The question of whether Hughes and Chatham breached the duty of reasonable care owed to Doyle and Parent, as passengers on the bus, was particularly appropriate for jury resolution "not only because of the idiosyncratic nature of most tort cases * * * or because there was room for a difference in view as to whether [defendants'] conduct in the particular circumstances of this case did or did not evidence a lack of due care, but, perhaps above all, because, in the determination of issues revolving about the reasonableness of conduct, the values inherent in the jury system are rightly believed an important instrument in the adjudicative process" ( Havas v Victory Paper Stock Co., 49 N.Y.2d 381, 388 [citation omitted]). Contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, the evidence regarding Hughes' negligence provides no basis for Supreme Court's decision to set aside the verdict and order a new trial ( see, Patti v Fenimore, 181 A.D.2d 869; Bagnato v Romano, 179 A.D.2d 713, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 701). As to the jury's finding Seney was negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident or any injuries sustained by Doyle or Parent, the issue of proximate cause is generally for the jury to determine based upon "the unique nature of the inquiry in each case" ( Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315). Given the evidence that Seney's vehicle struck the rear of the bus after the bus had stopped, and evidence that the impact did not damage the bus and did not cause the bus to move, the jury could reasonably have concluded that any injuries sustained by Doyle and Parent were caused by the abrupt stop of the bus and not the relatively minor subsequent impact caused by Seney's negligence. The evidence regarding the causation issue, therefore, provides no basis to support Supreme Court's decision to set aside the verdict and order a new trial ( see, Brooks v Adams, 204 A.D.2d 938; Yaver v Gofus, 156 A.D.2d 556).
In any event, even if this Court considered Pinstripes' arguments on liability on their merits, Pinstripes is still not entitled to summary judgment. ( Herrick v Second Cuthouse, 64 NY2d 692; Patrician Plastic Corp. v Bernadel Realty Corp., 25 NY2d 599; Calemine v Hobler, 263 AD2d 495; Bogorad v Fitzpatrick, 38 AD2d 923, 31 NY2d 984; Young v Mauch, 268 AD2d 583; Thomas v Holzberg, 300 AD2d 10; Canceleno v Johnston, 264 AD2d 405; Bagnato v Romano, 179 AD2d 713; Shea v Judson, 283 NY 393; Galvin v Zacholl, 302 AD2d 965.) Before: Chief Judge KAYE and Judges CIPARICK, GRAFFEO, READ, SMITH and PIGOTT.
The evidence presented by the plaintiff in opposition to the motion was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Bongiovi v Hoffman, 18 AD3d at 687). While the plaintiff contends that Persaud's deposition testimony raised a triable issue of fact as to whether or not he was driving "at an appropriate reduced speed" when he approached and crossed the subject intersection, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (e) does not mandate that a driver reduce his or her speed at every intersection, but only when warranted by the conditions presented ( see Bagnato v Romano, 179 AD2d 713). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted Persaud's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.
In opposition, the plaintiff failed to submit evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Her conclusory assertion that the defendant driver was traveling at a "horrific excessive speed" was unsupported by any evidence and was speculative, given her deposition testimony that she first saw the defendants' vehicle "just a couple of seconds" before the collision ( see McNamara v Fishkowitz, 18 AD3d at 722; Ishak v Guzman, 12 AD3d at 409; Meliarenne v Prisco, 9 AD3d at 354; Szczotka v Adler, 291 AD2d 444). Further, the plaintiffs conclusory assertion that the defendant driver was traveling at "a speed greater than reasonable and prudent considering the intersection's risks and potential hazards," in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180, is similarly unsupported by the evidence and speculative ( see Meliarenne v Prisco, 9 AD3d at 354; Zadins v Pommerville, 300 AD2d 1111, 1112; Wilke v Price, 221 AD2d 846, 847; Bagnato v Romano, 179 AD2d 713, 715). The plaintiff also failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the defendant driver's alleged failure to take evasive action, in light of the driver's deposition testimony that the plaintiffs car accelerated from the stop sign "just prior to impact" ( see Lupowitz v Fogarty, 295 AD2d 576; McKeaveney v Reiffert, 268 AD2d 411; Bolta v Lohan, 242 AD2d 356).
8 A.D.2d 871, 873). Furthermore, the record reveals that plaintiff's vehicle appeared so suddenly in the intersection as she emerged from Willow Avenue that evasive action on defendants' part was impossible (see, Le Claire v. Pratt, supra, at 613; Anastasio v. Scheer, 239 A.D.2d 823, 824; Cassidy v. Valenti, 211 A.D.2d 876, 877). Clearly, the very same vehicles that obstructed plaintiff's view of defendants' vehicles also obstructed defendants' view of plaintiff's vehicle and, in fact, of Park standing in the road directing traffic. Contrary to plaintiff's claim, there is no competent evidence in the record raising a genuine factual issue as to defendants' violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (a) or (e). Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 "does not mandate that a driver reduce his or her speed at every intersection, but only when warranted by the conditions presented" (Wilke v. Price, 221 A.D.2d 846, 847 [internal quotation marks omitted];see, Anastasio v. Scheer, supra, at 824; Bagnato v. Romano, 179 A.D.2d 713, 714, lv denied 81 A.D.2d 701). In our view, the record discloses no condition that would have required defendants to reduce their speed as they approached the intersection.
