Opinion
Civil No: 4:CV-05-00281.
May 27, 2005
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On February 8, 2005, the plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, commenced this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action by filing a complaint.
The plaintiff names as defendants the following individuals: 1) Jeffery A. Beard, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; 2) Donald Kelchner, the Superintendent at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (SCI-Camp Hill); 3) A. Newton, a psychiatrist who provides treatment to prisoners at SCI-Camp Hill; 4) Robert Marsh, Jr., a psychologist at SCI-Camp Hill; 5) Blaine Steigerwalt, the Unit Manager of the Special Management Unit (SMU) at SCI-Camp Hill; 6) Richard Southers, a counselor on the SMU at SCI-Camp Hill; 7) K.D. Kyler, the Superintendent at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (SCI-Huntingdon); 8) Frederick Wawrose, a physician at SCI-Huntingdon; 9) J.L. Grace, a deputy at SCI-Huntingdon; 10) A.S. Williamson, a deputy at SCI-Huntingdon; and 11) R.M. Lawler, an official at SCI-Huntingdon.
The plaintiff also named the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole as a defendant. By an Order dated March 31, 2005, the plaintiff's claim against the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole was dismissed.
The plaintiff claims that the defendants conspired against him by placing him in the SMU in retaliation for his filing of grievances and official complaints.
The plaintiff alleges that he has not received psychological or psychiatric treatment in the SMU, that prescribed medications were stopped upon his placement in the SMU and that his requests for treatment and reinstatement of his medications have been denied. He claims that the defendants have acted and are acting with deliberate indifference to his serious mental health needs, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
The plaintiff complains about the conditions in the SMU. He alleges that the conditions in the SMU are more restrictive than the restrictions in the Restricted Housing Unit from which he was transferred. He alleges that in the SMU cell lights are on twenty-four hours a day; that he can not control the temperature in his cell; that there are no surveillance cameras in the unit; that there is no access to telephones; that SMU inmates may not purchase cosmetics from the commissary; that he has been denied yard and showers for more than six months at a time; that there are six-month periods when the barber will not cut inmates' hair; that outgoing mail is picked up only once a day five days a week and the number of letters permitted to be sent out is limited to 30 per month; that sewage is often flooded onto the tier and inside cells but inmates do not receive cleaning supplies; that inmates are threatened with misconducts for talking to other inmates; that there is excessive banging and loud noise all night; that corrections officers handle food without regard to cleanliness; and that officers smoke cigarettes inside the SMU thus exposing inmates to the risk of cancer. The plaintiff characterizes the conditions in the SMU as atypical and significant hardships. He alleges that the procedures for SMU placement denied him due process.
The plaintiff also alleges that there are no prescriptive programs available to SMU inmates, that parole is automatically denied when prescriptive programs are not completed, that prison officials do not recommend parole for any SMU inmate, and that the Board of Probation and Parole does not consider SMU inmates for parole. He claims that the he was not considered for parole at the expiration of his minimum sentence in violation of his due process rights.
The plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages and other appropriate relief as ordered by the court.
He seeks an order for his psychiatric evaluation and treatment and to have his parole application considered by the Parole Board.
He seeks an order granting him relief from SMU placement.
On February 8, 2005, the plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, a motion for a preliminary injunction, and a brief in support of his motion for a preliminary injunction. He seeks an order that directs that he be removed from the SMU to a unit where immediate mental health evaluation and appropriate treatment can be administered. By an Order dated March 1, 2005, the plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted, the Clerk of Court was directed to serve the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction on the defendants and the defendants were ordered to file a brief in opposition to the plaintiff's motion within twenty days after they are served with the summons and complaint or, if they waive service of the summons and complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d), within sixty days after the date on which the request for waiver of service was sent.
On April 26, 2005, defendant Newton filed a response to the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendant Newton states that he is a private practitioner who provides psychiatric care and treatment to inmates at SCI-Camp Hill and that he is neither an official nor employee of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections or of SCI-Camp Hill. He states that he takes no position on the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.
