Opinion
Civil Action No. 5:01-CV-315-C
April 11, 2002
ORDER
On this day the Court considered Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Failure to State a Claim, or in the Alternative, in part, for a Rule 7 Order, filed January 30, 2002. Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, in part, for a Rule 7 Order on February 19, 2002. Defendants' Reply to Response and Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for a Rule 7 Order was filed on March 6, 2002. After considering all relevant arguments and evidence, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Baker Farms, Inc., Plaintiff, is a Texas corporation engaged in farm and livestock operations. Defendants, Jeoffrey [sic] Hulse, Ronny Gallagher, and Andrew Sansom, are residents of the State of Texas Defendants are employees of the State of Texas' Parks and Wildlife Department. Plaintiff operates 188 acres of leased land in Floyd County, Texas. The land leased by Plaintiff is divided into north and south tracts by a railway roadbed that was formerly owned by Burlington Northern Railroad Company. On or about December 15, 1992, Defendant Andrew Sansom, Executive Director, on behalf of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, accepted an Offer to Purchase the railway roadway. The State of Texas is the title holder of interest to the railway roadway. The railway roadbed was subsequently converted by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department ("TPWD") into the Caprock Canyon State Park and Trailway (hereinafter referred to as "Trailway"). The Trailway now serves as a public recreational facility. Plaintiff claims to have a property interest in appurtenant easement to a water well and crossway located on the Trailway. Plaintiff contends that his predecessor in interest in the land had established appurtenant prescriptive easements to the water well and crossway.
Plaintiff contends that the purchase of the Trailway by TPWD was by quitclaim title and expressly made subject to "all existing interest, including but not limited to all reservations, rights-of-way, easements of record or otherwise." Plaintiff asserts that he owns easements in the water well and crossway that were not of record but which were transferred with the land as appurtenant prescriptive easements. Plaintiff claims the water well was drilled on the Trailway by Plaintiff's predecessor in interest on or about February 8, 1964. Plaintiff further contends that a prescriptive easement to the water well was established in accordance with all prescriptive easement requirements.
On or about December 5, 2000, Plaintiff notified Defendant Jeoffrey [sic] Hulse, Park Manager of the Caprock Canyons State Park and Trailway, of Plaintiffs intent to place livestock on Plaintiff's leased property for grazing. Additionally, Plaintiff notified Defendant Hulse of Plaintiffs intent to access Plaintiffs alleged water well easement. Defendants dispute the existence of Plaintiffs alleged easement. On or about December 7, 2000, Plaintiff sought to lay new electric line to the well. Defendants Jeoffrey Hulse and Ronny Gallagher, along with two unnamed officers, did not allow Plaintiff to lay new electric line to the well. Plaintiff claims this denial to lay electric line to the water well constituted a deprivation of Plaintiffs property interest in the alleged water well easement without due process of law.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants Hulse and Gallagher threatened Plaintiff in stating that Plaintiff did not have authorization to enter upon the Trailway and that any excavation was prohibited and that, if Plaintiff failed to comply, TPWD would take appropriate legal action. Defendants admit Plaintiff is entitled to enter onto the Trailway. However, Defendants contend Plaintiffs light to enter onto the Trailway is due to the Trailway being a public throughway and not due to an easement as claimed by Plaintiff.
On or about December 12, 2000, Plaintiff requested from Defendant Andrew Sansom, as Executive Director of TPWD, "any rational basis for this misappropriation of private property without notice and without an opportunity to be heard." Defendant Sansom, answering Plaintiffs request, asserted that the TPWD disputes the existence of Plaintiffs alleged easement. In an effort to settle this dispute, the TPWD has offered for Plaintiff to license access to the water well from TPWD in return for a water trough that may be used by visitors to the Trailway.
Plaintiff asserts that, as a result of the alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs property interest by the Defendants, Plaintiff was forced to haul in water for Plaintiffs livestock. Additionally, Plaintiff has incurred expenses in drilling a new water well located on Plaintiffs leased property. Plaintiff prays for injunctive relief against Defendants, prohibiting them from further interference with or deprivation of Plaintiff's alleged property interest in the water well and crossway easements. Additionally, Plaintiff prays to recover costs incurred by Plaintiff in installing an alternative water well and punitive damages against Defendants Jeoffrey [sic] Hulse and Ronny Gallagher of $25,000.00 each and $50,000.00 against Andrew Sansom. Punitive damages are sought against each Defendant in his individual capacity for allegedly violating Plaintiffs constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff further prays for other costs and reasonable attorney fees.
II. STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(1) Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996).
The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction McDaniel v. United States, 899 F. Supp. 305, 307 (E.D. Tex. 1995). Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980).
When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits. Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). This requirement prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice. Id. The court's dismissal of a plaintiffs case because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is not a determination on the merits and does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have proper jurisdiction. Id.
In examining a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the district court is empowered to consider matters of fact which may be in dispute. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (1981). Ultimately, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998).
III. DISCUSSION
"The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if `the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be `to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'" Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). Defendants dispute Plaintiffs claims to ownership of appurtenant easements in a water well and crossway on State property. Additionally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the real party in interest, the State of Texas. Defendants contend that the State of Texas is an indispensable party to this suit because the State of Texas holds title to the property on which the alleged easements exist. Defendants assert it is necessary to try the State of Texas' title in the Trailway in order for Plaintiff to obtain relief. Plaintiff contends this suit is not to try the State of Texas' title in the Trialway, but rather, the suit is to enforce Plaintiffs right to access Plaintiffs alleged appurtenant easements on State property.
Contrary to Plaintiffs assertion that this Court must take Plaintiffs claims as true, when determining whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Court may find it lacks subject matter jurisdiction by the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the Court's resolution of disputed facts. Barrera-Moniegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996). The underlying dispute in this case is whether Plaintiff owns easement rights to the water well and crossway on the Trailway. If no easements exist, Plaintiff lacks any property interest of which Defendants could have deprived Plaintiff a determination that Plaintiff in fact has valid easements to the water well and crossway would restrict the State of Texas' interest in the Trailway, thus expending itself on the public domain.
A federal court does not have the power to adjudicate the State's interest in property without the State's consent. Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 682 (1982). As in Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Laney, where the court found the State of Texas was the true party of interest, although not expressly named as a defendant, this Court finds that the State of Texas is the true party of interest. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Laney, 199 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1131 (2000). The instant suit involves property interests of the State of Texas. The State of Texas holds record title to the Trailway and operates the property as a public recreational facility. The State of Texas is neither a party to this suit, nor has the State of Texas consented to be sued in this Court. Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to State sovereignty protection of the 11th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons previously discussed, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is GRANTED. The above-styled and -numbered cause is dismissed without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.