell, 570 S.W.2d at 384 ("Judges render judgment; clerks enter them on the minutes. The entry of a judgment is the clerk's record in the minutes of the court. 'Entered' is synonymous with neither 'Signed' nor 'Rendered.'" (internal citations omitted)); Henry, 891 S.W.2d at 792 (distinguishing rendition from judicial signing and clerical entry). Although judgment can be rendered orally or in writing, certain deadlines-like plenary jurisdiction and the deadline for appealing-run from the date a final judgment is signed. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a; Tex.R.App.P. 26.1; Goff v. Tuchscherer, 627 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tex. 1982) (noting that procedural rules providing that appellate steps run from the day the judge signs a judgment, decision, or order "were adopted for the purpose of making more definite the time from which an appeal had to be perfected"). But while the date of signing is critical to a trial or appellate court's jurisdiction, signing does not establish a judgment's effective date for all purposes. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a; see also, e.g., In re R.A.H., 130 S.W.3d 68, 70 (Tex. 2004) (noting that the "effective date" of a judgment acknowledging or adjudicating fatherhood is the date the judgment was rendered (citing Tex. Fam. Code § 160.609(b))).
Supra note 13.
Coleman, 151 S.W. at 1041.
Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tex. 1976).
Id.; see S&A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1995) (trial court's comments on the record approved a settlement but did not render judgment because the words spoken stated a future intent to render a "full, final, and complete" judgment only by signing the judgment); Mixon v. Moye, 860 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ) (holding that the trial court's letter was not a rendition of judgment because "it only indicate[d] the court's intention to render judgment in a certain way and set[] out guidelines by which counsel [were] to draw a judgment").
Words reflecting the judge's present declaration of a decision are necessary, but not sufficient, to effect the rendition of a judgment. "Generally, a judgment is rendered when the decision is officially announced orally in open court, by memorandum filed with the clerk, or otherwise announced publicly." For writings, courts have held that a letter to counsel could constitute a pronouncement of judgment if the letter (1) uses language reflecting a present intent to render judgment, (2) provides sufficient detail to state the court's decision on the matters at issue, and (3) is filed with the clerk of court. Other cases seemingly hold, or at least suggest, that letter rulings may suffice even if they are shared only with the parties or their counsel.
Garza v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 89 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002).
See, e.g., Gregory v. Foster, 35 S.W.3d 255, 256-57 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 2000, no pet.); see also Genesis Producing Co. v. Smith Big Oil Corp., 454 S.W.3d 655, 660 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (email might have rendered judgment except it was never filed with the clerk or otherwise publicly announced and was followed by a written order signed and filed with the clerk); Key Energy Servs. v. Shelby Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 428 S.W.3d 133, 144-45 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2014, pet. denied) (a letter to counsel may constitute pronouncement of judgment "if it is in sufficient detail to state the court's decision on all the matters at issue and filed with the clerk," but the court's letter to counsel met neither standard); Mixon, 860 S.W.2d at 210 (unfiled letter to counsel with one short paragraph of general guidance for preparing an order is not a rendition of judgment); Abarca v. Roadstar Corp. of Am., 647 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1982, no writ) (holding a letter to the parties filed with the clerk was a rendition of judgment); Ex parte Gnesoulis, 525 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ) (letter to counsel was not a rendition because it was not filed with the clerk and the "very general" provisions, including failure to state which party was granted a divorce, indicated the judge's intent that the letter be guidance for a written judgment, not a rendition).
See Estes v. Carlton, 708 S.W.2d 594, 596-97 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that the trial court's unfiled letter to the attorneys transmitting a signed, but unfiled, judgment was a rendition of judgment); Ortiz v. O.J. Beck & Sons, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 860, 865 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (holding that judgment was rendered by letter filed with the clerk but stating, more broadly, that "a decision announced by letter from the court to the parties when no announcement is made in open court or any memorandum filed with the clerk, would constitute rendition"); see also Rhima v. White, 829 S.W.2d 909, 913 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) (citing Estes for the proposition that an unfiled letter ruling can constitute a rendition of judgment); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Exxon, 663 S.W.2d 858, 863 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983) (citing Ortiz in holding that a trial court decision was "publicly announced" both through an initialed docket entry and an ex parte letter to the movant), rev'd on other grounds, 678 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1984).
In terms of the vehicle, we see little difference between a written memorandum of law and a written letter or email ruling. If a judgment may be rendered in the former as our cases have long held, it can just as surely be rendered in the latter. The form of writing is not important; the critical inquiries concern the court's use of language indicating a present intent to render a full, final, and complete decision and whether the court officially announced that decision publicly. The issue here is not whether an email or letter to counsel is the kind of writing by which a judge may render a decision but (1) whether the October 4 email substantively did so and (2) whether a private communication constitutes a public announcement.
See supra notes 19 and 20.
