56 to be distributed among those entitled under the will of Mrs. Jenkins, who died May 21, 1905. Mrs. Jenkins was a widow. By her will and codicils she devised this real estate, with other property, to the petitioners as trustees, upon trusts which have been twice before this court for construction. Bailey v. Smith, 214 Mass. 114. Bailey v. Smith, 222 Mass. 600. Certain provisions made for her brothers, William John Smith and Franklin Smith, and their widows, have terminated by reason of the death of all the beneficiaries of this description. Upon the death of William on January 10, 1910, one half the interest of the Jenkins estate in this real estate vested in remainder, subject to the trust, in Willard Pleis Smith and Helen I. Meade. Bailey v. Smith, 222 Mass. 600. Upon the death of the widow of William on February 17, 1915, these remainders came into absolute possession free of the trust without the necessity of any conveyance by the trustees.

See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Richardson, 297 Mass. 147, 148-149. Cf. Bailey v. Smith, 222 Mass. 600, 602-603. Nevertheless, we have held in several cases that a gift of a life interest to an heir with a remainder in the testator's heirs does not prove that the heirs were to be determined at the time of the life beneficiary's death.

That the particular estate to the trustees does not terminate and the time for distribution arrive until the death of testator's last surviving child does not indicate an intent that the heirs of testator's other children should not be determined until such time. See Atchison v. Francis, 182 Iowa 37, 41, 49, 165 N.W. 587, L.R.A. 1918E 1087; In re Estate of Smith, 16 Del. Ch. 272, 145 A. 671; Bailey v. Smith, 222 Mass. 600, 111 N.E. 684; 33 Am. Jur., Life Estates, Remainders, etc., section 71; 3 Page on Wills, Lifetime Ed., section 1055, pages 230, 231; Restatement, Property, section 309. We conclude the gift in subparagraph f is to those who were legal heirs of each of testator's children at the death of such child. Of course these heirs were then certain determinate persons.

What little recent authority there is beyond that of the English courts supports the English view; and, on the whole, we are inclined to adopt it. . . . There is nothing in this will which controls or modifies the meaning of the words 'next of kin.'" This interpretation of these words has been uniformly followed in decisions written by eminent judges who were fully aware of this conflict of authority and preferred to follow the rule of the Swasey case and that earlier laid down in Haraden v. Larrabee, 113 Mass. 430. Fargo v. Miller, 150 Mass. 225. Keniston v. Mayhew, 169 Mass. 166. Leonard v. Haworth, 171 Mass. 496. Kelley's Case, 222 Mass. 538. Bailey v. Smith, 222 Mass. 600, 602. Makller v. Independent Workmen's Circle of America, Inc. 255 Mass. 252.

Messrs. Buist Buist, of Charleston, S.C. Counsel for Respondent, cite: As to Exclusion Of Wife From TakingWith "Next Of Kin": 184 S.C. 243, 192 S.E., 273; 69 C.J., 221; 46 C.J., 473; Webster's New International Dict.; 95 N.Y., 17; 282 N.Y.S., 627; 157 Misc, 98; 285 N Y S., 313, 157 Misc., 944; Decedent Estate Laws, Secs. 81, 83, Subd. 4; 194 F., 387; 200 S.C. 373, 20 S.E.2d 811; 204 S.C. 50, 28 S.E.2d 792; 204 S.C. 257, 29 S.E.2d 116; 97 Conn., 103, 115 A., 626; 111 Conn., 683, 151 A., 265; 12 Rich. Eq., 259; 168 S.C. 494, 167 S.E., 820; 29 R.C.L., 254; Code of S.C. 1942, Sec. 8906. As to "Next Of Kin" as construed in otherJurisdictions: (Cal.), 85 P.2d 172; (Conn.), 151 A., 265, 11 Conn., 683; 102 Fla., 740, 140 So., 891; 62 Ga. 142; 126 N.E., 537, 292 Ill., 270; 162 N.E., 170, 330 Ill., 571; 113 S.W. 95, 130 Ky., 77; 41 N.E., 684, 222 Mass. 600; 171 Mass. 496; 126 N.W., 632, 161 Mich., 545; 164 A., 859, 112 N.J. Eq., 493; 170 A., 615, 115 N.J. Eq., 295; 168 A., 822, 823, 114 N.J. Eq., 411; 292 N.Y.S., 290, 161 Misc., 346; 63 N.E., 1102, 171 N.Y., 281; 8 N.E.2d 864, 274 N.Y., 288; 11 N.Y.S.2d 145, 170 Misc., 840; 39 N.C. 56; 179 S.E., 610, 208 N.C. 141; 31 Ohio Cir. Ct., 332; 95 P., 624, 20 Okla. 687; 94 A., 927, 249 P., 249; 143 A., 121, 293 Pa., 433; 53 A., 281, 24 R.I. 411; 105 A., 568, 42 R.I., 94. Counsel for Appellant, in Reply, cite: As to "Next OfKin": Page On Wills, Vol. 3, 1936, Sec. 1018; 69 C.J., Wills, 1938, Annotations to Sec. 1254; Words And Phrases, Perm. Ed., Vol. 28, p. 654, Annotation; June-December, 1937, Vol., Am. Dig., Wills, Sec. 509; 46 C.J., 473; 115 A., 626, 97 Conn., 102; 126 N.E., 886, 100 Ohio St., 447; 166 A., 159 at 161; 169 A., 690, 115 N.J. Eq., 171; 88 N.Y., 487; 71 Kan., 524, 81 P., 524, Kent, Vol. 2, 14th Ed., 420; 88 N.Y., 487.

