Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc.

11 Citing cases

  1. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco International Ltd.

    910 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 155 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a remand "should be limited to cases in which further action must be taken by the district court or in which the appellate court has no way open to it to affirm or reverse the district court's action under review"

    Id. Similarly, in Badalamenti v. Dunhams, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1364-65, 13 USPQ2d 1967, 1971-72 (Fed. Cir. 1990), because the district court was silent on the exceptional case issue and fee denial, we were "unable to review the decision of the district court on this issue." Recognizing that a remand was "unfortunate", we went on to eschew any suggestion that the case be found exceptional, noting that defendant's primary basis for requesting fees had disappeared and that, even if the case be found exceptional, a denial of fees remained discretionary with the district court.

  2. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG

    155 F. Supp. 2d 668 (E.D. Va. 2001)   Cited 13 times
    Discussing Rambus' litigation misconduct and document destruction

    First, it permits an award of fees "where it would be grossly unjust that the winner be left to bear the burden of his own counsel which prevailing litigants normally bear." Badalamenti v. Dunham's Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 851, 111 S.Ct. 142, 112 L.Ed.2d 109 (1990) (quoting J.P. Stevens Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 822 F.2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1987)) (emphasis in original). Thus, under § 285, an award of attorneys' fees compensates the prevailing party for losses incurred as the consequence of the conduct of the losing party.

  3. Victus, Ltd. v. Collezione Europa U.S.A., Inc.

    26 F. Supp. 2d 772 (M.D.N.C. 1998)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that fees can be awarded under section 285 for either objective or subjective bad faith whereas sham litigation requires a showing of both objective and subjective bad faith

    " The purpose of the statute is to allow the district court discretion to award fees "where it would be grossly unjust that the winner be left to bear the burden of his own counsel which prevailing litigants normally bear." Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting J.P. Stevens Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 822 F.2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress intended that district courts use this discretion sparingly, as the statute is a departure from the usual "American" rule that counsel fees are not awarded to the prevailing party in an action at law.

  4. Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors

    322 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2003)   Cited 96 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that plainly anticompetitive conduct by otherwise valid joint ventures must be "reasonably ancillary to the legitimate cooperative aspects of the venture"

    That sanction hasn't yet been approved by the district court and isn't before us. Relying on Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1990), defendants contend that the court abused its discretion because they had objected to the discovery requests as ambiguous, and plaintiffs never "tested" those objections. But plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery is the only testing that Rule 37(a)(4) requires.

  5. Freeman v. San Diego Assn. of Realtors

    01-56199oa (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2003)   Cited 1 times

    [ 32] Relying on Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1990), defendants contend that the court abused its discretion because they had objected to the discovery requests as ambiguous, and plaintiffs never "tested" those objections. But plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery is the only testing that Rule 37(a)(4) requires.

  6. Seal-Flex v. Athletic Track Court Const

    172 F.3d 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 99 times
    Holding that proving infringement requires the patentee to demonstrate that the accused product meets each claim limitation of the subject patent

    The imposition of sanctions for misconduct during discovery is not unique to this court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wexell v. Komar Indus., Inc., 18 F.3d 916, 919, 29 USPQ2d 2017, 2020 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (reviewing discovery sanctions under Sixth Circuit standards); Badalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1362, 13 USPQ2d 1967, 1970 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (same). Accordingly, this court applies the law of the pertinent regional circuit, in this case the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. See Pro-Mold Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1574, 37 USPQ2d 1626, 1631 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

  7. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Systems, Inc.

    3 F.3d 404 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 344 times
    Finding that "[a]s the party moving for attorney fees, the burden was on [the prevailing party] to prove the exceptional nature of the case by clear and convincing evidence"

    EMS argues that the district court issued no factual findings as to whether this was an "exceptional case" and thus a remand was necessary to allow the court to make the requisite findings of fact and to decide whether an award of attorney fees was warranted. In support of its argument, EMS relies upon our decisions in Badalamenti v. Dunham's Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 13 USPQ2d 1967 (Fed.Cir.1990), Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 7 USPQ2d 1606 (Fed.Cir.1988), and S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 228 USPQ 367 (Fed.Cir.1986), in which remand was deemed necessary for further "exceptional case" findings. Those cases, however, are distinguishable from the instant case.

  8. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Rambus, Inc.

    440 F. Supp. 2d 512 (E.D. Va. 2006)   Cited 3 times

    First, an award of fees is designed to "to compensate the prevailing party for its monetary outlays in the prosecution or defense of the suit," Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983), "where it would be grossly unjust that the winner be left to bear the burden of his own counsel which prevailing litigants normally bear." Badalamenti v. Dunham's Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quotingJ.P. Stevens Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 822 F.2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1987)) (emphasis in original). Additionally, § 285 is designed to deter parties from bringing or prosecuting bad faith litigation, see Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

  9. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Rambus, Inc.

    439 F. Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Va. 2006)   Cited 17 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that “ ‘[i]n the case of intentional misconduct, as where concealment was knowing and purposeful, it seems fair to presume that the suppressed evidence would have damaged the non-disclosing party’ ” (alteration in original)

    First, it "compensate[s] the prevailing party for its monetary outlays in the prosecution or defense of the suit," Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983), "where it would be grossly unjust that the winner be left to bear the burden of his own counsel which prevailing litigants normally bear." Badalamenti v. Dunham's Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting J.P. Stevens Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 822 F.2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1987)) (emphasis in original). Second, and of equal, if not greater, importance, the sanction serves to deter parties from bringing or prosecuting bad faith litigation, see Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

  10. In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig.

    231 F.R.D. 331 (N.D. Ill. 2005)   Cited 126 times
    Finding untimely motion to compel can only succeed by showing actual and substantial prejudice.

    The served party has the option of providing appropriate written objections and leaving it to the party seeking discovery to file a motion to compel. SeeBadalamenti v. Dunham's, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1362 (Fed.Cir.1990); Continental Industries, Inc. v. Integrated Logistics Solutions, LLC, 211 F.R.D. 442, 444 (N.D.Okla.2002). See also Rules 33(b)(4) and (b)(5) and 37, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Advisory Committee Notes To Rules 33 and 34 (1970 Amendment).