Opinion
A-12995
04-20-2022
BASIL J. BACKFORD, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Basil J. Backford, in propria persona, Anchorage, Appellant. Hazel C. Blum, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court Trial Court No. 3DI-15-00307 CR, Third Judicial District, Dillingham, Christina L. Reigh, Judge.
Basil J. Backford, in propria persona, Anchorage, Appellant.
Hazel C. Blum, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.
Following a jury trial, Basil J. Backford was convicted of felony driving under the influence after he crashed his truck into a ditch. On appeal, Backford, representing himself, raises several claims.
AS 28.35.030(n).
We first address Backford's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. To prove the charge of felony driving under the influence, the State was required to establish, in relevant part, that Backford operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and that, within the preceding ten years, he had been convicted of felony driving under the influence at least once.
See id. (raising driving under the influence to a felony offense under certain circumstances).
When we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view the evidence - and all reasonable inferences arising from that evidence - in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we ask whether a reasonable juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not evaluate witness credibility or the weight of the evidence, as those are questions for the factfinder.
Iyapana v. State, 284 P.3d 841, 848-49 (Alaska App. 2012) (citing Morrell v. State, 216 P.3d 574, 576 (Alaska App. 2009)).
Morrell, 216 P.3d at 576 (citing Ratliff v. State, 798 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Alaska App. 1990)).
We have reviewed the evidence presented at trial, which included many of Backford's own admissions. Backford told the trooper responding to a report of a single-vehicle crash that he was drunk and had consumed between eight and twelve cans of beer; that he had been trying to do "brodies" in his truck (i.e., spin the truck around in circles); and that he had crashed, hitting his head into the vehicle's windshield. He also told the trooper that he had not consumed any alcohol after the crash.
The trooper testified that when he contacted Backford, he could see that Backford had recently sustained an injury to his head - i.e., the wound was still bleeding - and he could smell "a very strong odor of an alcoholic beverage" coming from Backford. The trooper also testified that he had located the vehicle that Backford said he was driving, and that it was in a roadside ditch with its frame twisted from the force of the crash. The vehicle was registered to Backford's father. According to the trooper, he saw fresh tire marks on the gravel in "an aggressive circular pattern" consistent with Backford's report that he had been driving in circles. The trooper further stated that the vehicle's windshield was damaged in a "circular pattern spidering in the middle," which was consistent with Backford's report that his head had hit the windshield during the crash.
After the jury returned a guilty verdict for driving under the influence, the State submitted a certified copy of Backford's prior conviction for felony driving under the influence, which had occurred within ten years of the conduct in this case.
Viewing this evidence together, a reasonable juror could find that Backford was guilty of felony driving under the influence beyond a reasonable doubt.
Backford next contends that the superior court erred by failing to suppress his statements under Miranda v. Arizona. Because Backford did not raise this issue in the trial court, he must show plain error. Plain error requires, inter alia, that the error not be "the result of an intelligent waiver or a tactical decision not to object," and that "the error . . . be obvious, meaning that it should have been apparent to any competent judge or lawyer."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The particular nature of Backford's claim is not entirely clear; he appears to be arguing either that he never validly waived his Miranda rights, or that the officer questioned him notwithstanding his invocation of those rights.
Adams v. State, 261 P.3d 758, 773 (Alaska 2011).
The record suggests that Backford's attorney made a conscious decision not to file any suppression motions. Prior to trial, the prosecutor observed that it seemed like Backford was "waiving filing any suppression motions." When the superior court responded that "it sound[ed] like it," Backford's attorney replied, "Yeah, we're . . . ready to go forward."
See Moreno v. State, 341 P.3d 1134, 1143-44 (2015) (explaining that, on direct appeal, appellate courts will not construe counsel's inaction as a tactical decision "absent a clear indication in the record").
Even if we assume, as Backford asks us to, that this decision was not tactical, our review of the record reveals no obvious error. The record suggests that the trooper did at some point, administer Miranda warnings to Backford. And because there was no Miranda motion filed, there is an insufficient evidentiary record to evaluate whether Backford's statements were taken during custodial interrogation - a prerequisite for establishing a Miranda violation - and whether Backford validly waived his Miranda rights. Accordingly, Backford has not shown an error that should have been apparent to any competent judge or lawyer.
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) ("Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.'"); see also Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979) (establishing standards governing the determination of when a person is "in custody" for Miranda purposes).
We now turn to Backford's claim that the court committed plain error by not addressing certain discovery issues. This claim is not supported by the record. The record shows that Backford's attorney expressed concern about the absence of discovery in connection with only one of the State's witnesses. When the prosecutor informed Backford's attorney that the State would not call the witness to testify, the attorney indicated that she was satisfied and did not further pursue the issue. Soon after, the attorney told the court that the defense had nothing else to take up prior to jury selection. This record does not show any error in the court's handling of this discovery issue, let alone plain error.
Finally, Backford contends that his trial attorney was ineffective in various ways. But as a general matter, this Court will not consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on appeal because, in most instances, the appellate record is inadequate to allow the Court to meaningfully assess the attorney's performance. Backford's case is typical, and the appellate record is inadequate for this Court to meaningfully assess the competence of Backford's attorney's decisions. Backford's claims of ineffective assistance must be raised in the superior court in an application for post-conviction relief under Alaska Criminal Rule 35.1. The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
See Barry v. State, 675 P.2d 1292, 1295-96 (Alaska App. 1984).