In concluding that the October 4 email did not amount to a rendition of judgment, the court of appeals found the email's language insufficient and further mentioned, but did not hang its hat on, the communiqué's private transmission. Without deciding whether the October 4 email was substantively sufficient as a present, complete, and final decision, we find the email fatally deficient as a rendition of judgment because there was no judicial action to publicly announce the court's decision on the matters at issue.
___S.W.3d___, 2022 WL 123216, at *5, *7 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 13, 2022).
It is undisputed that the trial court did not orally announce, in open court, its decision on the issues addressed in the October 4 email. Nor is it alleged that the court delivered the email to the clerk of the court for filing, entry, or inclusion in the public record or took any actions reasonably calculated to effectuate such delivery. Wife nonetheless asserts that the court's decision was "otherwise announced publicly" in either of two ways: (1) disclosure to counsel of record, who "acknowledged it"; or (2) by attachment to Husband's post-judgment motion to reconsider and vacate the final divorce decree. We disagree on both counts.
Public announcement does not refer to judicial actions that only give notice to the parties or their counsel; it requires judicial action intended to make the decision accessible to the general public. This conclusion comports with the long-articulated requirement that an oral pronouncement of judgment be made in open court-rather than privately-or, if made in a memorandum of law, that the court deliver that writing to the clerk of the court, in his or her official capacity, for filing in the public record. Although "filing" is not the only way a document can be made public, the commonality between these well-settled methods of rendition is official action by the court reasonably calculated to make the decision accessible to the general public. This is no happenstance.
See, e.g., Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1970); Knox v. Long, 257 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. 1953), overruled on other grounds by Jackson v. Hernandez, 285 S.W.2d 184, 191 (Tex. 1955); Coleman v. Zapp, 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (Tex. 1912).
See Knox, 257 S.W.2d at 292 (the court's delivery of the official decision to the court clerk imposes a duty on the clerk to enter it "forthwith").
The public generally has a right to access judicial proceedings except for those rare cases in which competing rights or interests outweigh the public's interest. This right, which "is a fundamental element of the rule of law," is recognized under the common law, constitutionally guaranteed, and incorporated into our procedural rules requiring court proceedings and court records to be open to the public. In that vein, and particularly germane here, Rule 76a(1) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[n]o court order or opinion issued in the adjudication of a [civil] case may be sealed." If the court need not make a writing announcing its adjudication available to the general public, that adjudication would effectively be sealed contrary to the rule. To the extent some cases can be read as holding that a private communication can constitute a rendition of judgment, we disapprove them.
HouseCanary, Inc. v. Title Source, Inc., 622 S.W.3d 254, 267 n.10 (Tex. 2021) (noting that "[p]ublic access to courtrooms themselves is protected by the First Amendment, but like the common-law right of access to records and documents, this right of access is not absolute" and is "subject to reasonable limitations imposed to protect countervailing interests, such as the preservation of trade secrets" (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 263-64 ("The public's right of access to judicial proceedings is a fundamental element of the rule of law because monitor[ing] the exercise of judicial authority helps maintain[] the integrity and legitimacy of an independent Judicial Branch." (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code § 105.003(b) (allowing the court in a contested suit affecting the parent-child relationship to "limit attendance at the hearing to only those persons who have a direct interest in the suit or in the work of the court").
HouseCanary, 622 S.W.3d at 263 (quoting Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990 F.3d 410, 417 (5th Cir. 2021)).
Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) ("[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents." (footnote omitted)).
HouseCanary, 622 S.W.3d at 263-64; see Tex. Const. art. 1, § 13 ("All courts shall be open[.]").
See, e.g., Tex.R.Civ.P. 21d(f), 76a, 500.10(e); see also Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 12, reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code, tit. 2, subtit. F app. (public access to judicial records).
Although "documents filed in an action originally arising under the Family Code" are excluded from the definition of "court records" for purposes of Rule 76a(1)'s standard for sealing court records, Rule 76a(1) is categorical in prohibiting the sealing of any "order or opinion issued in the adjudication of a [civil] case." See Tex. R. Civ. P. 76a(1), (2)(a)(3). Discrete exceptions may exist under other law, but no one has argued that the trial court's decision in this case may or must be made privately.
See supra note 20.
We also reject the notion that Husband's attachment of the trial court's email to his post-judgment filing satisfies the requirement of a public announcement. That filing certainly had the effect of making the email part of the public record when it otherwise would not have been and in doing so made it accessible to the general public. But rendition is an official judicial act, not something that can be accomplished by the parties' unilateral or concerted actions in filing a writing or spreading the word. Aside from the necessity of judicial action as a legal matter, allowing only the trial court's actions to effectuate a rendition encourages communication between the court and counsel while helping to create a more certain line between mere guidance for drafting the judgment and an official rendition of judgment.
