The principal reason Smith gave for not relying solely on a non-engineer's statements (the potential for a financial conflict of interest), however, essentially goes to the issue of bias, such that the proper method of attacking the credibility of Butler's sources is cross-examination, not exclusion of his opinions altogether. Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 760 F.3d 1322, 1332 (11th Cir. 2014) ("Bias in an expert witness's testimony is usually a credibility issue for the jury.") (citations omitted); Bachmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1360 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (explaining that "the Court's limited gatekeeping role 'is not intended to supplant' [the] presentation of contrary evidence to the jury or the practice of cross-examination in a courtroom") (citation omitted). Moreover, as Butler's reports and affidavit make clear, he did not predicate his opinions only on the Tumultys' claim that their home was damaged by Hurricane Irma. Rather, he also took into account purportedly-pertinent NOAA data, his own visit to the home, his own roof inspection experience, knowledge, and training, and the three-second wind speed contour map. (Doc. 34-4 at 3-4, 10, 19; Doc. 34-5 at 3-5).
. Compare Bachmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 323 F.Supp.3d 1356, 1361 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (“Were [the expert] to go beyond her explanation of LTD Analysts job duties to state an opinion on whether Plaintiffs were properly categorized as exempt, that would be an impermissible legal conclusion.
; Bachmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 323 F.Supp.3d 1356, 1360 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (noting that litigant's expert may provide criticism of the opposing expert's qualifications). Therefore, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED in this respect.
This lone fact is not enough to qualify him as an expert, without more information about how his qualifications fit with his opinions. See Bachmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (citation omitted). While Mr. Velez may well be qualified to testify as an expert or hybrid witness, BPI has fallen far short of laying the foundation of the admissibility of his expert opinions.
These areas of designation call for such legal conclusions that ultimately would be inadmissible. See Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990) ("A witness...may not testify to the legal implications of conduct; the court must be the jury's only source of law."); Ojeda v. Louisville Ladder Inc., 410 F. App'x 213 (11th Cir. 2010) (excluding statements in affidavit as legal conclusions and improper lay witness testimony) (cited as persuasive authority); Bachmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1360 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (citing Montgomery, 898 F.2d at 1541); see also Birnholz v. 44 WallSt. Fund, Inc., 880 F.2d 335, 341 n.8 (11th Cir. 1989) ("the interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the court to decide");Owens v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2001).