Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-13238.
March 24, 2010.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, Carl Bauman, Judge, Superior Court No. 3KN-07-00941 CI.
Steven Bachmeier, pro se, Kenai, Appellant. Nelleene A. Boothby, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, Daniel S. Sullivan, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Carpeneti, Chief Justice, Fabe, Winfree, Christen, and Stowers, Justices.
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited for any proposition of law or as an example of the proper resolution of any issue.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
I. INTRODUCTION
The State of Alaska, Department of Revenue, Child Support Services Division (CSSD) intercepted Steven Bachmeier's 2007 Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) to satisfy a child support debt. Bachmeier appealed to the superior court, explaining that he "was living in the home with the children for many of the months that [he was] being charged for [support]." The court granted CSSD's motion to dismiss, and Bachmeier appealed to us. CSSD later adjusted Bachmeier's account, reimbursing him for the months he claimed he was living with his children. Bachmeier concedes his appeal is moot, but asserts we should nonetheless consider his due process argument. We conclude Bachmeier's appeal is moot and decline to consider it under our exception to the mootness doctrine.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Bachmeier is the father of children born to K.T. CSSD ordered Bachmeier to pay monthly child support. Because K.T. was receiving public assistance, CSSD ordered Bachmeier to pay CSSD directly.
In February 2007 K.T. informed the State's Public Assistance Office that Bachmeier had moved in with her and their children on January 23, 2007. CSSD suspended Bachmeier's ongoing support obligation effective February 5, 2007, and adjusted his outstanding debt.
In July 2007 Bachmeier was imprisoned. In September 2007 CSSD notified Bachmeier that it ordered withholding of his PFD to satisfy his outstanding child support arrearage. Bachmeier objected, stating he lived with K.T. and their children from November 2006 to May 2007 and so did not owe support for that period. He explained that he could not offer evidence supporting his case because he was in prison, but he pointed to a variety of sources that could verify his address. CSSD reviewed his objection but determined to maintain a hold on the PFD, and in October 2007 intercepted Bachmeier's PFD to satisfy his child support arrearage.
Bachmeier appealed to the superior court, explaining that he "was living in the home with the children for many of the months that [he was] being charged for [support]." CSSD moved to dismiss, claiming it had "properly credited [Bachmeier] for the time it verified that his family was intact. . . ." Bachmeier responded that K.T. was defrauding the State by "filing for assi[s]tance for months that [Bachmeier] was living there with the kids. . . ."
While Bachmeier's superior court appeal was pending, a CSSD employee contacted the Public Assistance Office and conveyed Bachmeier's claim that he lived with K.T. and the children from November 2006 to May 2007. The Public Assistance Office responded that K.T. did not inform the State of this arrangement but that it would investigate the claim. CSSD stated it would adjust Bachmeier's obligation if the Public Assistance Office made a favorable determination on his fraud claim.
As CSSD explained in its dismissal papers, "CSSD is not authorized to make any findings concerning public assistance fraud. The Division of Public Assistance . . . has its own administrative process for investigating fraud claims." (Footnote omitted.).
In July 2008 the superior court granted CSSD's motion to dismiss. It noted Bachmeier failed to show that K.T. acted fraudulently or that CSSD was responsible for investigating the alleged fraud. Bachmeier appealed to us.
While Bachmeier's appeal to us was pending, CSSD received a report from the Public Assistance Office confirming that Bachmeier had lived with K.T. as he claimed. CSSD then notified Bachmeier it intended to suspend his support obligation from November 1, 2006, through January 31, 2007. Bachmeier indicated he agreed with the suspension, and CSSD adjusted his account accordingly. Bachmeier later asked by letter to also be reimbursed for his February 2007 support obligation.
CSSD filed a motion to dismiss Bachmeier's appeal for mootness once it adjusted Bachmeier's account. But CSSD had not adjusted the account for February 2007 because, according to CSSD, it "had inadvertently overlooked Mr. Bachmeier's . . . letter." We therefore denied the motion. CSSD then removed the February 2007 charge, thereby fully adjusting his account for the entire period to which he originally objected. Bachmeier still pursued his appeal, urging us to consider his argument that his due process rights were violated.
III. DISCUSSION
In his opening brief — filed before CSSD adjusted the support charges — Bachmeier raised four arguments: (1) the superior court erred in dismissing his appeal; (2) CSSD's decision was not supported by substantial evidence; (3) he was deprived of due process; and (4) he did not owe support for the months that CSSD charged him. CSSD filed its brief after it adjusted the charges and argued Bachmeier's claims were moot because he received his requested relief, namely reimbursement of his PFD. In his reply brief Bachmeier acknowledged that he was reimbursed, but continued to pursue his argument that he did not receive due process.
"We generally will not consider questions `where events have rendered the legal issue moot.'" An issue is moot if a party has already received relief. Bachmeier sought reversal of the decision to charge him for support during the months he lived with K.T. and his children. It is undisputed that Bachmeier was reimbursed by CSSD for the months at issue. Because Bachmeier has received the relief he sought in his appeal, the appeal is moot.
Copeland v. Ballard, 210 P.3d 1197, 1201-02 (Alaska 2009) (quoting Kodiak Seafood Processors Ass'n v. State, 900 P.2d 1191, 1195 (Alaska 1995)).
Jacob v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 177 P.3d 1181, 1185-86 (Alaska 2008) (citing Fairbanks Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 1324 v. City of Fairbanks, 48 P.3d 1165, 1168 (Alaska 2002)).
Bachmeier nevertheless urges us to reach the merits of the case because it falls within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. In deciding whether to apply this exception, we consider three factors, none of which is dispositive: "`(1) whether the disputed issues are capable of repetition, (2) whether the mootness doctrine, if applied, may cause review of the issues to be repeatedly circumvented, and (3) whether the issues presented are so important to the public interest as to justify overriding the mootness doctrine.'"
See Vanek v. State, Bd. of Fisheries, 193 P.3d 283, 287 (Alaska 2008) (citing Akpik v. State, Office of Mgmt. Budget, 115 P.3d 532, 534 (Alaska 2005)) (summarizing mootness doctrine and public interest exception).
Fairbanks Fire Fighters Ass'n, 48 P.3d at 1168 (quoting Kodiak Seafood Processors Ass'n, 900 P.2d at 1196).
The exception does not apply to Bachmeier's claim. The first factor is not met because this case presents "unusual factual circumstances" and is therefore less likely to be repeated, and there is no reason to believe CSSD will erroneously deprive Bachmeier of his property in the future. Nor is the second factor met — this case does not involve a threshold issue or an agency interpretation of law that might escape review. Although the third factor might be met, we are unpersuaded it is sufficient to overcome the failure to satisfy the first two factors.
See id. (citing O'Callaghan v. State, 920 P.2d 1387, 1388-89 (Alaska 1996)); see also E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101, 1107 (Alaska 2009).
See Maness v. Daily, 184 P.3d 1, 8 (Alaska 2008) (concluding that first factor was not satisfied because appellant presented no evidence that conduct would be repeated).
Copeland, 210 P.3d at 1202 (citing Fairbanks Fire Fighters Ass'n, 48 P.3d at 1168).
See id. at 1203 (quoting State, Dep't of Natural Res. v. Greenpeace, 96 P.3d 1056, 1062-63 (Alaska 2004)) ("We have found this prong met when the case involved `concepts of fairness underlying the right to procedural due process'. . . .").
We therefore decline to consider Bachmeier's due process argument.
IV. CONCLUSION
This appeal is DISMISSED.