Bakeman v. Sears, Roebuck Co.

21 Citing cases

  1. McCann v. Bethesda Hospital

    80 Ill. App. 3d 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 52 times
    Relying on affidavit of licensed architect, who surveyed the parking lot in question, to find the parking lot's incline excessive and therefore dangerous

    Killeen v. Dunteman Co. (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 473, 397 N.E.2d 436; Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Poths (1968), 104 Ill. App.2d 80, 243 N.E.2d 40. • 2 A landowner is under a duty to an invitee to exercise ordinary care in the use and maintenance of his property ( Dunlop v. Marshall Field Co. (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 628, 327 N.E.2d 16), but a landowner has no duty and is consequently not liable for injuries sustained as a result of the presence of naturally accumulated snow or ice. ( Riccitelli v. Sternfeld (1953), 1 Ill.2d 133, 115 N.E.2d 288; Bakeman v. Sears, Roebuck Co. (1974), 16 Ill. App.3d 1065, 307 N.E.2d 449; DeMario v. Sears Roebuck Co. (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 46, 284 N.E.2d 330.) Liability is imposed, however, where a plaintiff shows that an injury occurred as the result of snow or ice "produced or accumulated by artificial causes or in an unnatural way or by defendant's own use of the area concerned and creation of the condition * * *."

  2. Bansch v. Donnelly

    77 Ill. App. 3d 922 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 8 times
    In Bansch v. Donnelly, 77 Ill. App.3d 922, 396 N.E.2d 869 (1979), the court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict even though it had been established that water would drip from the defendants' building overhang and freeze into patches of ice. Noting that four days of above-freezing weather had elapsed since the last rain before the accident, the Bansch court expressly relied on the lack of notice to reject the plaintiff's claim.

    The patch of ice was located 12 to 18 inches further from the front of the store than the furthest point of the facade. • 1, 2 The law governing determinations of liability in situations as this is well stated in Bakeman v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. (1974), 16 Ill. App.3d 1065, 1068-69, 307 N.E.2d 449, 452: "Generally no liability is incurred for injuries resulting from a fall on snow or ice which has accumulated as a consequence of natural causes where the accumulation or condition is not aggravated by the owner.

  3. Quinlivan v. a P

    395 Mich. 244 (Mich. 1975)   Cited 99 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Adopting the view of an out-of-state case that found § 343 " ‘controlling’ " and calling the Restatement a "helpful exposition"

    See, e.g., cases discussed in 38 ALR3d 10, § 7, pp 36 et seq. Compare Crawford v Soennischsen, 175 Neb. 87; 120 N.W.2d 578 (1963); Bakeman v Sears Roebuck Co, 16 Ill. App.3d 1065; 307 N.E.2d 449 (1974); Ferguson v J Bacon Sons, 406 S.W.2d 851 (Ky App, 1966); Uhl v Abrahams, 160 Mont. 426; 503 P.2d 26 (1972), and Watts v Holmes, 386 P.2d 718 (Wyo, 1963), inter alia, cases approving the natural accumulation rule, and Palmer Park Gardens, Inc, v Potter, 162 Colo. 178; 425 P.2d 268 (1967); Merkel v Safeway Stores, Inc, 77 N.J. Super. 535; 187 A.2d 52 (1962); Kremer v Carr's Food Center, 462 P.2d 747 (Alas, 1969); and Isaacson v Husson College, 297 A.2d 98 (Me, 1972), inter alia, recognizing a broader duty owed an invitee respecting natural accumulations of ice and snow. The same standard of care is owed by the landlord to the tenant and his invitees as is owed by the proprietor and landowner to the business invitee.

  4. Smalling v. LaSalle Nat'l Bk. of Chicago

    433 N.E.2d 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 18 times

    • 1 We first note that although several jurisdictions have imposed a more stringent duty on owners or occupiers of land with regard to the removal of natural accumulations of ice and snow (see Dawson v. Payless For Drugs (1967), 248 Or. 334, 433 P.2d 1019; Quinlivan v. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co. (1975), 395 Mich. 244, 235 N.W.2d 732; Kremer v. Carr's Food Center, Inc. (Alas. 1969), 462 P.2d 747; King Soopers, Inc. v. Mitchell (1959), 140 Colo. 119, 342 P.2d 1006), the law in Illinois is well established that a landowner has no duty to remove or take other precautions against the dangers inherent in natural accumulations of snow and ice. See Riccitelli v. Sternfeld (1953), 1 Ill.2d 133, 115 N.E.2d 288; Hankla v. Burger Chef Systems (1981), 93 Ill. App.3d 909, 418 N.E.2d 35; Erasmus v. Chicago Housing Authority (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 142, 407 N.E.2d 1031; McCann v. Bethesda Hospital (1979), 80 Ill. App.3d 544, 400 N.E.2d 16; Bakeman v. Sears, Roebuck Co. (1974), 16 Ill. App.3d 1065, 307 N.E.2d 449; Greenwood v. Leu (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 11, 302 N.E.2d 359; Newcomm v. Jul (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 918, 273 N.E.2d 699; DeMario v. Sears Roebuck Co. (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 46, 284 N.E.2d 330; Byrne v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago (1971), 131 Ill. App.2d 356, 266 N.E.2d 708; Fitzsimons v. National Tea Co. (1961), 29 Ill. App.2d 306, 173 N.E.2d 534. Liability will be imposed, however, where the injury occurred as a result of snow and ice which is produced or accumulated by an artificial cause or in an unnatural way or by defendant's own use of the area concerned and creation of the condition.