See United Rentals N. Am., Inc. v. Evans, 668 S.W.3d 627, 637 (Tex. 2023) ("We should strive throughout the law for easily administrable bright-line rules, which can be followed by parties with confidence and applied by judges with predictability.").
Because the trial court did not announce its October 4 decision publicly-whether by oral pronouncement, filing, or otherwise-the court's email did not constitute a rendition of judgment, and Wife's subsequent death divested the trial court of jurisdiction to thereafter render judgment.
Although the divorce proceedings were not concluded on the merits, neither the property dispute nor Wife's community interest goes away; it just goes somewhere else. That is, Wife's property interests in the marital estate must now be divided and distributed according to Texas probate law rather than in the divorce action. See Tex. Est. Code §§ 101.001-.002.
III. Conclusion
Public pronouncement of the trial court's decision is not a mere formalism but, rather, an official judicial action affording the decision legal significance. Because the trial court did not render judgment in the privately communicated October 4 email, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render judgment in the postmortem final divorce decree. Though our analysis differs from the court of appeals, we affirm its dismissal judgment.
This opinion should not be construed as commenting on the unargued issues addressed in Justice Lehrmann's concurring opinion. See Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 782 (Tex. 2020) (observing that courts serve as neutral arbiters of the issues the parties have framed for decision rather than as advocates who decide cases on unargued points).
Justice Lehrmann filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Busby and Justice Young joined.
Justice Lehrmann, joined by Justice Busby and Justice Young, concurring.
Debra H. Lehrmann Justice
The parties present the Court with a binary option: either the trial court's email to the parties before Baker's death qualified as a rendition of judgment dividing the parties' marital estate and the divorce decree should be affirmed in its entirety, or the email did not qualify as a rendition and the court of appeals correctly dismissed the entire divorce action as moot. The Court agrees with Bizzle and the court of appeals and dismisses the entire divorce action as moot. I too agree with Bizzle's premise-the email was not a public announcement of the trial court's decision and thus did not suffice as a rendition with respect to the property division. Further, I agree with the Court that Baker's death mooted the need for a just-and-right division of the marital property. Ante at 14.
However, I would add that the parties' marital status, orally pronounced by the trial court before Baker's death, became final upon her death. The law does not, and we should not, mandate the retroactive "undoing" of this status adjudication. However, neither party sought a judgment solely on the parties' status; in fact, both parties took the position at oral argument that the status adjudication of a divorce and the property division incidental to a divorce are inseverable and that the status adjudication could not survive Baker's death without a property division. Thus, it would be improper for the Court to grant such relief. I therefore concur in the Court's judgment and join its opinion, but I write separately on this important issue. As discussed below, when a trial court with jurisdiction grants a divorce but later loses jurisdiction to divide the marital estate, the judgment of divorce may remain intact despite the dismissal of the collateral issues.
I
A suit for dissolution of marriage presents several issues for resolution by the trial court, including the status of the parties, see Tex. Fam. Code §§ 6.001-.007, and a "just and right" division of the marital property, see id. § 7.001. When a party to a divorce proceeding dies before the trial court has resolved any of those issues, the unsurprising result is dismissal on mootness grounds. Whatley v. Bacon, 649 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1983). But what happens if a party dies after the trial court has expressly rendered judgment on the status question? Although that order is technically interlocutory because it does not dispose of all claims and all parties, the status adjudication is finalized, rather than subject to dismissal, by one party's death.
If necessary, issues involving child conservatorship and support obligations are also a mandated part of a divorce proceeding. Tex. Fam. Code § 6.406(b) ("If the parties are the parents of a child, . . . and the child is not under the continuing jurisdiction of another court . . ., the suit for dissolution of a marriage must include a suit affecting the parent-child relationship . . . ."). A Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship ("SAPCR") was not necessary in the divorce proceeding at issue.
Conceptually, it helps to sort the pertinent "claims" in a divorce into two buckets: the first encompasses the adjudication of the parties' legal status (i.e., their status as married or divorced), and the second encompasses collateral matters (i.e., property division and SAPCR issues). The Family Code understandably requires the issues in both buckets to be addressed in a final decree. See Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001. Without a division of the marital estate, the property is left without clear legal ownership-bad for the parties and bad for society. The two buckets are bound together in the Family Code because it would be both inefficient and impractical to allow parties to be divorced without a clear grasp of who owns what.
Those practical considerations fall away when a party dies after the rendition of divorce but before the rendition of the property division. In that case, the deceased party's estate immediately vests in her devisees or heirs. See Tex. Est. Code §§ 101.001-.002. And the deceased party's status as married or divorced at the time of death can have a significant effect on distribution of her estate. For example, if a person gets divorced after making a will, then the will's provisions are read as if the former spouse had failed to survive her, unless the will expressly provides otherwise. Id. § 123.001(b)(1). A divorce also revokes provisions in certain trust instruments executed by the deceased person before the divorce. Id. § 123.052. Intestacy laws apply differently depending on whether the deceased person left a surviving spouse. Id. § 201.001-.003. Nontestamentary assets are likewise affected; the Family Code places conditions on the validity of a provision in a life insurance policy issued before a divorce naming the former spouse as a beneficiary. Tex. Fam. Code § 9.301.
