For this reason it is unnecessary to discuss at length the authorities cited by appellant regarding reverter for breach of condition. In Baird v. Southern Ry., 179 Tenn. 366, 166 S.W.2d 617 (1942), cited by appellant, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the statement of Ry. v. Bell, supra, that "right of way" means mere easement, but noted that the deed in question conveyed "the right of way and road bed and 150 feet on east and 50 feet on west from center of said roadbed." The Supreme Court said:

The Court is required to consider the deed as a whole and to give meaning to each word used. See Baird v. S. Ry. Co., 179 Tenn. 366, 166 S.W.2d 617, 618 (1942). The deed reserves to the grantor “the coal, oil, gas and any and all other minerals” (Court File No. 36–2 at 4).

" Id. at 912. Sprint relies upon Baird v. Southern Railway, 179 Tenn. 366, 166 S.W.2d 617 (1942), in which the Court held the instrument conveyed a fee. However, the language and circumstances of that conveyance are closer to Nashville, Chattanooga St. Louis Railway v. Bell, supra, than to the York deed in this case.

E.g. , Buhl v. U.S. Sprint Commc'ns Co. , 840 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1992) ; Lillard v. Southern Ry. Co. , 206 Tenn. 1, 330 S.W.2d 335 (1959) ; Baird v. Southern Ry. , 179 Tenn. 366, 166 S.W.2d 617 (1942) ; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Bell , 162 Tenn. 661, 39 S.W.2d 1026 (1931) ; Pemberton v. Southern Ry. Co. , 162 Tenn. 65, 34 S.W.2d 444 (1931). In three of those cases, the Supreme Court held that the deed conveyed land in fee simple.

But it appears to the Court that under Tennessee law, a “right-of-way is an easement.”Dixon v. Chrisco, No. M201800132COAR3CV, 2018 WL 4275535, at *5 n. 10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2018) (citing Nashville, C & S.L. Ry. v. Bell, 39 S.W.2d 1026, 1028 (Tenn. 1931)); Smoky Mountain R. Co. v. Paine Oil Co., 496 S.W.2d 904, 910 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) (noting that the Tennessee Supreme Court had stated that “‘right of way' means mere easement'”) (citing Baird v. Southern Ry., 179 Tenn. 366, 166 S.W.2d 617 (1942)).Defendants' apparently incorrect suggestion that the ROW is Landfill Road itself fosters some of the confusion that the Court discusses and attempts to dispel in a footnote below. As further discussed in the footnote, this observation is relevant and significant here; it means that in seeking to have the ROW declared to extend to the benefit of the public at large (which is essentially what Plaintiffs are doing, as discussed below), Plaintiff (despite itself fostering confusion on this issue, as also noted in the footnote) is not seeking a declaration affecting ownership of Landfill Road or, for that matter, Defendants' right to use Landfill Road.

The Court is required to consider the deed as a whole and to give meaning to each word used. See Baird v. S. Ry. Co., 166 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tenn. 1942). The deed reserves to the grantor "the coal, oil, gas and any and all other minerals" (Court File No. 36-2 at 4).

In Nashville C. St. L. Ry. v. Bell, 162 Tenn. 661, 39 S.W.2d 1026 the Court held that a deed to the railroad containing language of the same import as in the instant case conveyed a fee and not an easement. To the same effect is Baird v. Southern Railway Co., 179 Tenn. 366, 166 S.W.2d 617. The petition for condemnation in the instant case shows beyond question that the City of Nashville intended to acquire a fee simple title.

None of the circumstances above mentioned was involved. Baird v. Southern Ry. Co., 179 Tenn. 336, 166 S.W.2d 617 is distinguishable for the same or similar reasons. Each case must be determined on its own peculiar facts.