Opinion
A20-1098
06-07-2021
Danna Rochelle BACK, petitioner, Respondent, v. STATE of Minnesota, Appellant.
Joseph A. Gangi, Farrish Johnson Law Office, Chtd., Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent) Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Joseph A. Gangi, Farrish Johnson Law Office, Chtd., Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Hooten, Judge.
OPINION
SLIETER, Judge Appellant State of Minnesota appeals the district court's determination that respondent Danna Rochelle Back is eligible for compensation based on exoneration. The state argues that the district court erred in concluding that Back was exonerated as contemplated by Minn. Stat. § 590.11. The district court properly determined that Back was exonerated as defined in subdivision 1, properly applied subdivision 3 by concluding the crime was not committed by Back, and properly determined that Back satisfied the elements of subdivision 5 of the statute. However, because the district court failed to exercise its discretion to determine Back's eligibility for compensation as an exonerated person as required by subdivision 7, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
This case has a significant history before all three levels of the judicial branch and has resulted in a revamping of Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (eligibility for compensation based on exoneration), by the legislature. The district court's conclusion that Back is eligible for compensation pursuant to the amended exoneration statute, of which the state seeks review, comes before our court as Back V .
In 2007, Back and N.S., at Back's insistence, went to the home of Back's former boyfriend. State v. Back , No. A08-0017, 2009 WL 910756, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 7, 2009) (Back I ). At the home, N.S. fatally shot Back's former boyfriend with a firearm. Id. Though Back did not possess or use the firearm, a jury found Back guilty of second-degree manslaughter with culpable negligence. Id. The district court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Back to an executed prison sentence, which our court affirmed. Id. at *7.
The supreme court reversed the conviction, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Back was culpably negligent because she owed no legal duty to N.S. or the victim. State v. Back , 775 N.W.2d 866, 872 (Minn. 2009) (Back II ). By the time of the supreme court's decision, Back had spent 32 months in prison and four months on supervised release.
Back next petitioned for eligibility for compensation pursuant to Minnesota's exoneration-compensation statute, which the district court denied. Our court reversed this decision and determined that Back qualified as an exonerated person within the meaning of subdivision 1 and remanded the case for consideration of the other eligibility requirements. Back v. State , 883 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. App. 2016) (Back III ). The supreme court determined that a portion of the statute which provided Back with a remedy was unconstitutional and reversed the court of appeals decision. Back v. State , 902 N.W.2d 23 (Minn. 2017) (Back IV ).
Following legislative amendments to subdivision 1 of the statute, which redefined what it means to be "exonerated," Back again petitioned the district court for a determination of eligibility. Following a hearing, the district court concluded that Back was eligible to seek compensation based on exoneration. The state appeals.
ISSUE
Did the district court fail to exercise its discretion as required by Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 7, to determine whether Back was eligible to seek exoneration compensation?
ANALYSIS
The state argues the district court abused its discretion by concluding Back was eligible to seek exoneration compensation. We first outline the steps the exoneration-compensation statutes provide for a determination of eligibility and receipt of exoneration compensation. Next, we consider those steps and the facts of this case to address whether the district court abused its discretion.
A.
In 2014, the Minnesota legislature enacted an exoneration-compensation statute, Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362 -.368 (2014), which provides an avenue for exonerated persons to petition to seek compensation from the state through Minn. Stat. § 590.11. In 2019, the legislature amended subdivision 1 of section 590.11, which defines "exonerated." Following a successful completion of the four steps required by section 590.11, four additional steps pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362 -.368 must occur before a petitioner may receive compensation for exoneration.
Section 590.11 prescribes a four-step process for the district court to determine eligibility based upon exoneration. Minn. Stat. § 590.11. The burden of proof rests on the petitioner to demonstrate the facts alleged in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2020).
First, a petitioner must prove, and the district court must find, as a threshold issue that the petitioner was exonerated. Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1 ; Back II , 883 N.W.2d at 619. The question of whether a petitioner meets the statutory definition of "exonerated" presents a question of statutory interpretation that appellate courts review de novo. Back IV , 902 N.W.2d at 27. In prior appellate cases, no hearing occurred because the district court determined whether the petitioner was exonerated "on grounds consistent with innocence" and that was the appellate issue. See , e.g. , Back III , 883 N.W.2d at 616 ; Freeman v. State , 944 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Minn. App. 2020) ; Kingbird v. State , 949 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Minn. App. 2020), review granted (Minn. Nov. 17, 2020).
