Bacon v. Thompson

12 Citing cases

  1. Wilson v. Kelso

    92 N.W.2d 392 (Iowa 1958)   Cited 6 times

    The creditor's right attaches at the time of the levy. Bacon Co. v. Thompson, 60 Iowa 284, 285-7, 14 N.W. 312, and citations; Young v. Evans, 118 Iowa 144, 146, 92 N.W. 111; Albia State Bank v. Smith, 141 Iowa 255, 258, 119 N.W. 608. See also Yetley v. Irons, 238 Iowa 23, 25 N.W.2d 677, 168 A.L.R. 1159; Dorcas v. Hamiel, 248 Iowa 290, 293, 294, 78 N.W.2d 661, 663.

  2. Fagan v. Grady

    101 N.H. 18 (N.H. 1957)   Cited 10 times
    Determining the deed addressed the controlling monument, extrinsic evidence supported the existence of that monument, and a surveyor placed a new monument in the same location at a later date

    In support of their exception to the order permitting amendment of the plaintiffs' bill in equity, the defendants urge that the plaintiffs' claim of ownership both by deed and by adverse possession "were inconsistent and the motion should have been denied." We think it plain that allowance of the amendment was discretionary with the Trial Court. Bacon v. Thompson, 87 N.H. 270. See Bean v. Insurance Company, 94 N.H. 342. The amendment served to present an alternative ground on which the plaintiffs' right to the disputed strip might be established, and no reason appears why the plaintiffs should not have been permitted to maintain their claim upon the basis of the deed, or adverse possession, or both. Brown v. Peaslee, 69 N.H. 436. It was open to them to claim title by conveyance, and if the deed should be found not to convey the full extent of the land occupied, to claim the balance by prescription.

  3. Sullivan v. Bank

    108 A.2d 553 (N.H. 1954)   Cited 3 times

    Gitchell v. Andover, 59 N.H. 363, 364. Although section 28 requires that a "petition setting forth all the facts" should be filed there is nothing in the record to show that the Trial Court abused its discretion in granting plaintiffs leave to amend whether a request therefor was made at the hearing or not. Bacon v. Thompson, 87 N.H. 270. See Taylor v. Jewell, 98 N.H. 331.

  4. Porter v. Barton

    95 A.2d 118 (N.H. 1953)   Cited 5 times
    Focusing on employer's right to control employee's performance

    The denial of plaintiff's motion to amend his declaration made during the course of the hearing presented a discretionary question of fact for the Trial Court. Whitney v. Hood Sons, 88 N.H. 483. There being nothing in this case to indicate an abuse of discretion his exception is without merit. Bacon v. Thompson, 87 N.H. 270, 271. Exceptions overruled.

  5. Eastman v. Waisman

    51 A.2d 151 (N.H. 1947)   Cited 24 times

    This represents the usual practice in this state and has been followed generally. Hening's Digest, 1242; Bacon v. Thompson, 87 N.H. 270; Pflug v. Pflug, ante, 134. This rule has certain limitations and exceptions which, however, do not benefit the defendant.

  6. Pflug v. Pflug

    47 A.2d 829 (N.H. 1946)   Cited 1 times

    PER CURIAM. Since no question relating to the sufficiency of the evidence to support any of the master's findings appears to have been raised in the Superior Court, it cannot be raised here. Bacon v. Thompson, 87 N.H. 270, 271. It was the position of defendant's counsel at the hearing that the only question before the master was the extent to which the payment or nonpayment of rents from certain property in Lawrence, Massachusetts, influenced him in his previous findings.

  7. Hebert v. Couture

    31 A.2d 61 (N.H. 1943)

    Under these circumstances, plaintiffs' exception to the action of the court raises no question of law. Analogous cases are Association Canado-Americaine v. Marquis, 90 N.H. 125; Bacon v. Thompson, 87 N.H. 270; Erisman Company v. Company, 87 N.H. 483. Exception overruled.

  8. Association Canado-Americaine v. Marquis

    5 A.2d 37 (N.H. 1939)   Cited 2 times

    Per Curiam. The case having been submitted by the defendant Marquis without questioning the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a decree in favor of the other defendants, the motion to set aside the decree apparently presents no question of law, Bacon v. Thompson, 87 N.H. 270; Erisman Co. v. Company, 87 N.H. 483, and the defendant's exceptions are therefore overruled. If, however, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the decree were properly before us, the same result would follow, since it is plain, in view of the facts above stated, that the defendant Emile Marquis was never named as beneficiary of the certificate in question according to the regulations of the association, and the decree of the court awarding the proceeds thereof to the brothers and sisters of the assured is strictly in accordance with said regulations.

  9. Davidson v. Corporation

    3 A.2d 106 (N.H. 1938)   Cited 3 times

    Such a motion was later filed and allowed and the defendant made no objection. The plaintiff's second motion to amend by alleging the date of injury as on or about June 25, 1934, instead of on or about July 25 of that year, to the granting of which the defendant did except, was made on the day of trial when counsel for the plaintiff for the first time saw an authenticated copy of the defendant's pay records. Counsel for the defendant admits that this motion to amend presented a question for the discretion of the court below (P. L., c. 334, s. 9; Bacon v. Thompson, 87 N.H. 270; Whitney v. Hood Sons, 88 N.H. 483), but argues that in this instance that discretionary power was abused. His contention is that the granting of this motion just before the trial began and without giving the defendant a continuance was unreasonable as a matter of law because it deprived the defendant of an opportunity to procure evidence to meet the changed date of injury. This contention cannot be sustained for the reason that the defendant's payroll, coupled with what the plaintiff said in his deposition, gave the defendant full and seasonable information, or opportunity to obtain information, as to the date of the alleged injury.

  10. Brown v. Churchill

    200 A. 393 (N.H. 1938)   Cited 3 times

    The only evidence is that all such arrangements were made after the death of the decedent. The master has found, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support his findings was not challenged at the trial and so cannot be challenged here (Bacon v. Thompson, 87 N.H. 270, 271, and cases cited), that the defendant agreed to pay for the funeral as trustee and that the terms of his trust did not permit him to do so. This agreement to pay was an original undertaking by the defendant, (Janvrin v. Powers, 79 N.H. 44), which obligates him personally in spite of the fact that he assumed the obligation in his fiduciary capacity.