Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:19-cv-03755
2021-02-02
James BAGLEY, Plaintiff, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY and Montgomery County Sheriff's Office, Defendants.
Nicholas Alexander Pohl, Shea Neal Palavan, Eric David Nielsen, The Nielsen Law Firm PC, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff. Daniel Plake, Conroe, TX, for Defendants.
Nicholas Alexander Pohl, Shea Neal Palavan, Eric David Nielsen, The Nielsen Law Firm PC, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.
Daniel Plake, Conroe, TX, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
Charles Eskridge, United States District Judge
Defendants Montgomery County and Montgomery County Sheriff's Office filed two motions to dismiss. The motion with respect to jural capacity of the Sheriff's Office and the applicable statute of limitations is granted. Dkt 8. The motion with respect to failure to state a claim is denied as moot. Dkt 25.
1. Background
This case arises out of injuries that Plaintiff James Bagley allegedly suffered while in custody in the Montgomery County Jail. The complaint factually pleads as follows.
Bagley was arrested under suspicion of driving while intoxicated on September 15, 2017. He was then detained in the Montgomery County Jail for almost a week. Dkt 1 at ¶ 13.
Bagley has epilepsy. Doctors have prescribed him a specialized medicinal regimen tailored to his condition, as is common among persons who suffer from epilepsy. Id at ¶¶ 14, 18. But Defendants didn't give him "his proper medications and/or the amounts thereof." Id at ¶ 18. They instead relied on their own "methodology and procedures." Id at ¶ 25.
Bagley, his wife, and his pharmacist attempted to correct Defendants' treatment plan. For the first five days of his incarceration, Bagley told jail staff and his wife that he wasn't receiving his prescribed epilepsy medication. Bagley's wife also brought his medication to the jail. And she began going to the jail nightly to speak with the nurse on duty, each time explaining his condition and the appropriate treatment schedule. Even with this information and after speaking with his pharmacist, Defendants didn't give him his prescribed medication. Id at ¶¶ 15–16.
Bagley alleges that he "continually requested his specific medications and amounts." Id at ¶ 18. He then suffered a partial seizure while incarcerated on September 21, 2017. He wasn't hospitalized, but jail staff still didn't give him his prescribed epilepsy medicine. Bagley then suffered a massive seizure the next day. He was immediately hospitalized and placed in an induced coma to avoid further brain damage. Id at ¶ 19.
Bagley remained in the hospital for three days, during which time he suffered other smaller seizures as doctors attempted to control his epilepsy and reconcile his medications. He was discharged on September 24, 2017, but was "essentially bedridden and with severe, debilitating mental trauma, rendering Plaintiff entirely disabled and of unsound mind for the next week." Id at ¶ 20. He alleges that he didn't regain "full cognitive function" until early October 2017. Ibid.
Bagley has suffered health consequences and complications from his seizure and hospitalization. Id at ¶ 21. He filed his original complaint on September 30, 2019. He asserts claims against Montgomery County and the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office for constitutional violations under 42 USC § 1983, as well as claims for negligence, res ipsa loquitor , and respondeat superior.
Defendants bring two motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. One concerns the jural capacity of the Sheriff's Office to be sued and the applicable statute of limitations. Dkt 8. Another argues failure to state a claim. Dkt 25.
2. Legal standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the defendant to seek dismissal if the plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
Review on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is constrained. The reviewing court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Walker v. Beaumont Independent School District , 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019), citing Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA , 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986). The court must also generally limit itself to the contents of the pleadings and its attachments. Brand Coupon Network LLC v. Catalina Marketing Corp. , 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014).
3. Analysis
a. Jural capacity
Defendants assert that the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office lacks the jural capacity to be sued. Dkt 8 at 4, in part citing Tex Local Gov Code § 71.001, and Darby v. Pasadena Police Department , 939 F.2d 311, 313–14 (5th Cir. 1991). Bagley agrees and doesn't oppose dismissal on this basis. Dkt 16 at 1.
The claims against the Sheriff's Office will be dismissed with prejudice.
b. Statute of limitations
A federal cause of action for violation of constitutional rights is provided by 42 USC § 1983. But it doesn't state an applicable statute of limitations. "To fill this gap, federal courts borrow the forum state's limitations period for personal-injury claims." Argueta v. City of Galveston , 2021 WL 137664, *1 (S.D. Tex.), citing Jackson v. Johnson , 950 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1992). Tort claims in Texas face a two-year limitations bar. See Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code § 16.003(a). And so, all claims asserted by Bagley are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Winfrey v. Rogers , 901 F.3d 483, 492 (5th Cir. 2018), citing Gartrell v. Gaylor , 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993).
The parties agree that two years is the applicable limitations period. See Dkt 8 at 4–5; Dkt 16 at 5–6. But they disagree whether this two-year statute of limitations bars all of Bagley's claims. This raises questions as to both the accrual date and potential tolling of the statute.
As to the accrual date. While state law provides the pertinent statute of limitations for the § 1983 claim asserted by Bagley, federal law determines when such a claim accrues. For example, see Moore v. McDonald , 30 F.3d 616, 620–21 (5th Cir. 1994). The Fifth Circuit in general holds that a § 1983 claim accrues "when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Brockman v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice , 397 F. Appx. 18, 22 (5th Cir. 2010, per curiam ), quoting Jackson , 950 F.2d at 265. And specifically, a § 1983 claim for personal injuries due to inadequate medical treatment accrues when the plaintiff "knew or should have known that he was receiving inadequate treatment." Martinez v. Foster , 2017 WL 1173369, *1 (E.D. Tex.), citing Brockman , 397 F. Appx. at 22.