Because the parties' community property is not divided in the divorce in this scenario, they may be treated as tenants in common or joint owners of that property for purposes of evaluating the deceased party's estate. See S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428, 440 (Tex. 2022); see also Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970) ("It is well settled that where, as here, a divorce decree fails to provide for a division of community property, the husband and wife become tenants in common or joint owners thereof."). While the Family Code contains an alternative mechanism for obtaining a just and right division of property not divided in the original divorce decree, see Tex. Fam. Code § 9.201, as noted, the need for such a division is mooted when one of the parties dies, as happened here; thus, Section 9.201 is not implicated.
We stated in Dunn v. Dunn that a spouse's death following rendition of a divorce judgment does not moot the case, which may be appealed, because "the property rights of the parties would be significantly affected depending upon whether the marriage was held to have been terminated by divorce decree or by death." 439 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. 1969) (noting that either the living spouse or a representative of the deceased spouse could have attacked the judgment for error under the predecessor to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 7.1(a), which provides that "[i]f a party to a civil case dies after the trial court renders judgment but before the case has been finally disposed of on appeal, the appeal may be perfected, and the appellate court will proceed to adjudicate the appeal as if all parties were alive"). Although the spouse in Dunn died after the trial court had divided the property, our reasoning for rejecting mootness in that case applies equally to the situation before us, where a spouse died after the rendition of divorce but before rendition of the property division.
Further, although divorce and property-division claims are inseverable for some purposes, they are not inseverable for all purposes. In Dawson-Austin v. Austin, we addressed the not-uncommon situation in which the trial court presiding over a divorce proceeding lacks personal jurisdiction over one of the spouses. 968 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1998). The trial court denied the wife's special appearance and signed a final decree, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 321. In this Court, the husband argued in pertinent part that the special appearance was properly denied because it was "well settled in this State that the division of a marital estate is not a claim severable from the rest of a divorce proceeding." Id. at 324. Thus, he contended, the wife's special appearance to an inseverable portion of the proceeding constituted a general appearance. Id.
We rejected that categorical understanding of the so-called "well settled" rule, noting that the cases cited for complete inseverability of a divorce adjudication and division of the marital estate all did so in the context of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 41 (Misjoinder and Non-Joinder of Parties), 174 (Consolidation; Separate Trials), and 320 (Motion [for New Trial] and Action of Court Thereon). Id. In fact, we stated explicitly that "[n]o case holds that claims of divorce and division of property do not involve severable jurisdictional issues." Id.
To the contrary, we explained, "a court [may] have jurisdiction to grant a divorce-an adjudication of parties' status-without having jurisdiction to divide their property-an adjudication of parties' rights." Id. (citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948)); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 6.308(a) ("A court in which a suit for dissolution of a marriage is filed may exercise its jurisdiction over those portions of the suit for which it has authority."). In remanding the case, we instructed the trial court to render judgment divorcing the parties and dismissing all other claims for want of jurisdiction. Dawson-Austin, 968 S.W.2d at 328. Because the claims involved "severable jurisdictional issues," a judgment granting the divorce but not dividing the property was perfectly valid. Id. at 324.
This holding is consistent with the well-settled understanding that divorce proceedings implicate both in rem and in personam jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dosamantes v. Dosamantes, 500 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1973, writ dism'd) ("Divorce actions are not mere in personam actions, but are quasi in rem." (citing Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942))). An action in rem "determin[es] the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of persons generally with respect to that thing." In rem, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); City of Conroe v. San Jacinto River Auth., 602 S.W.3d 444, 458 (Tex. 2020) ("An in rem action affects the interests of all persons in the world in the thing. . . ."). In a divorce proceeding, the "thing" is the marriage, and the trial court adjudicates the status of that marriage.
This case presents a different kind of jurisdictional problem, but in my view, the result is the same. The trial court's pronouncement of divorce should not cease to have legal significance because of the subsequent death of a party. The party's death can and should finalize and sever the judgment of divorce from the mooted remaining issues. As the Court correctly notes, Baker's estate did not go away; it must be distributed to her heirs. Ante at 14 n.33. And when a person's status at their death is divorced, their property should be dispersed in accordance with that status.
II
Divorce proceedings are certainly personal-both in a colloquial and legal sense. Accordingly, the trial court could not divide Baker and Bizzle's marital property pursuant to the Family Code after Baker's death. However, the lack of jurisdiction to divide the marital estate because the claim became moot does not legally or logically invalidate the prior status adjudication of the parties-the trial court had jurisdiction to render the parties divorced and did so. Still, because neither party requested entry of judgment divorcing the parties without a corresponding property division, and neither party requests that we order the trial court to grant such relief, I concur in the Court's judgment.
