Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-0694-K.
August 12, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Currently pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Having considered the merits of the motions, having construed the patent at issue in the Court's claim construction Memorandum Opinion and Order also entered this day, and for the reasons stated below, the Court rules as follows: (1) Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED, as the patent claims at issue do not employ means-plus-function language according to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6; and (2) Defendants' Motion is GRANTED, as the accused products do not infringe the claims of the `877 patent either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.
I. Background
On September 16, 1986, the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("U.S. PTO") issued United State Patent No. 4,611,877 ("the `877 patent") to GEC Avionics Limited. After several name changes, GEC Avionics Limited became BAE Systems Electronics Limited ("BAE"), Plaintiff in this case. Accordingly, BAE is the current owner of the `877 patent.
The `877 patent deals with "head up displays" in aircraft cockpits. In airplanes, pilots use what is called a "head up display" during flight. Head up displays are used to enable a pilot to see data that is of interest to him without having to take his eyes off the sky in front of him. Like a movie projector and its screen, a head up display consists of two basic parts: (1) a projector, which takes the data of interest from some sort of luminous data source and projects it toward a viewing surface, and (2) the viewing surface itself, known as a "combiner" because it allows the pilot to view the combination of the projected data and the sky in front of the pilot.
The `877 patent deals with the projector aspect of the head up display, and is aptly captioned "optical projector for head-up displays." Specifically, the abstract of the `877 patent provides:
[a]n optical projector for a head-up display wherein light from a data source (15) passes through a first lens arrangement (23) and then into a wedge-shaped body (27) via a first face (29) of the body wherein the light is, in turn, internally reflected at second and third angled faces of the body (35 and 33) and then exists the body at the second face (35) to pass via a second lens arrangement (25) to the system combining (13) in a direction at an angle to that which light enters the body.
The arrangement of the projector facilitates the projector having lateral dimensions dictated by the data source (e.g. a CRT) rather than the optical elements of the projector.
The `877 patent was filed in 1985 and approved in 1986, and it originally had 5 claims. However, in July of 2001, BAE requested that the U.S. PTO reexamine the patentability of the `877 patent due to BAE's alleged discovery of prior art relevant to the `877 patent. After conducting reexamination proceedings, the U.S. PTO issued reexamination certificate US 4,611,877, which confirmed the patentability not only of original claims 1-5, but also of claims 6-13.
BAE brings this suit against Defendants Rockwell Collins, Inc. ("Rockwell") and ELCAN Optical Technologies (an unincorporated division of Raytheon Company) ("ELCAN") alleging that they willfully infringed the `877 patent. In its First Amended Complaint, BAE contends that Rockwell manufactures and/or sells products comprising and/or incorporating optical projectors of the type described in the `877 patent, thus infringing the `877 patent. Additionally, BAE contends that ELCAN manufactures and sells component parts of the overhead projector, thereby inducing infringement and/or contributorily infringing on one or more claims of the `877 patent.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits and other summary judgment evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2551 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2551-54. Once a movant makes a properly supported motion, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment should not be granted; the nonmovant may not rest upon allegations in the pleadings, but must support the response to the motion with summary judgment evidence showing the existence of a genuine fact issue for trial. Id. at 321-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2551-54; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14 (1986). All evidence and reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993 (1962).
III. Analysis
While the parties dispute the meaning of several terms included in the `877 patent, the central controversy involved in this case centers around the construction of claim 1 of the `877 patent. Claim 1 reads as follows:
An optical projector comprising a luminous data source and means for projecting and collimating light from the data source comprising a first lens arrangement having an optical axis arranged to receive light from the data source, a second lens arrangement having an optical axis inclined with respect to the optical axis of the first lens arrangement, and reflector means between the first and second lens arrangement arranged to deflect rays from the first lens arrangement to the second lens arrangement for transmission thereby . . .
Column 3, lines 12-21 of the `877 patent (hereinafter set out as "Col. 3, ll. 12-21"). While the parties contest the meaning of several phrases in the claims of the `877 patent, the Court's construction of the phrase "collimating light" renders all other disputes moot, and establishes that Defendants do not infringe the `877 patent.
A. Burden of Proof in a Patent Infringement Case
A party is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of noninfringement if it shows, based on the correct claim construction, that no reasonable jury could have found infringement on the undisputed facts or when all reasonable factual inferences are drawn in favor of the patentee. See TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Additionally, while equivalence is a question of fact normally reserved for the fact finder, the trial court should grant summary judgment in any case where no reasonable fact finder could find equivalence. See id.