As to the state-law tort claims asserted by Bagley, they in general accrue when "facts come into existence that authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy." Valdez v. Hollenbeck , 465 S.W.3d 217, 229 (Tex. 2015). As such, with respect to these tort claims for personal injuries stemming from improper medical treatment, the state and federal rules are the same. That is, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff has reason to know that he's receiving improper treatment. For example, Casarez v. NME Hospitals, Inc , 883 S.W.2d 360, 364–66 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, writ dism'd by agr.) ; see also Reeves v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice , 1999 WL 262139, *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo, no pet.) (unpublished) (discussing accrual of state-law claims where § 1983 claim also asserted).
Bagley was incarcerated on September 15, 2017. He alleges that he wasn't given his prescribed epilepsy medication from that day through September 22nd. His complaint makes clear that he knew he was receiving inadequate medical care from his first day of his incarceration. Indeed, the allegations indicate that he and others several times brought this to the attention of those at the jail and attempted to correct his medication. Dkt 1 at ¶¶ 13–19.
The two-year statute of limitations thus accrued on September 15, 2017. This means that the limitations period expired on September 15, 2019. Gross v. Copeland , 5 F.3d 1496, 1496 (5th Cir. 1993, per curiam ). Bagley filed this lawsuit on September 30, 2019. By law, that is fifteen days too late. His claims are time-barred unless a tolling provision applies.
As to tolling of the statute. Bagley doesn't really dispute the foregoing. He instead argues that he was rendered of unsound mind with the massive seizure experienced on September 22, 2017. Dkt 1 at ¶ 20. This, he says, tolled the statute of limitations until he regained full cognitive function some weeks later in October 2017. Dkt 16 at 6–7.
The Fifth Circuit holds that when a federal court applies a state's statute of limitations to a § 1983 claim, it should also apply that state's tolling provisions. Jackson , 950 F.2d at 265 (citations omitted); see also Argueta , 2021 WL 137664 at *1. Texas law provides, "If a person entitled to bring a personal action is under a legal disability when the cause of action accrues, the time of the disability is not included in a limitations period." Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code § 16.001(b). The term disability includes being "of unsound mind." Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code § 16.001(a)(2).
It can be assumed that Bagley sufficiently pleads he was of unsound mind and under legal disability within the meaning of § 16.001(a)(2) once he suffered his massive seizure on September 22, 2017. But he misconstrues the applicability of the unsound-mind exception. As stated, it applies only if the person asserting it "is under a legal disability when the cause of action accrues. " Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code § 16.001(b) (emphasis added). "A disability that arises after a limitations period starts does not suspend the running of the period." Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code § 16.001(d). This means that it isn't an exception that simply extends the deadline on the back end of the limitations period where the disability arises after the accrual date. For example, see Jeanty v. TXFM, Inc. , 2020 WL 6483376, *8 (E.D. Tex.) ; Salazar v. Johnson , 2019 WL 2124678, *2–3 (W.D. Tex.).
The decision of the Fifth Circuit in Cabeen v. Thomas controls. 409 F. Appx. 776 (5th Cir. 2011, per curiam ). The plaintiff there was also a prisoner. He was hospitalized for injuries sustained by the alleged use of excessive force by jail officers. He alleged that he became mentally incapacitated during his hospitalization and argued that the unsound-mind exception saved his otherwise untimely claim. To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit held that, even if the plaintiff could show that "during his hospitalization" he was of unsound mind, that disability arose "after the limitations period accrued" and didn't toll "the period for claims predating" the pertinent deadline. Id. at 778.
So, too, here. Bagley was aware that jail personnel were denying him his prescribed medication from the date of his arrival onward. His claim accrued then. His disability occurred one week later. The unsound-mind exception doesn't toll the pertinent statute of limitations.
The United States Supreme Court recognizes in these situations that "statutes of limitations often make it impossible to enforce what were otherwise perfectly valid claims." United States v. Kubrick , 444 U.S. 111, 125, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979). Bright-line demarcation in such statutes may extinguish claims, but "their very purpose" is to do just that. Ibid. And federal courts are obliged to observe applicable statutes of limitations without regard to consequences. As long ago stated by the Fifth Circuit, "It is of course unfortunate for the plaintiff to be barred from enforcing what may be a meritorious claim, but that is always the consequence when a statute of limitations applies." Dedmon v. Falls Products Inc. , 299 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1962).
No opinion is expressed as to the merits of Bagley's claims, but they must be dismissed. Yet he has to this point filed only an original complaint, without facing any prior motion to dismiss. A district court "should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires." FRCP 15(a)(2). The Fifth Circuit has long held that this evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend. See Carroll v. Fort James Corp. , 470 F.3d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 2006) ; Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Investment Corp. , 660 F.2d 594, 597 (5th Cir. 1981).
This pleading defect likely can't be cured on repleading. Even so, dismissal will be without prejudice. Bagley may seek leave to replead his claims, if he can do so in good faith.
c. Failure to state a claim
Defendants also move under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, asserting sovereign immunity on behalf of Montgomery County as to the state-law claims and attacking the substance of all asserted claims. Dkt 25. These arguments needn't be addressed in light of the above resolution. The motion will be denied as moot.
4. Conclusion
The motion by Defendants Montgomery County Sheriff's Office and Montgomery County to dismiss as to jural capacity and as to the statute of limitations is GRANTED . Dkt 8.
The claims against the Sheriff's Office are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE .
The claims against Montgomery County are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE . Bagley must bring any motion seeking leave to amend by February 22, 2021.
The motion by Defendants to dismiss for failure to state a claim is DENIED AS MOOT . Dkt 25.
SO ORDERED .