Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc.

32 Citing cases

  1. XCO INTERNATIONAL INCORP. v. PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC CO

    No. 01 C 6851 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2003)   Cited 2 times
    Denying motion for attorneys fees because "while XCO did not prevail on its motions, such motions had a reasonable bases in fact and law"

    If the court determines an exceptional case exists, it then, in its discretion, must decide whether to award attorney's fees. Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Badalamenti). The party seeking an exceptional case status has the burden of proving that its case is exceptional by clear and convincing evidence.

  2. Riach v. Manhattan Design Studio

    No. 00 C 5883 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2001)

    An award of fees is a two step process. First, the court must find that the case is an "exceptional case". If the court determines an exceptional case exists, it then, in its discretion, must decide whether to award attorney's fees. Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Badalamenti). The party seeking an exceptional case status has the burden of proving that its case is exceptional by clear and convincing evidence.

  3. Brasseler U.S.A., I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp.

    93 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (S.D. Ga. 1999)   Cited 3 times

    Their "discretion [is] informed by [their] familiarity with the matter in litigation and the interests of justice." Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quotes and cite omitted). "[T]he decision respecting inequitable conduct is a discretionary decision to be made by the judge on his or her own factual findings. . . . Once threshold findings of materiality and intent are established, the court must weigh them to determine whether the equities warrant a conclusion that inequitable conduct occurred."

  4. Victus, Ltd. v. Collezione Europa U.S.A., Inc.

    26 F. Supp. 2d 772 (M.D.N.C. 1998)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that fees can be awarded under section 285 for either objective or subjective bad faith whereas sham litigation requires a showing of both objective and subjective bad faith

    " The purpose of the statute is to allow the district court discretion to award fees "where it would be grossly unjust that the winner be left to bear the burden of his own counsel which prevailing litigants normally bear." Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting J.P. Stevens Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 822 F.2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress intended that district courts use this discretion sparingly, as the statute is a departure from the usual "American" rule that counsel fees are not awarded to the prevailing party in an action at law.

  5. Alexander Manufacturing Co. v. HM Electronics, Inc.

    857 F. Supp. 648 (N.D. Iowa 1994)

    Plaintiff asserts these discrepancies are attributable to the lapse of time between the sale of the prototypes in 1981 and 82 and the preparation of the declaration in October 1984. Plaintiff states they may have been careless, negligent, or inattentive in attempting to review 2-3 year old sales records but that doesn't amount to intent to deceive. Plaintiff asserts that this is not an "exceptional case" warranting attorney's fees. Plaintiff asserts that the purpose of 35 U.S.C. ยง 285 is to provide the district court with the discretion to award attorneys fees where it would be grossly unjust for the winner be left to bear the burden of his counsel fees. Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Plaintiff contends that the cases cited by the defendant are distinguishable and this court should follow Western Marine Electronics v.Furuno Electric Co., Ltd., 764 F.2d 840, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1985) where the court affirmed the district court's denial of attorney's fees in an action involving the on-sale bar issue even though the district court had determined that the patentee had not been forthright in producing certain documents and that some of its interrogatory answers may have been deliberately misleading.

  6. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.

    866 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017)   Cited 32 times
    Concluding "the Second Circuit would hold that, in light of Octane, the Lanham Act should have the same standard for recovering attorney's fees as the Patent Act."

    Here, however, there is intervening relevant Supreme Court authority which, we think, would lead the Second Circuit to follow other circuits which have held that the Octane standard applies to the Lanham Act. See Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc. , 896 F.2d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[I]f the regional circuit court has not spoken, we must predict how that court would decide the issue...."). The Second Circuit in Penshurst Trading Inc. v. Zodax L.P., 652 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir. 2016), held that "[w]e have not yet decided whether [the Octane ] rule applies in the context of the Lanham Act, but we need not do so here ... [because] we [would] affirm the district court's denial of attorney's fees" under either Octane or Louis Vuitton.

  7. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc.

    687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 72 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Finding that the purpose of ยง 285 is to reimburse the alleged infringer for defending an action improperly brought, or prolonged in bad faith

    The purpose of section 285, unlike that of Rule 11, is not to control the local bar's litigation practicesโ€”which the district court is better positioned to observeโ€”but is remedial and for the purpose of compensating the prevailing party for the costs it incurred in the prosecution or defense of a case where it would be grossly unjust, based on the baselessness of the suit or because of litigation or Patent Office misconduct, to require it to bear its own costs. SeeBadalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1364 (Fed.Cir.1990); Cent. Soya Co., Inc. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1983). As Seagate noted, under the subjective prong, โ€œto establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.โ€

  8. Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors

    322 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2003)   Cited 96 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that plainly anticompetitive conduct by otherwise valid joint ventures must be "reasonably ancillary to the legitimate cooperative aspects of the venture"

    That sanction hasn't yet been approved by the district court and isn't before us. Relying on Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1990), defendants contend that the court abused its discretion because they had objected to the discovery requests as ambiguous, and plaintiffs never "tested" those objections. But plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery is the only testing that Rule 37(a)(4) requires.

  9. Freeman v. San Diego Assn. of Realtors

    01-56199oa (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2003)   Cited 1 times

    [ 32] Relying on Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1990), defendants contend that the court abused its discretion because they had objected to the discovery requests as ambiguous, and plaintiffs never "tested" those objections. But plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery is the only testing that Rule 37(a)(4) requires.

  10. Seal-Flex v. Athletic Track Court Const

    172 F.3d 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 99 times
    Holding that proving infringement requires the patentee to demonstrate that the accused product meets each claim limitation of the subject patent

    The imposition of sanctions for misconduct during discovery is not unique to this court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wexell v. Komar Indus., Inc., 18 F.3d 916, 919, 29 USPQ2d 2017, 2020 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (reviewing discovery sanctions under Sixth Circuit standards); Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1362, 13 USPQ2d 1967, 1970 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (same). Accordingly, this court applies the law of the pertinent regional circuit, in this case the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. See Pro-Mold Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1574, 37 USPQ2d 1626, 1631 (Fed. Cir. 1996).