The decided cases, and the commentators, are consentient in the view that Rule 37(b)(2)'s plain language means exactly what it says. See, e.g., Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc. 896 F.2d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 142, 112 L.Ed.2d 109 (1990); Salahuddin v. Harris, 782 F.2d 1127, 1131 (2d Cir. 1986); Laclede Gas Co. v. G. W. Warnecke Corp., 604 F.2d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 1979); 4A J. Moore J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 37.03[2], at 37-62 to 37-64 (2d ed. 1991); 8 C. Wright A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2289, at 790 (1970). In this case, therefore, the propriety of dismissing plaintiffs' complaint under Rule 37(b)(2) hinges on the answer to the following question: Did either Ward's refusal to answer the tax exemption questions during his deposition or the plaintiffs' failure to produce the Impex documents transgress "an order to provide or permit discovery," Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2), then in effect?