Opinion
I.D. No. 0010007932
Date Submitted: January 18, 2002
Date Decided: February 1, 2002
Upon Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas. Affirmed.
Vernon G. Bailey, Wilmington, Delaware, pro se, Appellant.
Allison L. Peters, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, attorney for Appellee, State of Delaware.
ORDER
This 1st day of February, 2002, upon consideration of the papers filed by the parties and the record in this case, it appears that:
(1) On April 19, 2001, the Court of Common Pleas convicted Appellant and Defendant below, Vernon Bailey, of Driving an Unsafe Motor Vehicle, Operating a Motorcycle Without a Helmet/Glasses, Operating an Unregistered Vehicle, and Failure to Have Insurance Identification in Possession. Bailey appealed his conviction on all four traffic violations to this Court.
(2) On December 12, 2001, this Court dismissed the portions of Bailey's appeal of his convictions for Driving an Unsafe Motor Vehicle, Operating a Motorcycle Without a Helmet/Glasses, and Operating an Unregistered Vehicle because the sentences he received for those convictions failed to meet the constitutional requirement to file an appeal in this Court. The Court also determined that Bailey's appeal was not untimely. The Court now considers the merits of Bailey's appeal of his conviction for Failure to Have Insurance Identification as set forth in Argument III, Argument IV, and Argument V of his opening brief.
Bailey v. State, Del. Super., Cr. A. No., Goldstein, J. (Dec. 12, 2001), Letter Op. at 2.
Id.
(3) The standard of review by this Court upon appeal from a decision by the Court of Common Pleas is the same standard applied by the Supreme Court when reviewing an appeal from a decision of this Court. First, this Court must review the trial court's rulings for errors in formulating or applying legal standards. Second, this Court must review the factual findings of the trial court to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support those findings and whether those findings were the result of a logical and orderly deductive process. Only when the findings below are clearly wrong is the Court free to make contradictory findings of fact.
Baker v. Conner, 488 A.2d 1303, 1309 (Del. 1985).
Downs v. State, 570 A.2d 1142, 1144 (Del. 1990).
Id.
Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671, 673 (Del. 1972) (citations omitted).
(4) All three of Bailey's arguments allege that the court below erred in its interpretation of the applicable statutes. Initially, Bailey argues that the court below erred in its interpretation of the applicable statutes by finding him guilty of Failure to Have Insurance Identification.
(5) At trial, the court below ruled that it was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Bailey failed to display an insurance card at the request of a police officer. The court also held that the documents Bailey provided at trial did not constitute an insurance policy under Del. C. Ann. tit. 21 Del. C. § 2118(p) (1995) or the necessary insurance card required to be provided to a police officer as defined by § 2118(o).
(6) Bailey argues on appeal that the court below erred in its interpretation of § 2118 to find him guilty of Failure to Have Insurance Identification. Specifically, Bailey argues that because he is a dealer he is exempted from the requirements of § 2118(p). The State responds that Bailey's interpretation of the relevant statutes is a result of a misreading of the plain language of those statutes.
(7) Del. C. Ann. tit. 21 Del. C. § 2118(p) (1995) sets forth the requirements of insurance for all motor vehicles required to be registered in the State of Delaware. Section 2118(p) sets forth the requirement that an operator be in possession of an insurance identification card at all times while operating a vehicle. The statute reads, in pertinent part:
The insurance identification card issued for a vehicle required to be registered under this title shall at all times, while the vehicle is being operated upon a highway within this State, be in possession of the operator thereof or carried in the vehicle and shall be produced upon the request of a police officer or justice of the peace or any other party involved in an accident with the insured.
Bailey argues that, as a dealer, he is exempt under Del. C. Ann. tit. 21 Del. C. § 316 (1995) from the requirements of § 2118. Bailey contends that, as a result, he was not required to provide an insurance identification card for the motorcycle he was riding when he was pulled over. Rather, Bailey states that dealers purchase "blanket insurance coverage" which does not describe individual vehicles.