Since the statutory next of kin of Nicholls, in the natural and accurate sense of the words, could not be determined until his death, the gift over to them remained wholly contingent until he died. Walcott v. Robinson, 214 Mass. 172. Bailey v. Smith, 222 Mass. 600, 602, 603. Conant v. St. John, 233 Mass. 547, 551, 552.

Upham v. Parker, 220 Mass. 454, 457. Bailey v. Smith, 222 Mass. 600, 602, 603. Sherburne v. Howland, 239 Mass. 439, 441, 442.

That this paragraph provides for a valid contingent remainder is recognized by authoritative writers and is sustained by the great weight of American authority. 2 Tiffany Real Property, Third Edition, Section 321, and numerous authorities cited in Notes 88 and 89. "A very common interest of a remainder contingent because of uncertainty in the remainderman is presented by the limitation of a remainder to the heirs, or to the heirs of the body, of a living person named, in which case the heirs cannot be ascertained until such person's death, on the principle that there can be no heir to a living person, as expressed in the maxim, nemo est haeres viventis." Supra, note 91, citing Wallace v. Minor, 86 Va. 550, 10 S.E. 423; Richardson v. Wheatland, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 169; Bailey v. Smith, 222 Mass. 600, 111 N.E. 684; Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Hoppin, 249 Ill. 406, 94 N.E. 669; Laws v. Davis, 34 Ohio App. 157, 170 N.E. 601, and other cases. See also 2 Restatement Property, Section 157, comments U and W; 2 Minor's Institutes (2d Ed.), Revised and Corrected, 337; Hinton v. Milburn's Ex'rs., 23 W. Va. 166, 170; Patton v. Corley, 107 W. Va. 318, 319, 320, 148 S.E. 120, 121.

The words "my next of kin", as used in the deed, in the absence of provisions showing a contrary intent, mean nearest blood relatives of the grantor at the time of his death, according to the law of consanguinity. Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48, 3 So. 900; Pinkston v. Semple, 92 Ala. 564, 9 So. 329; 46 C.J. 464; 69 C.J. 221; Appeal of Wildman, 111 Conn. 683, 151 A. 265; Clark v. Mack, 161 Mich. 545, 126 N.W. 632, 28 L.R.A., N.S., 479; Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N.C. 158, 106 N.E. 501; Jones v. Oliver, 38 N.C. 369; Simmons v. Gooding, 40 N.C. 382; Harrison v. Ward, 58 N.C. 236; Galloway v. Babb, 77 N.H. 259, 90 A. 968; Bailey v. Smith, 222 Mass. 600, 111 N.E. 684; Swasey v. Jaques, 144 Mass. 135, 10 N.E. 758, 59 Am.Rep. 65; Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248, 57 A. 609, 58 A. 36, 66 L.R.A. 408; Jones v. Parsons, 182 Iowa 1377, 166 N.W. 707; Hammond v. Myers, 292 Ill. 270, 126 N.E. 537, 11 A.L.R. 315; Re Stoler, 293 Pa. 433, 143 A. 121, 59 A.L.R. 1402; Smith v. Egan, 258 Mo. 569, 167 S.W. 971, Ann.Cas.1915D, 723; Keniston v. Mayhew, 169 Mass. 166, 47 N.E. 612; Morse v. White, 182 Mich. 607, 148 N.W. 970; 2 Thompson, Real Prop., p. 379, § 2355. GARDNER, Justice.

In the absence of expressions in the will and circumstances attributable to it to the contrary this construction would have been correct as the "next of kin" generally refers to the nearest blood relations but does not include a brother's wife, neither does it include nephews and nieces, children of a deceased brother along with or to the exclusion of surviving brothers. Galloway vs. Babb, 77 N.H. 259, 90 A. 968; Bailey vs. Smith, 222 Mass. 600, 111 N.E. 684; 28 R. C. L. 254. We think the Chancellor was in error because the terms of the will, when considered in connection with the facts affecting it, show a different intent on the part of the testator, and this is true whether the words "next of kin" had reference to those living at the death of the testator or those living at the time of the termination of the life estate.