An infringement analysis is a two-step process in which the court first determines the correct scope of the claim at issue, and then compares the properly construed claim to the accused device to determine whether all of the claim limitations are present either literally or by a substantial equivalent. See id. Infringement is only established when all elements of the claim, as correctly construed, are present in the accused systems. See id.
The Court held a Markman hearing in this case on June 23, 2004. Having reviewed the parties' briefs and all related filings and evidence, including the patent-in-suit, the specification, the patent prosecution history to the extent it was submitted by the parties, and the parties' proposed claim constructions, the Court enters its separate Markman order simultaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and Order. In the Markman order, the Court determined that the `877 patent claims an optical projector which fully collimates the light before the light reaches the combiner. That construction is dispositive of each of BAE's claims in this case.
B. Defendants' Accused Products Do Not Infringe the `877 Patent
In its First Amended Complaint, BAE alleges that Defendant Rockwell "has been and is making, having made, using, offering for sale, and selling products comprising and/or incorporating at least one optical projector for use in a head up display," including some of Rockwell's HGS systems, marketed under the trademark HGS® BAE specifically complains that the following HGS systems infringe one or more claims of the `877 patent: HGS-2850, HGS-2860, HGS-2900, HGS-3000, and HGS-3300. BAE's First Amended Complaint also contends that ELCAN "has been and is making, having made, using, offering for sale, and selling prisms . . . made specifically for use in a head up display, said prisms including but not limited to those included in Rockwell's HGS systems. . . ." BAE contends that ELCAN's prims infringe the claims of the `877 patent. BAE contends that Defendants infringed the `877 patent both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents.
1. Literal Infringement
Defendants claim that summary judgment is appropriate because in the accused products, collimation of the light does not occur until the light hits the combiner, while in a head-up display made in accordance with the `877 patent, the light is collimated before it ever reaches the combiner.
The evidence before the Court shows that to collimate light is to render light rays from a point source parallel. Pursuant to the Court's construction of claims 1 and 10 of the `877 patent, the entire collimating function of the `877 patent is performed by the optical projector, and as such, the light rays emitted from the luminous data source in the `877 patent are parallel before they reach the combiner. In the accused systems, however, it is not disputed that the light rays emitted from the luminous data source are not rendered parallel until they bounce off of a combiner. In both the `877 patent and the accused systems, an observer views a collimated image. However, in the `877 patent, the light is collimated before it bounces off of the combiner, while the light is not collimated until after it bounces off of the combiner in the accused systems. Accordingly, because none of the accused systems include optical projectors which collimate the light before the light reaches the combiner, the accused systems do not literally infringe the `877 patent. See TechSearch, 286 F.3d at 1371 (holding that infringement only occurs when all elements of a patent's claim are present in an accused system).
BAE misinterprets Defendants' position. First, BAE states that Defendants argue that "the total collimation function in defendants' accused products takes place at the combiner. This is admittedly false." Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 9 ("Plaintiff's Opp."). BAE then goes on to present deposition testimony of several of Defendants' representatives to the Court in which they state that by removing either of two lens arrangements in the accusing products, no infringement occurs. This testimony, BAE argues, shows that total collimation does not depend solely on the ability of the HGS systems' combiners to collimate the light. This argument is wrong. When systems conforming to the `877 patent and the HGS systems (the allegedly infringing systems) are compared to each other, the light emitted from the `877 patent is collimated by the time the light reaches the combiner, while the light emitted from the HGS systems is not collimated until the light reflects off of the combiner. It cannot be doubted that removing a lens arrangement from an optical projector in an HGS system would disrupt the path of the light so significantly that the image would not be collimated after it reflected off of the combiner. However, that is not the issue in this case. The issue is whether, once leaving the lens arrangements, the light is collimated. In the `877 patent, it is; in the accusing systems, it is not.
For the reasons given above, the accused systems do not literally infringe claims 1 or 10 of the `877 patent, which both require the optical projector to collimate the light. As Defendants do not infringe claims 1 or 10 or the `877 patent, and considering that claims 2-9 and 11-13 are dependent on the meanings of claims 1 and 10, Defendants also do not infringe any of the dependent claims of the `877 as a matter of law. See Minnesota Min. Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1299-1300 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the dependent claims of a patent cannot be infringed unless the independent claims on which they depend are infringed).
