Bailey v. Wilkes

12 Citing cases

  1. Smith v. HI-Tech Pharm.

    No. S22C1252 (Ga. Aug. 21, 2023)

    On occasion our courts have used the terms "primary jurisdiction" or "exclusive jurisdiction" in addressing arguments that seem to be about administrative exhaustion. See, e.g., Hunnicutt v. Ga. Power Co., 168 Ga.App. 525 (309 S.E.2d 862) (1983); Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga.App. 410 (291 S.E.2d 418) (1982). These doctrines are related but distinct.

  2. Perkins v. Georgia Dept. of Med. Assist

    252 Ga. App. 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 11 times
    Concluding that it was proper to dismiss putative class action where claims of both representative plaintiffs were subject to dismissal, including claims against one of the representative plaintiffs for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

    However, "`[w]here the question involved is within the jurisdiction of an administrative agency and the question demands the exercise of administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge and experience of the agency, no action for damages will lie prior to a decision by the agency.'" Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 414 (2) ( 291 S.E.2d 418) (1982); see also Douthit v. State of Ga., 180 Ga. App. 464, 466 ( 349 S.E.2d 493) (1986). Dismissals for failure to exhaust administrative remedies may only be "based upon statutes which by express terms or necessary implication give to the administrative board exclusive jurisdiction or which make the exhaustion of administrative remedies a condition precedent to judicial action."

  3. International Indemnity v. Regional Employer Serv

    239 Ga. App. 420 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 3 times

    Recognizing that regulation of insurance rates involves resolution of issues within the special knowledge and experience of the Commissioner, the legislature provided a statutory means to obtain a full hearing on these issues before the Commissioner along with the right of judicial review of actions taken by the Commissioner. OCGA § 33-9-26; § 33-2-17 through § 33-2-28; The Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq.); see Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 412-414 ( 291 S.E.2d 418) (1982). Furthermore, OCGA § 50-13-21 of the APA provides that: "The Commissioner of Insurance, when performing the duties as Commissioner of Insurance, may satisfy the procedure for conduct of hearings on contested cases required under this chapter by following Chapter 2 of Title 33.

  4. Provident Indemnity v. James

    234 Ga. App. 403 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 6 times

    Hunnicutt v. Ga. Power Co., supra at 526; but see Turpeau v.Fidelity Financial Svcs., 936 F. Supp. 975 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (holding that a party alleging damages that directly resulted from a violation of OCGA § 33-31-4 must exhaust administrative remedies under the Insurance Code), aff'd, 112 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 1997). Cf. Mayor c. of Savannah v. Savannah Cigarette c., 267 Ga. 173, 174 ( 476 S.E.2d 581) (1996) (reaffirming a previous Supreme Court ruling that a party challenging rezoning must petition local authorities for relief prior to asking a court of equity to declare a zoning ordinance unconstitutional); Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 412-414 ( 291 S.E.2d 418) (1982) (determining that the legislature specifically established that the State Personnel Board had "special knowledge and experience" and, therefore, primary jurisdiction to resolve employee grievances and other employment controversies). Such cases deal with executive branch action or inaction, which are not appealable until there is an exhaustion of administrative remedies, which is a condition precedent to subject matter jurisdiction.

  5. City of Arcade v. Emmons

    228 Ga. App. 879 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 4 times

    Although the trial court had jurisdiction to consider whether the City's violation of statutory procedures rendered its contract with Bartram void ( Grove, supra), it did not have jurisdiction in this case to exercise control over matters which the legislature has determined are within the primary administrative jurisdiction of the EPD with appeal therefrom pursuant to OCGA § 12-2-2 (c) and the provisions of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act. See Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 412-414 ( 291 S.E.2d 418) (1982); George v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 250 Ga. 491 ( 299 S.E.2d 556) (1983); OCGA §§ 12-8-21 (d); 12-8-23.1; 12-8-24.

  6. Johnson v. Rogers

    448 S.E.2d 710 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 15 times
    Finding that, when tortious interference claims are based upon acts resulting from the execution of an employee's official duties, party has no viable claim if the contractual or business relationship exists with the employee's company

    4. Pretermitting whether the trial court did not err in holding that appellant's substantive due process claims asserting constitutional deprivation ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983), by means of constructive demotion or retaliatory transfer, are barred by his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Compare Allen v. Bergman, 198 Ga. App. 57, 58 (1) ( 400 S.E.2d 347) with Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 412 (2) ( 291 S.E.2d 418) is whether the trial court's ruling was right for any reason. Malaga Mgmt. Co., supra. Appellees have presented certain direct evidence, which has not been contradicted or impeached, refuting appellant's claims of constructive demotion and retaliatory transfer.

  7. Flournoy v. Akridge

    375 S.E.2d 479 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 3 times

    Bennett v. Board of Trustees c., 258 Ga. 201 (3) ( 366 S.E.2d 287) (1988), upon which appellees rely, does not stand for the proposition that a complainant must appeal his adverse State Personnel Board decision to superior court within 30 days and that the failure to do so bars later relitigation of the issues in superior court. It only says that before one can raise the issues in the judicial forum, the administrative remedies must have been exhausted. Appellant has done so. Compare Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410 (2) ( 291 S.E.2d 418) (1982), in which appellant attempted to bypass the State Personnel Board remedies and go straight to state court. Appellee contends that the recent United States Supreme Court decision in University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (106 SC 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635) (1986), supports its position that appellant was required to appeal the state administrative decision to superior court instead of bringing a § 1981 and § 1983 action.

  8. Douthit v. State

    349 S.E.2d 493 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 2 times

    We find no error in the grant of summary judgment in this case. A similar argument to the one advanced by Douthit was made in the case of Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 412-414 ( 291 S.E.2d 418). In that case, Bailey filed a multiple count complaint against fellow employees (superiors in the chain of employment responsibility) for alleged tortious interference by the superiors with his right to employment.

  9. Moss v. Central State Hospital

    176 Ga. App. 116 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 4 times

    The administrative remedy provided to state employees, such as appellants in the instant case, affords as complete protection as would a declaratory judgment. Cf. Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 412 (2) ( 291 S.E.2d 418) (1982). Should appellants refuse to submit to polygraph testing, any resulting action against appellants would have to be initiated in accordance with the Rules and Regulations of the State Personnel Board.

  10. Hunnicutt v. Ga. Power Co.

    168 Ga. App. 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 16 times
    In Hunnicutt, the trial court had the power to deal with the general abstract question presented in this case, and therefore had subject matter jurisdiction to consider it.

    We find no statute from which it might be inferred that the PSC has exclusive or even primary jurisdiction over disputes which are premised upon the alleged wrongful termination of utility service. See Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410 ( 291 S.E.2d 418) (1982). The sole basis for appellee's argument that appellant is now precluded from asserting a tort claim for the wrongful termination of his electricity is the existence of the following non-statutory provision relating to the PSC's authority in connection with a disputed bill: "Right of the customer.