On April 28, 2005, the defendants other than defendant Newton (hereinafter the corrections defendants) filed a brief in opposition to the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. On May 10, 2005, the plaintiff filed a reply brief in support of his motion for a preliminary injunction.
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits of the litigation and (2) that the movant will be irreparably injured pendente lite if relief is not granted. Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980). "Moreover, while the burden rests upon the moving party to make these two requisite showings, the district court 'should take into account, when they are relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest.'" Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 652 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Delaware River Port Auth v. Transamerican Trailer Transp., Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 920 (3d Cir. 1974)). The determination of whether a preliminary injunction should be issued depends on a balancing of these factors. Punnett, supra, 621 F.2d at 582. "Furthermore, when the preliminary injunction is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy." Id.
The plaintiff contends that for more than nineteen months the defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his mental health needs by confining him in the SMU at SCI-Camp Hill. The plaintiff asserts that he has been diagnosed with schizotypal personality disorder, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. He asserts that he has been prescribed numerous psychotropic medications including Buspar, Risperidal, Paxil, Librium, Ativan, and Depekene. He asserts that he suffers from extreme mood swings. He states that at times he has extreme episodes of anxiety which cause uncontrollable fidgeting, spontaneous loud outbursts of profanity, seemingly endless pacing and pains in the back and feet from constantly moving around, teeth grinding, erratic hyperventilation, compulsive scratching and small sores from scratching, violent thoughts, uncontrollable weeping and burning eyes, painful constipation, auditory hallucination, and periods without sleep lasting as long as four days. He states that at times he suffers from severe depression which causes him to sleep as much as twenty hours a day, a lack of desire to clean himself or his cell, weeping, loss of appetite, achy bones, dreams about death and thoughts of dying, lack of interest in incoming mail, bed wetting, weeks of silence, hair pulling, migraine headaches, laziness, nightmares and a feeling of complete hopelessness. He asserts that he is at risk of suicide or self-mutilation. He asserts that after his transfer to the SMU on July 9, 2003 his psychotropic medications were stopped and that he has not received any psychiatric evaluation or treatment while in the SMU. The plaintiff also asserts that the conditions in the SMU violate his constitution rights, that he was denied due process in connection with his placement in the SMU, and that he has been automatically denied parole as result of his confinement in the SMU. The plaintiff is seeking an order directing the defendants to remove him from the SMU to a unit where an immediate mental health evaluation and appropriate treatment can be administered.
The corrections defendants contend in their brief in opposition to the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction that it is unlikely that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim because he would not succeed in establishing that the defendants were deliberately indifferent. The defendants contend that the record is devoid of any indication that the defendants knew that their conduct presented a substantial risk of harm to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, however, contends that the defendants were aware of the plaintiff's mental health diagnosis and that since his placement in the SMU they have failed to provide him with an evaluation or treatment. For purposes of an application for injunctive relief, we think that the defendants focus upon past knowledge of the prisoner's circumstances is not so germane as whether the conditions of confinement and treatment do in fact constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
The corrections defendants also contend that the plaintiff has been provided with some mental health treatment and therefore he would be unable to prove that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. However, the mental health treatment cited by the corrections defendants relate to the period prior to the plaintiff's placement in the SMU. The plaintiff claims that since his placement in the SMU he has not received any mental health treatment.
We do not find that it is likely that the plaintiff will succeed at trial in proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants have been or are deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need of the plaintiff. We do not find there to be a need for a hearing.
The defendants ask the court to take notice of the plaintiff's testimony and general appearance in the jury trial in Baker v. Mirabella, 4:03-CV-01463, where the undersigned presided and where the jury found in the defendant's favor. We decline to attempt to draw any inference from that trial in addressing the current motion, or to draw any inference as to likelihood of success on the merits from the predominance of defense verdicts in the many prisoner conditions of confinement and deliberate indifference claims over which this court has presided.
We conclude that the plaintiff does not have a reasonable probability of success on the merits of his claims and that the plaintiff will not be irreparably injured if a preliminary injunction is not issued. Accordingly, it is recommended that the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction be denied.