On appeal, we conclude that the district court erred in its application of the law on this point. ¶17 In Bakanowski v. Bakanowski , 2003 UT App 357, 80 P.3d 153, we indicated that "while the recipient spouse's need to fund post-divorce savings, investment, or retirement accounts may not ordinarily be factored into an alimony determination, we cannot say that the ability to fund such post-divorce accounts may never be taken into account as part of" that analysis. Id.
As is the case with awards of permanent alimony, temporary alimony awards must "follow[] logically from, and [be] supported by, the evidence." Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 13, 80 P.3d 153 (quotation simplified). ¶34 Because of their nature, however, temporary awards are often based on limited evidence.
¶96 To satisfy this burden, a party seeking alimony must provide the court with a credible financial declaration and financial documentation to demonstrate that the Jones factors support an award of alimony. Bakanowski v. Bakanowski , 2003 UT App. 357, ¶ 9, 80 P.3d 153 (explaining that before awarding alimony, "the trial court is required to make adequate factual findings on all material issues, unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also UTAH R. CIV. P. 101(d)(1) ("Attachments for motions and responses regarding alimony shall include income verification and a financial declaration.").
¶ 96 To satisfy this burden, a party seeking alimony must provide the court with a credible financial declaration and financial documentation to demonstrate that the Jones factors support an award of alimony. Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 9, 80 P.3d 153 (explaining that before awarding alimony, “the trial court is required to make adequate factual findings on all material issues, unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see alsoUtah R. Civ. P. 101(d)(1) (“Attachments for motions and responses regarding alimony shall include income verification and a financial declaration.”). Failure to consider the Jones factors when determining an appropriate alimony award “constitutes an abuse of discretion.”
¶ 96 To satisfy this burden, a party seeking alimony must provide the court with a credible financial declaration and financial documentation to demonstrate that the Jones factors support an award of alimony. Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 9, 80 P.3d 153 (explaining that before awarding alimony, “the trial court is required to make adequate factual findings on all material issues, unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 101(d)(1) (“Attachments for motions and responses regarding alimony shall include income verification and a financial declaration.”). Failure to consider the Jones factors when determining an appropriate alimony award “constitutes an abuse of discretion.”
We will not disturb the trial court's alimony award so long as the trial court exercises its discretion within the standards set by the appellate courts.” Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 7, 80 P.3d 153 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that Husband has also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's factual findings, we will not disturb the court's findings “unless they are clearly erroneous.”
"We review a trial court's award of alimony for an abuse of discretion." Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 7, 80 P.3d 153. Thus, "[w]e will not disturb a trial court's ruling on alimony as long as the court exercises its discretion within the bounds and under the standards we have set and has supported its decision with adequate findings and conclusions." Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/characteristic_n?tab=meaning_and_ use#9590365 (defining "characteristic" as something "[t]hat serves to identify or to indicate the essential quality or nature of a person or thing; distinctive; typical"). Accord Rhew v. Rhew, 138 N.C. App. 467, 473, 531 S.E.2d 471 (2000) ("the trial court can properly consider the parties’ custom of making regular additions to savings plans as a part of their standard of living in determining the amount and duration of an alimony award" where "[e]vidence was presented that established an historical pattern of such contributions" [citation omitted]); Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 16, 80 P.3d 153 (inclusion of saving as part of needs analysis permissible where contribution to savings accounts "was standard practice during the marriage and helped to form the couple’s marital standard of living"). Thus, the plain meaning of the alimony statute’s directive that the judge must consider the "marital lifestyle" and the "ability of each party to maintain the marital lifestyle" requires consideration of saving where the evidentiary record shows it was a regular practice during the marriage.
There, the parties' testimonies established that "[b]efore 2014, they made deposits into investment accounts 'when money was left over after normal marital spending,' and after 2014, they made direct deposits into investment accounts as part of [the husband's] employment." Id. ¶ 2. We reiterated that, in situations like these, "[t]he critical question is whether funds for post-divorce savings, investment, and retirement accounts are necessary because contributing to such accounts was standard practice during the marriage and helped to form the couple's marital standard of living." Id. ¶ 17 (quoting Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 16, 80 P.3d 153). We noted that "when the Bakanowski court provided the test for appropriate consideration of savings, investment, and retirement accounts in alimony calculations, it cited" another case "in which the court reasoned that because the parties had made regular savings deposits, including savings in the alimony award could help maintain the recipient spouse's marital standard of living."
This court has previously explained that retirement accounts "may not ordinarily be factored into an alimony determination," unless "funds for post-divorce ... retirement accounts are necessary because contributing to such accounts was standard practice during the marriage and helped to form the couple's marital standard of living." Bakanowski v. Bakanowski , 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 16, 80 P.3d 153. If this circumstance exists and the district court determines that the retirement account "should be taken into account as part of the needs analysis, then the court's findings must be even more detailed than those in a standard needs analysis," because this award "is the exception, rather than the rule." Id. ; see also Rudman v. Rudman , 812 P.2d 73, 76 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that in cases "where the evidence is severely conflicted, it is essential that the reviewing court clearly understand the findings on which the [district] court bases its conclusions").