  5. Lansing v. County of McLean

    372 N.E.2d 822 (Ill. 1978)   Cited 30 times
    Recognizing that section 3-105 codifies the natural accumulation rule

    The nature of the legal position occupied by a local public entity is also shown by the fact that private individuals are free from a duty to remove the natural accumulation of snow and ice on their own property. See Bakeman v. Sears, Roebuck Co. (1974), 16 Ill. App.3d 1065; Foster v. George J. Cyrus Co. (1971), 2 Ill. App.3d 274; Anderson v. Davis Development Corp. (1968), 99 Ill. App.2d 55; Annot., Liability For Injuries From Ice OrSnow On Residential Premises, 54 A.L.R.3d 558 (1973); Prosser, Torts sec. 131, at 982 (4th ed. 1971). The significance of the similarity in the position of a government entity and a private individual is underscored by section 2-110 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 85, par. 2-110), which provides:

  6. Stackhouse v. Royce Realty & Mgmt. Corp.

    2012 Ill. App. 2d 110602 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 12 times
    In Stackhouse, after the jury returned its verdict, the defendants orally moved for judgment n.o.v. The circuit court denied the motion.

    ¶ 29 We also find that Burns is factually distinguishable from the instant case because the danger in Burns—exposed tree roots—was open and obvious. Indeed, in determining that the defendant landowner did not owe the plaintiff any duty, the Burns court relied on several cases that involved open and obvious dangers. Burns, 161 Ill.App.3d at 130, 112 Ill.Dec. 672, 514 N.E.2d 68 (citing Warchol, 75 Ill.App.3d at 297, 30 Ill.Dec. 689, 393 N.E.2d 725 (involving exposed tree roots), Lohan v. Walgreens Co., 140 Ill.App.3d 171, 173, 94 Ill.Dec. 680, 488 N.E.2d 679 (1986) (natural accumulation of snow and ice), and Bakeman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 16 Ill.App.3d 1065, 1068, 307 N.E.2d 449 (1974) (same)). The Burns court further specifically distinguished the issue therein from those cases that involved hidden dangers.

  7. Tzakis v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc.

    356 Ill. App. 3d 740 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 45 times
    Holding that placement of salt on snow not negligent

    A plaintiff need not prove his or her case at a summary judgment hearing but must present facts to show the origin of the ice was unnatural or caused by the defendant. Gilberg v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d 554, 558 (1984), citing Technical Representatives, Inc. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 107 Ill. App. 3d 830, 833 (1982), and Bakeman v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 16 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1070 (1974). "In an action for negligence, the plaintiff must set forth sufficient facts to establish a duty owed by defendants to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty and an injury proximately caused by the breach."

  8. Branson v. R L Investment, Inc.

    196 Ill. App. 3d 1088 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that since there was no evidence that the means of ingress and egress was unsafe for any reason other than a natural accumulation of water, there was no triable issue of fact

    • 8 While a plaintiff in a slip-and-fall case need not prove his case at the summary judgment hearing, in order to defeat the defendant's motion, the plaintiff must affirmatively show that the origin of the water was unnatural or caused by defendant. ( Shoemaker v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center (1989), 187 Ill. App.3d 1040, 543 N.E.2d 1014; Lohan v. Walgreens Co. (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 171, 488 N.E.2d 679; Bakeman v. Sears, Roebuck Co. (1974), 16 Ill. App.3d 1065, 1070, 307 N.E.2d 449; Byrne v. Catholic Bishop (1971), 131 Ill. App.2d 356, 266 N.E.2d 708.) A finding of an unnatural or aggravated natural condition must be based upon an identifiable cause of the water accumulation. ( Lapidus v. Hahn (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 795, 450 N.E.2d 824 (leaky roof); McCann v. Bethesda Hospital (1979), 80 Ill. App.3d 544, 400 N.E.2d 16 (sloping parking lot); Stroyeck, 26 Ill. App.2d 76, 167 N.E.2d 689 (improper sidewalk construction).) Mere speculation or conjecture is not sufficient to establish liability.

  9. Weldon v. Hawkins

    183 Ill. App. 3d 525 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 6 times
    Explaining different standard for bench trials

    Our review of case law indicates that the burden is on plaintiff to show that the area of the premises containing the weeds was not in a natural condition at the time of the accident. (See Lohan v. Walgreens Co. (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 171, 488 N.E.2d 679; McCann v. Bethesda Hospital (1979), 80 Ill. App.3d 544, 400 N.E.2d 16; Bakeman v. Sears, Roebuck Co. (1974), 16 Ill. App.3d 1065, 307 N.E.2d 449.) In the instant case, therefore, plaintiff should have been allowed to present evidence regarding whether the land containing the weeds was in an unnatural condition.

  10. Eichler v. Plitt Theatres, Inc.

    167 Ill. App. 3d 685 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that section 324A applied to impose a duty on theater toward persons coming onto adjacent parking lot where owner of lot relied on theater to remove snow and ice from parking lot

    • 1 The general rule, which plaintiffs do not dispute, is that there is no duty to remove natural accumulations of snow and ice. Galivan v. Lincolnshire Inn (1986), 147 Ill. App.3d 228, 229; Bakeman v. Sears, Roebuck Co. (1974), 16 Ill. App.3d 1065, 1068. Plaintiffs, however, contend that while there is no common law duty to remove snow and ice, such a duty existed in the present case because defendants entered into a contract in which they undertook the obligation of removing snow and ice.