The Minnesota legislature amended the exoneration-compensation statute in 2019 to define "exonerated" as having a "vacated, reversed, or set aside [ ] judgment of conviction on grounds consistent with innocence. " Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(b)(1)(i) (Supp. 2019) (emphasis added). The legislature defined "on grounds consistent with innocence" as a showing of "any evidence of factual innocence" by the petitioner. Id. , subd. 1(c) (Supp. 2019). Unlike the previous cases to come before our court for review of a petition pursuant to section 590.11, this matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing, which requires us, for the first time, to review an order that addresses additional subdivisions of the statute beyond subdivision 1.
Second, the district court must "determine if an individual who is exonerated is eligible for compensation based on the establishment of innocence. " Id. , subd. 3(b) (Supp. 2019) (emphasis added). This requires the petitioner to establish "that a crime was not committed or that the crime was not committed by the petitioner." Id. Third, the district court must determine whether the exonerated petitioner meets the elements described in subdivision 5. This subdivision states that:
Subdivision 3(a), not here applicable, directs the district court to issue an order of eligibility if the prosecutor "joins the petition and indicates that it is likely that the original complaint or indictment would not have been filed or sought or would have been dismissed with the knowledge of all of the circumstances." Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 3(a).
A claim for compensation arises if a person is eligible for compensation under subdivision 3 and:
(1) the person was convicted of a felony and served any part of the imposed sentence;
(2) in cases where the person was convicted of multiple charges arising out of the same behavioral incident, the person was exonerated for all of those charges;
(3) the person did not commit or induce another person to commit perjury or fabricate evidence to cause or bring about the conviction; and
(4) the person was not serving a term of incarceration for another crime at the same time ....
Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 5. We note that steps two and three of the analysis will typically be combined for the district court to consider during the hearing and based on both the record and the facts presented.
Fourth, subdivision 7 requires the district court to exercise its discretion to determine whether the exonerated petitioner is eligible for compensation: "If, after considering all the files and records admitted and any evidence admitted at a hearing held pursuant to subdivision 4 , the court determines that the petitioner is eligible for compensation, the court shall issue an order containing its findings ...." Id. , subd. 7 (emphasis added). Subdivision 4—which informs the district court's analysis of steps two, three, and four—describes the evidence which may be considered in determining eligibility:
Court records related to the conviction and the exoneration are admissible in a proceeding under this section .... Both the petitioner and the prosecutor have the right to present additional evidence. The court may consider acts by the petitioner that may have contributed to bringing about the conviction and any other offenses that may have been committed by the petitioner in the same behavioral incident, except for those acts contained in subdivision 5, paragraph (c). The victim of the offense has a right to submit an oral or written statement before the court issues its order. The statement may summarize the harm suffered by the victim as a result of the crime and give the victim's recommendation on whether the petition should be granted or denied.
Id. , subd. 4 (emphasis added).
If a petitioner succeeds in obtaining a district court order concluding eligibility for compensation, the petitioner may bring a claim for an award based on exoneration. Because the facts and procedural history of this case implicate only the above section 590.11 process, we do not address the process which will next occur pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362 -.368, in our analysis.
The remaining process would entail (1) bringing a claim for an award pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 611.362 and appointment of a compensation panel by the chief justice of the supreme court, (2) the panel holding an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of damages pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 611.364 -365, (3) judicial review, if sought by a party, of the damages decision pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 611.366, and (4) the panel forwarding the decision to the commissioner of management and budget, who then submits "the amount of the award to the legislature for consideration as an appropriation." Minn. Stat. § 611.367.
B.
We now apply this statutory framework to the facts of this case. For reasons described below, the district court properly concluded that the first three steps of the statute were met but the district court failed to exercise its discretion required by step four.
Definition
The state argues the district court erred by concluding Back is an exonerated individual, claiming the definition of "exonerated" in subdivision 1 is ambiguous. Applying the rules of statutory construction and legislative history, the state argues, leads to a conclusion that Back is not exonerated. We disagree.
Our court in Freeman addressed the meaning of "factual innocence" by determining that, "[b]y its plain terms, the phrase ‘any evidence of factual innocence’ means any evidence that shows some fact establishing the absence of the petitioner's guilt." 944 N.W.2d at 491. We agree with the district court's interpretation of the statute and discern no error in the court's conclusion that, based on the reversal of Back's conviction by the supreme court in Back II , Back was exonerated as defined by subdivision 1.
Alternatively, the state contends that the supreme court's decision in Back II did not exonerate Back but was, instead, a "clarification of the law" and, therefore, not based on Back's factual innocence. The state cites Kingbird for this proposition. Again, we are not persuaded.
