Opinion
C. A. 8:22-cv-03702-SAL-JDA
01-04-2023
Anthony Bailey, Plaintiff, v. Well Path, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Anthony Bailey (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is presently incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Berkeley County Detention Center. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard court form, which was entered on October 26, 2022. [Doc. 1.] However, Plaintiff did not sign his Complaint and he did not pay the filing fee. [Id. at 4.] Accordingly, the undersigned entered an Order dated October 31, 2022, directing Plaintiff to bring the case into proper form by completing the standard form, paying the filing fee, and submitting properly completed service documents. [Doc. 5 at 1-2.] Plaintiff complied with the Court's Order and filed a completed, signed Complaint on the standard court form which was entered on November 21, 2022. [Doc. 1-2.] Additionally, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 8], which was granted on November 29, 2022 [Doc. 13].
By Order dated November 29, 2022, the Court notified Plaintiff that this action was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified by the Court in that Order. [Doc. 12.] The Court noted, however, that Plaintiff may be able to cure the pleading deficiencies of his Complaint and granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to amend his Complaint. [Id. at 5.] Further, Plaintiff was specifically warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint that corrects those deficiencies identified [in the Court's Order], this action will be recommended for summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A.[Id. at 6.] Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint, and he has failed to cure the deficiencies identified by the Court in its Order.
Because Plaintiff did not respond to the Court's Order, and the time for response has lapsed, he has failed to prosecute this case and has failed to comply with an Order of this Court. As Plaintiff has already ignored this Court's Order and deadlines, sanctions less drastic than dismissal would not be effective. Accordingly, as an additional basis for dismissal, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard court form. [Docs. 1, 1-2.] The allegations in the Complaint are difficult to decipher and Plaintiff's handwriting is nearly illegible. However, the undersigned is able to glean the following pertinent facts. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and is currently incarcerated at the Berkeley County Detention Center in Moncks Corner, South Carolina. [Doc. 1-2 at 2.] The sole Defendant named in this action is Well Path, which apparently provides medical services to the Detention Center. [Id.]
Plaintiff appears to allege the events giving rise to his claim occurred in the morning of June 6, 2022, and he simply asserts “denial forced meds. no security” as the factual basis underlying his claim. [Id. at 4.] For his injuries, Plaintiff appears to contend that he suffered nerve damage. [Id. at 5.] For his relief, Plaintiff appears to seek damages in the amount of $13,000. [Id.] Plaintiff makes no other allegations.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Balt. City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “And, although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is particularly true in a § 1983 action where “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). “In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Here, for the reasons below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
As an initial matter, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff's Complaint is nearly illegible and the allegations are unintelligible. Even liberally construing the allegations that can be deciphered, the Court cannot discern the nature of Plaintiff's suit other than that it appears to involve medical care provided by Well Path at the Detention Center. However, such cursory allegations fail to state a claim under which relief can be granted as the Court cannot determine the nature of Plaintiff's claims.
For example, Plaintiff provides no specific factual allegations against Defendant to assert a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. Weller, 901 F.2d at 397 (noting dismissal is proper where there were no allegations against defendants); Gibson v. Foster, No. 5:17-cv-01333-JMC-KDW, 2017 WL 7355301, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2017) (finding summary dismissal proper where “the Complaint contains no allegations of wrongdoing by th[e] Defendant”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 690060 (D.S.C. Feb. 1, 2018). “Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.” Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014). Therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary dismissal from this action.
Additionally, although Plaintiff appears to allege that he has suffered nerve damage and was forced to take medication, he provides no other facts to support any cognizable cause of action. Thus, Plaintiff's Complaint as a whole is subject to dismissal because his allegations fail to state a claim for relief that is cognizable under § 1983. To the extent Plaintiff asserts state law claims for medical malpractice, personal injury, and negligence, his claims are not cognizable. This is so because the law is well settled that state law tort claims are not actionable under § 1983 as a matter of law. See, e.g., Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard-a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[N]egligent deprivations of life, liberty, or property are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Mere negligent conduct . . . does not constitute a violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”). “A state law tort is not actionable as a claim under § 1983 on its own.” Warthen v. Midgett, No. 2:16-cv-00931-DCN-MGB, 2017 WL 9250328, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1190869 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2017).
Likewise, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state a plausible federal law claim for Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that (1) he was deprived of an objectively serious medical need by a state actor and (2) the state actor knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). Deliberate indifference “is a higher standard for culpability than mere negligence or even civil recklessness, and as a consequence, many acts or omissions that would constitute medical malpractice will not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.” Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178. Absent exceptional circumstances, a plaintiff cannot establish a cognizable deliberate indifference claim when there exists a mere disagreement between the plaintiff and the state official over the proper medical care. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985).
A pretrial detainee's deliberate indifference claim arises under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; however, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments provides the framework for analyzing such a claim. See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir. 1988).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant knew of and disregarded a serious medical need and its associated risks. Instead, Plaintiff simply alleges that he was “deni[ed] forced meds[,]” that there is “no security,” and that he suffered nerve damage. [Doc. 1-2 at 4.] But Plaintiff does not provide any other facts to support a deliberate indifference claim and he fails to identify any defendant responsible for his injury. Therefore, because Plaintiff has “not nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” the Complaint is subject to dismissal. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
As the Fourth Circuit has noted:
To state a claim under Section 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a prisoner must show that he had a serious medical need, and that officials knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed. A “serious medical need” is a condition “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” An official acts with deliberate indifference if he had actual knowledge of the prisoner's serious medical needs and the related risks, but nevertheless disregarded them.Depaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without further leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
As noted, Plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies noted by the Court in its Order dated November 29, 2022. [Doc. 12.] Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or attempted to cure the deficiencies in his original filings. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissal without further leave to amend.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).