Bahneman v. Prudential Ins. Co.

6 Citing cases

  1. National Life Ins. Co. v. White

    38 A.2d 663 (D.C. 1944)   Cited 2 times

    Clarkson v. New York Life Ins. Co., D.C.S.D.Fla., 4 F. Supp. 791; Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Milton, 160 Ga. 168, 127 S.E. 140, 40 A.L.R. 1382; Adamson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 42 Ga. App. 587, 157 S.E. 104; Greenberg v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 379 Ill. 421, 41 N.E.2d 495; Hawkins v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 205 Iowa 760, 218 N.W. 313; Garden v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 1094, 254 N.W. 287; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Preston, 253 Ky. 459, 70 S.W.2d 18; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hurt, 254 Ky. 603, 72 S.W.2d 20; Plummer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 132 Me. 220, 169 A. 302; Maze v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 188 Minn. 139, 246 N.W. 737; Bahneman v. Prudential Ins. Co., 193 Minn. 26, 257 N.W. 514, 97 A.L.R. 121; Equitable Life Assur. Sec. v. Serio, 155 Miss. 515, 124 So. 485; Wenstrom v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 55 N.D. 647, 215 N.W. 93, 54 A.L.R. 289; Losnecki v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 106 Pa. Super. 259, 161 A. 434; Janney v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 200, 173 A. 819; State Life Ins. Co. v. Atkins, Tex.Civ.App., 9 S.W.2d 290; Gibson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 84 Utah 452, 36 P.2d 105; Trainor v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., D.C.W.D.Wis., 42 F. Supp. 206. Some courts expressly decline to follow the Ginell case and refuse to interpret the word permanent to mean lasting until death.

  2. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurst

    174 Md. 596 (Md. 1938)   Cited 30 times

    The view here taken is supported by the decisions of other appellate tribunals which have construed similar provisions of insurance policies. See Garden v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 1094, 254 N.W. 287; Kurth v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 211 Iowa 736, 234 N.W. 201; Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Milton, 160 Ga. 168, 127 S.E. 140; Adamson v. Metropolitan etc. Co., 42 Ga. App. 587, 157 S.E. 104; New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Durre, 101 Ind. App. 467, 199 N.E. 868; Bahneman v. Prudential Ins. Co., 193 Minn. 26, 257 N.W. 514; Maze v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 188 Minn. 139, 246 N.W. 737; Laupeheimer v. Massachusetts etc. Co., 224 Mo. App. 1018, 24 S.W. 2nd 1058; Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Gerwick, 50 Ohio 277, 197 N.E. 923; Losneckiv. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 106 Pa. Super. 259, 161 A. 434; Janney v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 200, 173 A. 819; Equitable Life Assur.

  3. Wheeler v. Equitable Life Assurance Society

    1 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 1942)   Cited 6 times

    Defendant contends that the policy insures only against total and actually permanent disability and that where it was conclusively established by plaintiff's recovery before trial that the total disability was not actually permanent, he is not entitled to disability benefits. We think this case is controlled by Maze v. Equitable L. Ins. Co. 188 Minn. 139, 246 N.W. 737, and Bahneman v. Prudential Ins. Co. 193 Minn. 26, 257 N.W. 514, 97 A.L.R. 121. The policies considered in those cases were held to include in their coverage the appearance of permanent disability as well as actually permanent disability. Defendant attempts to distinguish the Maze and Bahneman cases on the ground that in the present case the insurer has inserted in the policy a presumption in aid of proof and that this presumption harmonizes the provisions of the policy which were found inconsistent in the Maze and Bahneman cases.

  4. Yoffa v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

    304 Mass. 110 (Mass. 1939)   Cited 22 times

    New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 174 Md. 596. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Milton, 160 Ga. 168. Maze v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. 188 Minn. 139. Bahneman v. Prudential Ins. Co. 193 Minn. 26. Plummer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 132 Maine, 220. Laupheimer v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. 224 Mo. App. 1018. Compare Ginell v. Prudential Ins. Co. 237 N.Y. 554, reversing 205 App. Div. (N.Y.) 494; Garabedian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 135 Pa. Super. 320.

  5. Madison v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America

    181 So. 871 (La. 1938)   Cited 23 times

    It is also well settled law that the term "permanent" when used in a life insurance policy providing for disability benefits where the insurer becomes "totally and permanently" disabled is construed to be used for the purpose only of excluding disabilities which are merely temporary. Although the disability be one which may or will pass away in a period of time, yet if the required period is longer than that which, reasonably considered, is only temporary, then it must of necessity fall within the opposite general term "permanent", because it not temporary. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Serio, 155 Miss. 515, 124 So. 485; Bahneman v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 193 Minn. 26, 257 N.W. 514, 97 A.L.R. 121; Crowe v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 179 La. 444, 154 So. 52; Frey v. Manhattan Life Insurance Company, 182 La. 821, 162 So. 633. The case of Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Serio, cited with approval by this court in the case of Crowe v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, contains a full discussion of the term "total and permanent" disability, and we quote from that case as follows (page 486):

  6. Grotefend v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.

    26 N.J. Super. 61 (App. Div. 1953)

    To hold to the strict definition that no liability arose under the insurance contract until it became absolutely certain that the insured's incapacity would continue until his death, would, in most cases, convert the insurance contract into a life insurance policy and defeat the very purpose of the disability insurance benefits which are designed to help sustain the insured during the period of his total incapacity. Clott v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, supra; Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Milton, 160 Ga. 168, 127 S.E. 140, 40 A.L.R. 1386; Bahneman v. Prudential Ins. Co., 193 Minn. 26, 257 N.W. 514, 97 A.L.R. 126, 132. Where, in the given case, it may appear that there is every indication of total disability and there is medical prognosis as to its permanency, it is a matter of common knowledge that such a prognosis cannot be made with absolute certainty and that occasionally total disability, indicated at a given time as being permanent, in the course of time and through the assistance of nature aided by improved medical science and technique, terminates so that the individual is entirely cured or it becomes partial only.