Kingbird, who had been convicted of possessing a firearm, had his conviction and sentence overturned based on a clarification by the supreme court as to what constitutes a "firearm." In contrast, in Back II , the supreme court overturned Back's conviction and sentence based on an application of existing law. Back II , 775 N.W.2d at 869-72. The decision in Back II was based on the holdings of State v. Cantrell , 220 Minn. 13, 18 N.W.2d 681, 686 (1945) (determining that culpable negligence requires the existence of a duty), Larson v. Larson , 373 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Minn. 1985) (stating that whether a person owes a duty of care "is an issue for the court to determine as a matter of law"), and Lubbers v. Anderson , 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995) (explaining that the existence of a duty is an essential element of a negligence claim).
Based on our de novo review of the district court's conclusion, the district court properly concluded that Back meets the definition of "any evidence of factual innocence" and is exonerated.
Interests of Justice
As the district court concluded, Back established that "the crime was not committed by [Back]" as defined by subdivision 3(b), and "that a crime was not committed or that the crime was not committed by [Back]." (emphasis added). The supreme court's decision in Back II demonstrates that Back did not commit "the crime," Back II , 775 N.W.2d at 872 (holding that Back "was not culpably negligent" and reversing Back's conviction of second-degree manslaughter), and the state presented no evidence during the hearing that Back committed another crime. We therefore discern no error in the district court's conclusion that Back established innocence. Resolution of this step in the process leads to our review of step three.
Elements
The state does not dispute that Back's petition satisfies the relevant elements of subdivision 5, which are that:
(1) the person was convicted of a felony and served any part of the imposed sentence;
....
(3) the person did not commit or induce another person to commit perjury or
fabricate evidence to cause or bring about the conviction; and
(4) the person was not serving a term of incarceration for another crime at the same time ....
Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 5. We agree with the district court's conclusion that these elements are satisfied, and we discern no error in the conclusion that Back satisfied this step in the process.
Order
The district court conducted the evidentiary hearing pursuant to subdivision 4 and was presented with evidence, which included statements from the victim's family and testimony from Back about Back's involvement in the events that led to the victim's death. The district court mistakenly believed that, despite making factual findings that would suggest Back was not eligible, it was compelled by the language of the exoneration statute to conclude Back is eligible. It is, we believe, this misapprehension which leads to the district court's failure to exercise its discretion required by subdivision 7.
The district court issued findings which recognized Back's significant role in victim's death. The district court found that, by insisting that she go to the victim's home with the assailant, Back was "the linchpin that made the murder possible" and that Back "does not have clean hands in this case." However, the district court found that "[the exoneration-compensation statute] does not explain what to do if the petitioner shows she did not personally commit a crime, but ... played a significant part in the crime that was committed."
The district court found that subdivisions 3 and 4 are "at odds in this case." The district court continued: "I am making a specific finding that if this Court is meant to balance Petitioner's acts and the other considerations in subdivision 4 against Petitioner's ‘any showing of factual innocence’ [Back] would not be entitled to compensation for any period before the conviction was reversed," but "[a]pplying the actual wording of the statute ... requires an order finding [Back] is eligible for compensation under subdivision 3. [Back] was exonerated and did not personally commit the crime for which she was incarcerated." The district court also explained that if "the factors of subdivision 4 do not matter, [Back] would be entitled to compensation back to the date of the verdict."
We empathize with the district court's struggle to discern the legislature's direction caused by its design of the exoneration statute. However, we conclude that the legislature unambiguously granted the district court discretion to consider the evidence as described in subdivisions 4 to conclude, pursuant to subdivision 7, whether an exonerated petitioner is eligible for compensation.
By determining that the statute "required" a finding of eligibility based solely on Back's exoneration status, the district court therefore failed to exercise discretion to determine Back's eligibility. This failure by the district court to exercise discretion constitutes an abuse of discretion. See State v. DeLaCruz , 884 N.W.2d 878, 888 (Minn. App. 2016) (holding that a district court's failure to exercise its discretion is an abuse of discretion). We therefore remand to the district court to exercise the discretion afforded it pursuant to subdivision 7 and make a determination of Back's eligibility for exoneration compensation. We do not express an opinion as to the result upon remand. DECISION
Because we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion, we do not address Back's cross appeal.
Because the district court failed to exercise its discretion to determine whether Back, whom the district court properly concluded is exonerated, is eligible for compensation, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand and in its discretion, the district court shall determine whether the record and evidence supports a conclusion of eligibility for exoneration compensation and whether an additional hearing is necessary to make such a determination.