Bachus v. West Traverse Township

5 Citing cases

  1. Bachus v. West Traverse

    122 Mich. App. 557 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that the trial court clearly erred in its factual findings when a party did not rebut the admission contained in their answer to interrogatories at an evidentiary hearing

    In this panel's prior opinion in this cause, our beloved colleague, Judge NATHAN J. KAUFMAN, gave us a classic example of chutzpah, to wit: a defendant who, about to be sentenced for murdering his parents, begs the mercy of the sentencing court because he is an orphan.Bachus v West Traverse Twp, 107 Mich. App. 743, 749, fn 1; 310 N.W.2d 1 (1981), remanded 412 Mich. 870 (1981). This case presents another splendid example of chutzpah.

  2. Rozmarek v. Plamondon

    419 Mich. 287 (Mich. 1984)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that the plaintiffs' involvement in negotiations to buy the property at issue did not defeat their claim to title for the same property by way of adverse possession

    The payment of taxes is not conclusive, but is an important element in determination of title by adverse possession. Bachus v West Traverse Twp, [ 107 Mich. App. 743, 748; 310 N.W.2d 1 (1981)]; Burns v Foster, supra, p 15; Monroe v Rawlings, 331 Mich. 49, 51; 49 N.W.2d 55 (1951). "It is also undisputed that an active railroad spur crossed over a part of the property until 1976.

  3. Goodrich v. Cook

    No. 333418 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2017)   Cited 1 times

    Defendants next challenge the exclusivity of plaintiffs' possession, arguing that the exclusivity of their possession was precluded by defendants' barn (i.e., a barn "belonging" to 8638 Coon Hill Road) being partially on the disputed property and by Fannie Mae's possession of 8638 Coon Hill Road following the foreclosure. To satisfy the exclusivity prong of an adverse possession claim, the adverse possessor's possession must not be shared with the true owner, the public in general, or anyone else. Marble v Price, 54 Mich 466, 467-468; 20 NW 531 (1884); Bachus v West Traverse Twp, 107 Mich App 743, 747; 310 NW2d 1 (1981), remanded 412 Mich 870 (1981). This is a separate structure from the barn constructed by plaintiffs.

  4. Jonkers v. Summit

    278 Mich. App. 263 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 58 times
    Stating that "platted public roads convey either a mere public easement or, at most, a `base fee' that amounts to little more than nominal title and no beneficial ownership whatsoever"

    The Wanzers argue that the township cannot claim adverse possession of property for which it assessed taxes to be paid by the Wanzers. This Court explained in Bachus v West Traverse Twp (On Remand), 107 Mich App 743; 310 NW2d 1 (1981), and Bachus v West Traverse Twp, 122 Mich App 557; 332 NW2d 535 (1983), that it would be intolerable and unjust for a governmental agency to claim adverse possession of property while simultaneously including that property in the tax description of the dispossessed landowner. But in the instant case, the township's tax assessments of the Wanzers' property and of the boat-launch area is consistent with its good-faith belief that the township owned the boat-launch area.

  5. Davids v. Davis

    179 Mich. App. 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 11 times
    Affirming quiet title by adverse possession of a "wild, undeveloped, landlocked" tract of land when the plaintiff had put up a wire fence around most of the parcel and strung chains across a path on the boundary

    He also was assessed, and paid, the taxes on the property since he first acquired an interest in the land in the 1950s. See Monroe v Rawlings, 331 Mich. 49, 51-52; 49 N.W.2d 55 (1951); Burns, supra, p 15; Bachus v West Traverse Twp, 107 Mich. App. 743, 748-749; 310 N.W.2d 1 (1981), remanded to circuit court 412 Mich. 870; 313 N.W.2d 282 (1981), remanded to Court of Appeals 413 Mich. 914; 320 N.W.2d 55 (1982); Bachus v West Traverse Twp (On Remand), 122 Mich. App. 557; 332 N.W.2d 535 (1983). Furthermore, Davids testified that during the 1960s he approached Davis, Sr., and asked him to sell a right-of-way across parcels 1A and 1B to permit access across those parcels onto parcel 2 and that Davis, Sr., refused to do so. Finally, Snyder testified that Davis, Sr., had told him in 1976 that Davids owned parcel 2.