We disagree. Although Carroll did not see decedent's vehicle until the moment of impact, any inference of negligence relating to that fact is based on speculation and is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment ( see, Miranda v. Devlin, 260 A.D.2d 451, 452; see also, Perez v. Brux Cab Corp., 251 A.D.2d 157, 159; Tran v. Nowak, 245 A.D.2d 1083, 1084). Further, the fact that Carroll did not reduce his speed upon entering the intersection is insufficient to raise an issue of fact concerning his alleged negligence because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (e), when "read in conjunction with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (a), `does not mandate that a driver reduce his or her speed at every intersection, but only when warranted by the conditions presented'" ( Wilke v. Price, 221 A.D.2d 846, quoting Bagnato v. Romano, 179 A.D.2d 713, 714, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 701). Here, there was no evidence of any condition that would have required Carroll to reduce his lawful speed ( see, Matt v. Tricil [N. Y.], 260 A.D.2d 811; Anastasio v. Scheer, 239 A.D.2d 823, 824).
However, the Supreme Court properly denied summary judgment to Boriewski, Efficiency, and Service Liquor. In light of the plaintiffs deposition testimony that Boriewski was driving "fast", and Hurley's deposition testimony that Boriewski was driving between 50 to 55 miles per hour on an unplowed road with 4 to 6 inches of snow, on it, there are questions of fact as to whether Boriewski contributed to the emergency situation with which he was confronted ( see, Stoehr v. Levere, 183 A.D.2d 886; Bagnato v. Romano, 179 A.D.2d 713).
Any evidence that Button was speeding does not change the conclusion that plaintiff, in failing to yield the right of way, was solely responsible for the collision (see, id.). Nor are we at all persuaded by plaintiffs' efforts to impose a duty upon Button, under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (e), to reduce his speed or take other evasive action before entering the intersection (see, Wilke v. Price, 221 A.D.2d 846). The record discloses no condition that would have required Button to reduce his speed as he approached the intersection (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 [e]; Anastasio v. Scheer, 239 A.D.2d 823; Bagnato v. Romano, 179 A.D.2d 713, 714, lv. denied 81 N.Y.2d 701) or evidence that Button had any opportunity to avoid the collision (see, Hazelton v. Brown, 248 A.D.2d 871, 873; Wilke v. Price, supra, at 847; Hornacek v. Hallenbeck, 185 A.D.2d 561, 562). The parties' additional contentions have been considered and found unavailing.
The conduct of Reynolds in supplying an advertising sign which was thereafter moved by the defendant Neighborhood Deli from its original location to a location which allegedly blocked the plaintiff's view of Gardiners Avenue, only furnished the condition or occasion for the event which caused the accident and did not constitute one of the causes of the accident ( see, Margolin v. Friedman, 43 N.Y.2d 982, 983). Summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Reynolds because it is undisputed that it did not place the sign in the location which allegedly blocked the plaintiff's view of Gardiners Avenue. The questions of whether the appellant Deborah Bernardo, the driver of the car which collided with the plaintiff's car, was negligent and whether her negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of the accident, is a jury question ( see, Bagnato v. Romano, 179 A.D.2d 713). Accordingly, the cross motion by the Bernardos for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them was properly denied. O'Brien, J.P., Goldstein, McGinity and Luciano, JJ., concur.
In addition, there was no evidence of any culpable conduct on defendant's part. Plaintiffs' speculation that defendant may have contributed to the accident by failing to anticipate that plaintiff might improperly pull into traffic or to take appropriate evasive action is insufficient to raise an issue of fact ( see, Miesing v. Whinnery, 233 A.D.2d 551; Peck v. Dygon, 224 A.D.2d 744, 745; Wilke v. Price, 221 A.D.2d 846). The record discloses no condition that would have required defendant to reduce her speed as she approached the intersection ( see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180[e]; Wilke v. Price, supra; Bagnato v Romano, 179 A.D.2d 713, 714, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 701) or evidence that defendant had any opportunity to avoid the collision. Rather, it was defendant's uncontroverted testimony that she never saw plaintiff before the accident and had no time to apply her brakes or to turn her steering wheel ( see, Wilke v. Price, supra; McKenney v. Orzechowski, 208 A.D.2d 1149; Cohen v. Masten, 203 A.D.2d 774, 775-776, lv denied 84 N.Y.2d 809).