(8) The Court finds that Bailey's interpretation of the plain language of the statutes at issue is erroneous. Section 316(a) allows dealers to be exempt from the registration provisions of Title 21 for vehicles that are "driven or moved upon a highway in conformance with this title relating to . . . dealers." Section 2124 sets forth registration requirements for dealers. A s the State points out, the statute does not exempt dealers from the obligation of carrying insurance for the vehicles they operate or from the obligation to display an insurance identification card for those vehicles.
(9) Bailey also argues that he presented sufficient proof of insurance at trial. At trial, Bailey presented a garage insurance policy. The court below determined that the policy insured only the motor vehicles in Bailey's possession at his place of dealership. Therefore, the policy was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 2118(p). The Court finds that the decision of the court below is supported by substantial evidence in the record below and is not clearly erroneous.
(10) Bailey next argues that the court below erred by convicting him of Failure to Have Insurance Identification because the police officer who issued the citation had no authority under the statute to request an insurance card from Bailey. Bailey argues that § 2118(p) requires proof of insurance to be submitted to a police officer only when the operator of a vehicle is involved in an accident.
(11) The Court finds that Bailey's interpretation of § 2118(p) is erroneous. As quoted above, the statute provides that an operator of a vehicle have an insurance identification card in his possession at all times when the vehicle is being operated and that the card "shall be produced upon the request of a police officer or justice of the peace or any other party involved in an accident with the insured." Bailey argues that the phrase should be interpreted so that only when a police officer, justice of the peace, or any other party is involved in an accident with an insured is the party authorized to request a vehicle's operator to produce the insurance identification card. As the State argues, such an interpretation of the statutory language would lead to the illogical result that a police officer could ask for an insurance identification if the officer was actually involved in an accident with the insured.
Under Bailey's interpretation of the language of the statute, subsection (p) could be re-written to provide that an insurance identification card, "shall be produced upon the request of a police officer involved in an accident with the insured or justice of the peace involved in an accident with the insured or any other party involved in an accident with the insured."
(12) Rather, the Court finds that the plain reading of the statute provides that an insured must produce an insurance identification card issued for a vehicle in three instances: at the request of a police officer, at the request of a justice of the peace, or at the request of any other party if that party is involved in an accident with the insured. Therefore, the Court finds that the court below did not err by convicting Bailey of Failure to Present Insurance Identification because the police had no authority to ask for his insurance identification card.
(13) Finally, Bailey argues that the court below erred in finding him guilty of Failure to Have Insurance Identification because § 2118(p), and the State at trial, shifted the burden of proof from the State to the defendant.
(14) Section 2118(p) provides that when an operator of a vehicle fails to produce an insurance identification card when requested pursuant to the above-quoted language, the operator:
shall not be convicted under this subsection if, prior to conviction, the operator shall produce to the court in which the offense is to be tried the insurance identification card or in lieu thereof other sufficient proof of insurance showing such insurance to be in full force and effect at all pertinent times when the motor vehicle is being operated within this State . . .
Bailey argues that he complied with the above-quoted language by producing at trial the insurance policy discussed above. Bailey contends that the burden then should have shifted to the State to prove that the insurance w as not adequate or "defective" in some way.
(15) The Court finds that § 2118(p) does not unconstitutionally shift the burden from the State to prove a defendant's guilt to the defendant to prove his innocence. Rather, as the State contends, the State has the initial burden to show that a defendant failed to produce an insurance identification card when required and there is no presumption within the statute that a driver is without adequate insurance. Rather, the State must provide evidence that such is the case. In Bailey's case, the State provided such evidence through the testimony of the police officer who pulled Bailey over.
(16) The language quoted above does not shift the burden of proof; rather, the statute merely allows a defense where a vehicle's operator can provide to the court at a later date proof that he had adequate insurance for the vehicle. Again, as set forth above, the Court finds that the State presented substantial competent evidence that Bailey did not produce an insurance identification card when required to do so by a police officer. The court below determined that the documents produced by Bailey at trial were not sufficient to show proof of insurance as required by § 2118. The court's finding is sufficiently supported by the record.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.