Justice Young filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Hecht and Justice Blacklock joined.
Justice Young, joined by Chief Justice Hecht and Justice Blacklock, concurring.
Evan A. Young Justice
The Court holds that the trial judge's email to the parties was not a "rendition" of a final judgment because a court "renders" judgment only with a public announcement of the decision, which the email did not do. I agree and join the Court's opinion, as well as Justice Lehrmann's scholarly concurrence. Both opinions correctly, comprehensively, and clearly describe current law.
But I am unsatisfied with the status quo-nobody should be satisfied with it. Our system's tedious distinction among "rendering" judgments, "signing" them, and "entering" them was necessary in early Texas, when judges would travel by horseback to attend court in far-flung locations. The confusion sown by these distinctions today, however, is needless and intolerable. Technology now permits judicial actions to be publicly disseminated with the click of a button and in the flash of an eye. Our law increasingly and wisely requires courts to provide notice this way, including in a statute the legislature adopted in its last regular session. I therefore write separately to suggest that the time has come for proper changes-whether in procedural rules, statutes, or common law- to bring much-needed clarity and efficiency to our system of litigation. Specifically, we should consider banishing from current practice the distinctions among "rendering," "signing," and "entering," and enshrine those distinctions into Texas's storied legal history. This Court could achieve much of that goal through our rule-making authority, but legislative consideration of further statutory amendments would be necessary to truly move beyond our archaic system of judgment-formation.
I
As the Court explains, Texas law distinguishes among the rendition, signing, and entry of a judgment. Ante at 7-8. These three actions currently need not and often do not occur simultaneously. As we observed before the dawn of the current technological era, "[t]he day a judge signs an order is frequently, perhaps usually, after the time the judgment is rendered and surely it is before the judgment is entered." Burrell v. Cornelius, 570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1978).
This triadic system has always had problems, which remain serious. But the system developed for reasons rooted in the historic conceptions of each step's role. Together, they formed a sensible structure, but one that I cannot imagine anyone building from scratch today.
The most important step was rendition, which the law has long understood as the "judicial act of the court in pronouncing the sentence of the law." Henry Campbell Black, A Treatise on the Law of Judgments 113 (1st ed. 1891). Rendition was the main event-the one that enforceably adjusted the rights of the parties. It could be either oral or written. See, e.g., Dunn v. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. 1969).
"The entry of a judgment," by contrast, was (and is) "a ministerial act, which consists in spreading upon the record a statement of the final conclusion reached by the court in the matter." Black, supra, at 113-14; see also Dunn, 439 S.W.2d at 832 ("[T]he entry of a trial judgment is only a ministerial act."). Rendition, therefore, had to go first, and was deemed conceptually and temporally "independent of the fact of its entry" on the record. Black, supra, at 115. The ministerial entry of a rendered judgment was "not essential to the validity of the judgment itself," and the court clerk's failure to enter a judgment "[would] not, as between the parties, operate to invalidate the judgment." Id. at 119.
Signing was different still. As our system developed, the"requirement that a judge shall sign all judgments rendered in his court [was] merely directory." Id. at 118. The signature, in other words, served as a kind of signal that should lead to entry-the signature was merely "the allowance or permission by the master, prothonotary, or other proper officer, to the plaintiff or defendant, to have judgment entered in his favor" by the court clerk. Id. at 117 n.11 (quoting French v. Pease, 10 Kan. 51, 55 (1872)).
But just as the lack of entry itself did not invalidate a judgment as between the parties, neither did the lack of a signature, because the judgment had "force and effect . . . whether it is ever signed by the judge or not." Black, supra, at 119. A signed judgment is not necessary for a judgment to bind the parties, as this Court has held and as lower courts occasionally continue to observe. See, e.g., Dunn, 439 S.W.2d at 832-33; In re Marriage of Martz, No. 09-21-00048-CV, 2022 WL 2251731, at *5 (Tex. App.-Beaumont June 23, 2022, pet. denied) (citing Dunn for the proposition that a rendered judgment finally settles the parties' rights and is not affected by further proceedings). In practice, however, signed judgments are required, because without them, many other steps in the litigation process are impossible. See, e.g., Tex.R.App.P. 26.1 (requiring a party to file a notice of appeal within 30 days after a judgment is signed); Tex.R.App.P. 4.2(c) (requiring judges to sign written orders finding when a party first received notice or acquired actual knowledge that a judgment was signed). Because of the impairment of parties' rights, a court that refuses to sign a judgment may become the proper target of a mandamus proceeding. See, e.g., In re Pete, 607 S.W.3d 481, 483 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, orig. proceeding) (conditionally granting mandamus relief requiring a court to sign a written order on a party's motion because "the act of committing the judgment or order to writing and signing it is a ministerial act").
