Veterans compensation when paid to an administrator is the corpus of the estate. Anderson v. Steddum, 194 S.W. 1132; Bagwell v. McCombs, 31 S.W.2d 835; Gilbert v. Hines, 32 S.W.2d 877. R.C. Russell, of Magee, and J.A. Covington, Jr., of Meridian, for appellee.

It has been determined that a guardian is not entitled to commission on insurance proceeds or pension benefits. See Gilbert v. Hines, 32 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1930, no writ) (war risk insurance proceeds considered corpus of estate); Bagwell v. McCombs, 31 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1930, no writ) (veteran's disability benefits deemed corpus of estate); Anderson v. Steddum, 194 S.W. 1132 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1917) (pension benefits held to be corpus of estate), aff'd, 222 S.W. 1090 (Tex.Comm'n App. 1920, holding approved). In McCrory v. Wichita County, 261 S.W.2d 867 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1953, writ ref'd), the court addressed the classification of trust distributions.

The issue of what constitutes "income" of a ward's estate has been addressed rarely by Texas courts. A guardian has been denied a statutory commission upon the payment of war risk insurance, Gilbert v. Hines, 32 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1930, no writ), United States veteran's disability benefits, Bagwell v. McCombs, 31 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1930, no writ), and pension benefits. Anderson v. Steddum, 194 S.W. 1132 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1917), aff'd, 222 S.W. 1090 (Tex.Comm'n App. 1920, holding approved).

Expenditures made by a guardian as authorized by law made on account of his ward may be subject to offset, but expenditures made by the guardian from funds obtained without authority or in defiance of the requirements of law are not subject to an offset. McKinney v. Texas Bank and Trust, 295 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1956, no writ); Bagwell v. McCombs, 31 S.W.2d 835, 837 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1930, no writ); and Anderson v. Steddum, 194 S.W. 1132, 1134 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1917, aff'd at 222 S.W. 1090, 1091). Even though the cost of maintenance may have been partially paid with funds borrowed personally by the guardian, in our view Federal, having wrongfully converted the certificate, was not entitled to an offset of any such funds.

The promisor on the note is a partnership composed of residents of Midland County. The Appellee asserts that the location of the main asset is at the place of the residence of the debtors, being Midland County where suit was instituted. The Appellant relies primarily upon the decision in Bagwell v. McCombs, 31 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1930, no writ). The Appellee relies primarily upon the holdings in Saner-Ragley Lumber Co. v. Spivey, 238 S.W. 912 (Tex.Com.App. 1922), and Lancaster Wallace v. Sexton, 245 S.W. 958 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1922, writ ref'd). None of these cases deal directly with the situs of a debt secured by a promissory note.

Although dealing with a guardianship venue statute predecessor to the present Probate Code guardianship venue statute, the Court in Weeks v. De Young, Tex.Civ.App. — (Galveston) er. refused, 290 S.W. 852 holds such a venue statute mandatory and jurisdictional. See also: Munson v. Newson, S.Ct., 9 Tex. 109; Gibson v. Dennis, Tex.Civ.App. — (Texarkana) er. dism'd, 90 S.W.2d 319; Bagwell v. McCombs, Tex.Civ.App. — (Dallas) nwh, 31 S.W.2d 835; Doyle v. Sorrells, Tex.Civ.App. — (San Antonio) nre, 297 S.W.2d 233. Doyle, supra, holds it was the duty of the trial court to transfer the case to Tarrant or Dallas County, and refusal to do so constitutes reversible error.

In that case the court said that when the funds were paid to the guardian appointed under the laws of the State of Texas, such funds could only be expended by such guardian in conformity to the laws of this state. The same question arose again in this court in the case of Bagwell v. McCombs, Tex.Civ.App., 31 S.W.2d 835, 837. In that case this court said:

Examination of such regulations reveals they are merely recommendations and a statement of the policy of the department, and cannot, nor do they purpose to control the amount of compensation allowable by a state court to a guardian. [In re Strozyk's Guardianship, 156 Wn. 233, 286 P. 646; Bagwell v. McCumbs 31 S.W.2d 835.] Viewing the foregoing we now come to a consideration of the question of the propriety of the court allowing the maximum compensation called for by the statute under the circumstances disclosed by the record: that is to say, did the court err in finding the maximum allowance to be fair and reasonable. Respondent seems to be laboring under the impression that he is entitled, as a matter of course, to a charge of five per cent "as commission" upon the Government payments to his ward. He so terms it in his settlement and his petition for allowance. As a matter of common knowledge these checks from the Government come regularly by mail.

We, therefore, hold that the claim for war risk insurance was a part of the corpus of the estate, and, when this claim was later converted into money and paid to the guardian, its status, as a part of the corpus of the ward's estate, was unchanged, and no commissions to the guardian could be allowed thereon. Anderson v. Steddum (Tex.Civ.App.) 194 S.W. 1132; Bagwell v. McCombs, Guardian (Tex.Civ.App.) 31 S.W.2d 835; Freedman v. Vallie (Tex.Civ.App.) 75 S.W. 322. Appellant's contention that the money paid to the guardian, by the United States government for disability, represented income from the ward's estate and was not a part of the corpus of the estate, cannot be sustained.