Since 1967, Washington courts have applied the "most significant relationship test" to contract choice of law issues.Mulcahy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 152 Wn.2d 92, 100, 95 P.3d 313 (2004) (citingBaffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wn.2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967)). "'In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, the validity and effect of a contract are governed by the law of the state having the most significant relationship with the contract.'" Id.

In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Schutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985), the Supreme Court addressed the requirements for the forum state's substantive law to govern common issues in a nationwide class action. The Court held that the forum state must have 'significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts' to the claims asserted by each member of the plaintiff class, contacts 'creating state interests,' in order to ensure that the choice of . . . law is not arbitrary or unfair.' Schutts, 472 U.S. at 821-22 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13, 101 S.Ct. 633, 639-40, 66 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981)). In Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, 70 Wn.2d 893, 899, 425 P.2d 623 (1967), the Washington State Supreme Court adopted the significant relationship test to determine the contract choice of law. Therefore, the law of the state that has the most significant relationship with the contract governs the validity and effect of the contract.

"The ‘approach is not to count contacts, but rather to consider which contacts are most significant and to determine where those contacts are found.’ " Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wash.2d 893, 425 P.2d 623, 628 (1967). Indeed, the "contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue."

Numerous States have adopted the "most significant relationship" rule set forth in the Restatement (2nd), Conflicts of Law, § 332, or a similar rule as an escape from the rigidity of lex loci contractus. See, e.g., Baffin Land Corporation v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wn.2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967); Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal.2d 588, 12 Cal.Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906 (1961); Boston Law Book Co. v. Hathorn, 119 Vt. 416, 127 A.2d 120 (1956); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, 50 A.L.R.2d 246 (1954); W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945). In Baffin, supra, the Washington Supreme Court explained the absurdity of strict application of lex loci contractus in the modern world as follows:

Id. The “approach is not merely to count contacts, but rather to consider which contacts are most significant and to determine where these contacts are found.” Johnson, 87 Wash.2d at 581, 555 P.2d 997 (citing Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wash.2d 893, 900, 425 P.2d 623 (1967)). Second, courts will continue to evaluate the interests and public policies of potentially concerned jurisdictions.

See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); First National Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973); Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1980); Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718, 449 P.2d 378 (1968); Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill.2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974); Casey v. Manson Construction Engineering Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979); Pioneer Credit Corporation v. Carden, 127 vt. 229, 245 A.2d 891 (1968); Baffin Land Corporation v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wash.2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967). In addition, the New York approach to choice of law, which evaluates and balances the contacts of jurisdictions involved in a choice of law controversy in order to apply the law of the jurisdiction that is the "center of gravity" of the controversy; see Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 479, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); is commonly viewed as having merged with the Restatement Second approach.

Section 6 of the Restatement sets forth seven factors relevant to a determination of the state having the most significant relationship to the issue: Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wn.2d 577, 580, 555 P.2d 997 (1976); Burnside, 123 Wn.2d at 100; Werner v. Werner, 84 Wn.2d 360, 368, 526 P.2d 370 (1974); Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wn.2d 893, 899-900, 425 P.2d 623 (1967). (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

There, the court summarized: We conclude, therefore, that the second La Selle case [ La Selle v. Woolery, 14 Wn. 70, 44 P. 115 (1896)] and its progeny, which Baffin [Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wn.2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967)] determined is no longer applicable as to the contract choice of law question, should no longer be adhered to on the question of community liability involved here. Rather we conclude that, since the obligation of a husband in Oregon subjects all the property of the married couple to the debt except the separate property of the wife, the effect of applying Oregon law to the situation before us is that all property, including community property, held by the Gobles and the Wallaces, with the exception of the wives separate property, is subject to the obligation involved.

In this respect the District does not enjoy any advantage over Maryland. Cf., Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wash.2d 893, 425 P.2d 623, 628 (Wash. 1967). Finally, appellant argues that a variation between the disclosure statement and the conditional sale contract runs afoul of the requirements of section 128(a)(9) and Regulation Z, § 226.8(b)(4), and is "apparent on the face of the statement."

There was no such reliance here on the availability of the assumption of risk defense. Cf. Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn. Inc., 70 Wn.2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967); Pacific States Cut Stone Company v. Goble, 70 Wn.2d 907, 425 P.2d 631 (1967). Moreover, Lyons aside, the instruction, although a correct statement of law, was abstract, and its giving constituted reversible error.