Historically, therefore, rendition was the central moment. If it was oral, busy courts, or clerks uninformed of the rendition, might fail to provide a subsequent signed judgment or enter the rendition into the record. See, e.g., Bassett v. Mills, 34 S.W. 93, 94 (Tex. 1896) (explaining that a judgment was not entered in the record "by reason of some oversight"); Trotti v. Kinnear, 144 S.W. 326, 329 (Tex. Civ. App.- Galveston 1912, no writ) (explaining that the failure to have the judgment entered on the record "was due to the inadvertence or negligence of the clerk"). Signing or entry could be overlooked-perhaps for years. See, e.g., Burnett v. State, 14 Tex. 455, 456 (1855) (authorizing the court to direct the clerk to enter on the record a judgment that "was actually made at a former term and omitted to be entered by the clerk"). A signed and entered judgment was always desirable, but-and this is what matters for today's purposes, and why I have belabored the point-those steps were not needed or expected at the same time as the court's rendition of judgment.
It may seem as though, even long ago, nothing justified dividing the stages of forming a court's judgment-a trifurcation, one might even say-but the opposite is true. As I see it, the system developed because of its practical benefits. Sometimes, judgments could not be quickly reduced to writing for public consumption, requiring delays between a judgment's rendition and its subsequent entry on the record. Litigants also benefited from the system-they could proceed as if bound by a final judgment without needing to wait for a written order to memorialize it.
The system also allowed judges to decide cases quickly, leaving it to clerks to enter their judgments while the judges traveled to other towns to decide cases. Such a scheme was especially helpful in early Texas, when a small number of judges "handled crowded dockets . . . traveling their multicounty circuits twice a year to hear daunting numbers of cases." James L. Haley, The Texas Supreme Court: A Narrative History, 1836-1986, at 33 (2013). In the days of the Republic, the justices of this Court were the district judges, plus a chief justice. Michael Ariens, Lone Star Law: A Legal History of Texas 201 (2011). Since the Supreme Court could not meet without the presence of a majority of the district judges, id., a system that permitted their quick movement throughout Texas was important.
Historical roots like that one-and many others-illustrate why it often was essential for the key step of rendition to be distinct. But that does not mean that entry of the judgment was ever unimportant. For example, a court's entry of judgment would "furnish an enduring memorial and incontestable evidence of the judgment, and . . . fix its date for purposes of . . . creating a lien." Black, supra, at 119. The entry of judgment, in other words, was historically understood as the effective date of notice to non-parties of the court's judgment.
Having a judgment properly appear in the record was also essential to establish a court's appellate jurisdiction. Regardless of when a judgment was rendered, if it was not entered into the record before a party appealed, courts would dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scott v. Burton, 6 Tex. 322, 322 (1851) (dismissing an appeal from a judgment that was not entered on the record); Simpson v. Bennett, 42 Tex. 241, 241 (1874) (holding that "there [was] no final judgment" because "the record shows no final disposition of this case" and dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction); Mignon v. Brinson, 11 S.W. 903, 904 (Tex. 1889) (dismissing a case for lack of jurisdiction because "an appeal will lie from the judgment entered").
Over time, the date a judgment was signed also grew in importance. Because renditions of judgment were not required to be in writing, they often were not written down for entry into the record, which made it difficult for parties to calculate procedural timelines. For example, an early amendment to Rule 306a directed judges, attorneys, and clerks "to use their efforts to cause all judgments, decisions, and orders . . . to be reduced to writing and signed by the trial judge and the date of signing stated therein," but continued to acknowledge that the "absence of any such showing shall not invalidate any judgment or order." Official Amendments to Texas Rules of Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases, 8 Tex. B.J. 532, 533 (1945). A later amendment to Rule 306a "eliminate[d] the use of the term 'rendition of judgment,'" Rules of Civil Procedure: New Amendments, 43 Tex. B.J. 767, 778 (1980), to make abundantly clear that "[t]he date a judgment or order [was] signed" was what courts must use to "determine the beginning of the periods prescribed by these rules." Id. at 775 (emphasis added).
In part to avoid such problems, our rules of procedure-nearly from their birth-emphasized the date a judgment was signed to "insure [the judgment's] appearance of record," Official Amendments to Texas Rules of Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases, 8 Tex. B.J. 532, 534 (1945) (Rule 306a), and thus "enable the appellant to ascertain more definitely when the time to perfect an appeal begins to run," Tentative Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 8 Tex. B.J. 405, 408 (1945); see also Rogers v. Peeler, 271 S.W.3d 372, 376-77 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. denied) (citing Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b when noting that "[t]he importance of the date the written judgment is signed is to provide certainty in calculating procedural timetables").
