302 Ill. 511, 514.) See also Pierotti v. Pierotti (1951), 343 Ill. App. 116, 98 N.E.2d 875 (both had remarried and petitioner estopped); McDonald v. Neale (1962), 35 Ill. App.2d 140, 182 N.E.2d 366, cert. denied (1963), 372 U.S. 911, 9 L.Ed.2d 719, 83 S.Ct. 725 (petitioner alone remarried and was estopped); Henley v. Houck (1964), 49 Ill. App.2d 472, 200 N.E.2d 99 (petitioner alone remarried and was estopped); Varap v. Varap (1966), 76 Ill. App.2d 402, 222 N.E.2d 77 (petitioner estopped from attacking his first divorce decree because of his subsequent remarriage to respondent); Webb v. Webb (1970), 130 Ill. App.2d 618, 620-21, 264 N.E.2d 594 (petitioner alone remarried and "[t]he rule that a person who has accepted the benefits of a divorce decree should not be permitted to attack the same, is a rule of estoppel * * *"); Baker v. Baker (1971), 2 Ill. App.3d 795, 276 N.E.2d 792 (petitioner alone remarried and, having accepted benefits of decree, was estopped); Martin v. Martin (1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 486, 373 N.E.2d 602 (both parties remarried and petitioner estopped); In re Marriage of Gryka (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 443, 413 N.E.2d 153 (husband remarried and estopped from challenging decree). • 1 A careful reading of the cases estopping the petitioner from assailing the decree when the petitioner alone has remarried, or when the petitioner alone has accepted other benefits under the decree, or both, leads this court to conclude that, even though the cases speak in terms of estoppel, they are in fact using the term in its more general sense, meaning to stop or bar one from raising a challenge.

Petitioner, however, denies the presence of any fraudulent representations and contends that her ex-husband was estopped by his subsequent remarriage from seeking to vacate the judgment. (See Baker v. Baker, 2 Ill. App.3d 795, 276 N.E.2d 792 (1971).) Mr. Held responds that he was not attempting to vacate the entire judgment but was merely asking the court to vacate some of its provisions and allow for various modifications upon rehearing. He claims that his remarriage does not estop him from seeking to modify a judgment for dissolution of marriage.

Defendant appellee has stood on her brief filed in the trial court and made a part of the record. The plaintiff cites Baker v. Baker, 2 Ill. App.3d 795, 276 N.E.2d 793; Scase v. Johnson, 130 Ill. App. 35; Boylan v. Boylan, 349 Ill. 471, 182 N.E. 614; Pierotti v. Pierotti, 343 Ill. App. 116, 98 N.E.2d 875; McDonald v. Neale, 35 Ill. App.2d 140, 182 N.E.2d 366; Webb v. Webb, 130 Ill. App.2d 618, 264 N.E.2d 594, in support of his first assertion. There are numerous bases on which these cases can be distinguished, but they are principally distinguished by the fact that in each of them the court had jurisdiction over the parties at the time of granting the divorce which was attacked in the subsequent proceeding. Mrs. Forest did remarry but only after several attorneys informed her that she could not be helped.