2. Doctrine of Equivalents
BAE contends that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to infringement of the `877 patent under the doctrine of equivalents because "it was well known to one of ordinary skill in the art to move some optical collimating power from the optical projector to the combiner." Plaintiff's Opp. at 11. The doctrine of equivalents allows a patentee to claim those insubstantial alterations which were not captured in the original patent claim, but which could be created through trivial changes. See Honeywell Intern. Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2004). An element in an accused device is equivalent to a claim limitation only if the differences between the two are insubstantial. See id. BAE's attempt to create a fact issue as to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a difficult task, as it must convince the fact finder that the accused systems' inclusion of an optical projector which does not collimate light is an insubstantial change from an optical projector which does collimate light.
BAE contends that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because "it was well known to one of ordinary skill in the art to move some optical collimating power from the optical projector to the combiner." Plaintiff's Opp. at 11. The Court disagrees with the proposition that using an optical projector which does not collimate light is an insubstantial change from an optical projector which does collimate light. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be used to find that the antithesis of a claimed element is insubstantially different from the claimed element itself. See Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1106 (Fed. Cir 2000). In Moore, the court considered a patent dealing with a "C-fold mailer-type business form with an integral return envelope." Id. at 1094. The language in claim 1 of the patent-in-suit read, in pertinent part "`first and second longitudinal strips of adhesive . . . extending the majority of the lengths of said longitudinal marginal portions. . . .'" Id. at 1095 (emphasis in original). In the patent-in-suit, it was not disputed that the adhesive extended the majority of the lengths of the longitudinal marginal portions. See id. at 1106. The plaintiff argued that the defendant infringed claim 1 under the doctrine of equivalents by having the adhesive extend "`about 48%' of the length of the longitudinal margins," which it argues was insubstantially different from extending 50.001% of the length of the margins. Id. The court rejected this argument, holding that "it would defy logic to conclude that a minority — the very antithesis of a majority — could be insubstantially different from a claim limitation requiring a majority." Id.
A stronger set of facts applies to this case. The `877 patent claims an optical projector which collimates light without using a combiner. The accused systems include optical projectors which emit uncollimated light at a combiner, which then collimates the light. An optical projector which does not collimate light is substantially different from an optical projector which does collimate light, and no reasonable juror could find otherwise. See id.
Additionally, claim 1 of the `877 patent contains clear structural limitations, calling for the optical projector to collimate the light emitted from a luminous data source. The principles set out by the Federal Circuit in Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc., 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997) apply to this case. In Sage, a patentee for a system of disposing of sharp medical instruments brought an infringement action against a competitor, and argued infringement both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents. See id. at 1423-24. The court there held that the patentee was bound by its specific arrangement of its claimed limitations, and could not escape under the doctrine of equivalents. In particular, the court held that because this issued patent contained clear structural limitations, the public had the right to rely on those limits in conducting its business activities. See id. at 1425-26.
The principles espoused in Sage apply to this case. The `877 patent clearly limits itself to only including an optical projector which performs the function of collimating light on its own. The accused systems certainly do not include optical projectors which perform the function of collimating light on their own. The public may rely on the limitations of the `877 patent, and BAE, not the public, is subject to the consequences of those limitations.
In order to have infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the plaintiff must establish that the accused systems accomplish substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result as the claimed invention. See Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 206, F.3d 1408, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 2000). It is not disputed that the accused systems have optical projectors which do not collimate light and curved combiners which do collimate light, while the `877 patent teaches optical projectors that do collimate light and flat combiners that reflect that light to the observer. While the result of viewing a collimated image is substantially the same between the two, that is the only part of the test that is met.
Therefore, Defendants have not infringed claims 1 or 10 of the `877 patent under the doctrine of equivalents as a matter of law, and judgment will enter that BAE take nothing on its claims of infringement against Defendants.
IV. Conclusion
Because the claims of the `877 patent do not invoke means-plus-function language, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Additionally, since the accused systems do not infringe the claims of the `877 patent either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, Defendants' are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, and their motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. As Defendants raised only affirmative defenses against Plaintiff's claims, no counterclaims remain for the Court's determination.
Judgment will enter this day that Plaintiff take nothing in this suit against Defendants, with all costs taxed against Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.