And as lawyers well know, today's rules trigger a host of vital deadlines or consequences based not on when judges render a judgment but when they sign it (or, sometimes, when that judgment is entered). See, e.g., Tex.R.App.P. 26.1 (making notice of appeal due within 30 days after a judgment is signed); Tex.R.Civ.P. 510.8(b) (requiring justice courts, in judgments for a plaintiff in an eviction case, to render judgment "for possession of the premises, costs, delinquent rent as of the date of entry of judgment, if any, and attorney fees if recoverable by law").
Our law has also consciously reduced its emphasis on rendition of judgment to limit undesirable ambiguity. When parties get a rendition unaccompanied by other indicia of a judgment, they often have more questions than answers. Appearances can be deceiving. To be a binding rendition of judgment, for example, the oral pronouncement must "dispose[] of all issues between the two parties." State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 789 (Tex. 2015). Otherwise, it is not a rendition at all- what seems like it would bind the parties in fact will not. And, as today's case reflects, a purported rendition of judgment will not qualify as a rendition if it is not publicly announced. See Garza v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 89 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002) ("[A] judgment is rendered when the decision is officially announced orally in open court, by memorandum filed with the clerk, or otherwise announced publicly."). Likewise, to count as a rendition, the trial court must "indicate[] its intent to render immediate judgment," and do so with clarity. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d at 789 (emphasis added). So if the court's pronouncement, even if public, does not "clearly indicate that [it] intended to render judgment," it simply fails to be a rendition of judgment that binds the parties. S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1995) (emphasis added).
Parties can hardly be faulted for worrying about whether something that looks like a rendition is clear enough, or public enough, or complete enough, to be a rendition. They should worry about it, because when a court defectively renders judgment, it can leave the parties in limbo, or worse. For example, if a court (for any of the reasons listed above, or more) defectively renders judgment declaring the parties divorced, the parties cannot know whether they are actually divorced. The same is true, of course, for other steps. When a court fails to sign a judgment or appealable order-or signs one without the parties knowing about it, see, e.g., In re Whataburger Rest., 645 S.W.3d. 188, 192-93 (Tex. 2022)-it may inject risk and uncertainty when parties attempt to calculate and abide by the relevant timelines for post-judgment motions and the filing of appeals.
In so many ways, therefore, our State's archaic system of judgment formation can create serious problems. The problems transcend substantive ambiguity ("am I divorced, or not?") because a defect in one step or another can pose jurisdictional consequences, as in Whataburger. See id. at 193-94 (mandamus relief required where appellate jurisdiction was not timely invoked due to the failure to notify parties of signed order). Circumstances like these can leave parties (and courts) to question whether a court even has jurisdiction to decide their case at all. See, e.g., Garza, 89 S.W.3d at 2 (classifying the appeal as interlocutory and "dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction" because "the district court . . . never signed a judgment affirming the [challenged] administrative decision").
Problems like these waste the appellate courts' judicial resources, expand costs to the parties by thousands of dollars, prolong litigation by months or years, and potentially deprive citizens of their appellate rights altogether. Such a problem attributable to our system of judgment formation always presents a great and terrible irony-after all, in early Texas, the division of judgments facilitated efficient justice. Imagine, for example, if the law would not resolve even simple disputes for parties in remote areas until they waited for the judge to travel back to the city, issue written orders, give them to the clerk, and then send notification that all of this had happened-with the parties bound only then. What was meant for good can, as circumstances evolve, turn out for ill.
II
Our divided system of judgment formation can do real harm, in other words. The question for today is whether the triad still provides enough value to compensate for the harm. I doubt it. True, binding parties at the moment of rendition without requiring a simultaneous written order still has its benefits, especially where reducing a complex judgment to writing may take time. But this step usually can be handled expeditiously, and I doubt that the crutch of differentiating among "rendering," "signing," and "entering" a judgment is truly indispensable in any case. The one we decide today is one of many in which the current system engenders more confusion than clarity.
Nor is my observation today particularly novel. In 1976, when electronic filing or video conferencing were science fiction at best, Justice Reavley remarked for the Court that "[t]he opportunities for error and confusion may be minimized if judgments will be rendered only in writing and signed by the trial judge after careful examination." Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tex. 1976). In other words, our judicial system should take every opportunity to extirpate rather than fertilize confusion.
Forty-eight years later, previously unimaginable information technology has created new opportunities for fostering clarity. Courts can simultaneously render, sign, and enter judgments on the record. Doing so electronically guarantees that it is done publicly. Given these new abilities, there is no excuse for not eliminating the "error and confusion," id., that inhere in our current system. The judiciary and the legislature should consider taking up Justice Reavley's challenge. Better late than later yet.
Had we done so already, problems like the one we resolve today would not arise in the first place. Fixing the problem, however, is not something that can be done in a contested case like this one that generates a judicial opinion. "[W]e do not exercise our rulemaking authority via judicial opinion." In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 351 (Tex. 1998). Instead, it will likely require a variety of revisions to the law governing Texas courts, both in our rules and in various statutes. As I noted above, many current rules and statutes are tied to a court's taking one action or another. Some are of extreme importance, others are relatively mundane, but all of them would be better if we had a single moment of general applicability: the moment at which a court's decision is electronically added to the public docket. We can address some of this in our administrative capacity after consultation with the Supreme Court Advisory Committee, including the participation of other interested parties. And the legislature can do so after consideration in its normal process, which would, of course, allow it to either make a wholesale reform or to do so in stages, if it chooses to act at all.
So many of the difficult cases arise in the family-law context because the Family Code contains many provisions that rely on this distinction. See, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011 (requiring courts to render a final order within 90 days after the commencement of a suit affecting parent-child relationships); id. § 101.026 (defining "render" as "the pronouncement by a judge of the court's ruling on a matter" and providing that a court may render judgment by, among other things, a notation "on the court's docket sheet or by a separate written instrument"); id. § 85.041 (requiring courts that have rendered protective orders to give "to the respondent a copy of the order, reduced to writing and signed by the judge or master").
See, e.g., Tex.R.Civ.P. 306a(1) (providing that the court's plenary power and the deadline for parties to file post-judgment motions stems from the date the judgment was signed); Tex.R.App.P. 35.1 (requiring parties to file an appellate record within 60 days after a judgment is signed); Tex.R.Civ.P. 150 (providing that in cases where a judgment has been rendered, the suit may proceed to judgment if the cause of action survives a party's death).
See, e.g., Tex.R.App.P. 24.2(a)(2)(b) (providing that, in cases where a judgment is for recovery of an interest in personal property, a judgment debtor must post a bond that is more than the value of the property interest on the date when the court rendered judgment); Tex.R.Civ.P. 90 (requiring parties in nonjury cases to specifically point out pleading defects in writing before the judgment is signed); Tex. Water Code § 55.509 (detailing how courts render judgments in validation suits and providing that the judgment has res judicata effect only when entered); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.013 (providing that writs of error, when available, may be taken at any time within six months after a final judgment is rendered).
Various other statutes may bear reexamining in light of the systemic changes that I suggest today. Here are just a few possibilities: Tex. Gov't Code § 72.157 (requiring the clerk of the court to "enter" a copy of a protective order into the registry no later than 24 hours after the court "issues" the order); Tex. Lab. Code § 102.075 (requiring parties to appeal a judgment entered pursuant to an arbitration board decision within ten days of when the district court entered its judgment); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.01 (defining a "judgment" as "the written declaration of the court signed by the trial judge and entered of record showing the conviction or acquittal of the defendant").
Similar changes-or at least complementary changes-to what I suggest today have recently been made. In its most recent legislative session, the legislature passed and Governor Abbott signed a bill that requires trial and appellate courts to "deliver through the electronic filing system . . . to all parties in each case in which the use of the electronic filing system is required or authorized all court orders the court enters for the case." Act of May 29, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 861, § 18.003, § 80.002 (codified at Tex. Gov't Code § 80.002(b)). This Court recently enacted amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure to implement the legislative mandate. Order of September 8, 2023, Misc. Docket No. 23-9071 (modifying Tex.R.Civ.P. 21, 165a, 246, 298, 299, 299a, and 306a; Tex.R.App.P. 9.2; and Rule 2.7 of the Statewide Rules Governing Electronic Filing in Criminal Cases).
The new statute and new rules reflect an effort to create a legal culture of clarity and notice. This Court has long reiterated and enforced the overriding value of clarity to ensure that litigation proceeds on its merits without substantial rights being forfeited through procedural irregularity. For example, we granted conditional mandamus relief in Whataburger "because the clerk's failure to give notice of the trial court's order" prevented the exercise of relator's right to appeal. 645 S.W.3d at 194. The need for that relief arose because the trial judge signed something, which started a clock-but because nobody knew it, the clock ran out before the aggrieved party could act. The new statute and rules should eliminate this sort of trap. Our system would be better and clearer if the rules were triggered only when the order is in fact electronically filed. Put another way, the delivery of the orders should be the single point of their effectiveness, replacing the existing, antiquated medley.
***
Our divided system of rendering, signing, and entering judgments creates far more problems than it solves-and needlessly. In today's technological era, we should no longer tolerate this confusing, error-inducing, and cost-imposing system. When the rules impose requirements tethered to rendition, signing, or entering, we should instead key those requirements to the electronic filing of an order. When statutes impose such requirements, the legislature could make the needed changes. I encourage not just the three branches of our state government but all relevant stakeholders to consider how our system can be improved along these lines to more effectively administer justice on behalf of the People of Texas.