Defendants did not establish that plaintiff's summary judgment motion was premature, as they failed to show that they needed proof that was within the exclusive knowledge of plaintiff, that their claims in opposition are supported by something other than mere hope or conjecture, and that they attempted to discover facts at variance with plaintiff's proof (see Voluto Ventures, LLC v Jenkens & Gilchrist Parker Chapin LLP, 44 A.D.3d 557, 557 [1st Dept 2007]; CPLR 3212 [f]). Conversely, defendants failed to "show[ ] that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify their opposition to the motion were exclusively within [plaintiff's] knowledge and control" (Bacchus v Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 192 A.D.3d 553, 554 [1st Dept 2021]). Plaintiff had already been deposed (on three separate dates) by the time he moved for summary judgment.
The court correctly denied defendant's motion to dismiss, as the complaint adequately alleges that defendant improperly manipulated the initial legal regulated rents of apartments in the building through the offering of concessions to the tenants (see Rent Stabilization Code [9 NYCRR] § 2521.1[g]; Chernett v. Spruce 1209, LLC, 200 A.D.3d 596, 597, 161 N.Y.S.3d 48 [1st Dept. 2021] ). The court providently exercised its discretion in declining to consider defendant's untimely reply papers (see CPLR 2214[c] ; Bacchus v. Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 192 A.D.3d 553, 554, 146 N.Y.S.3d 3 [1st Dept. 2021] ). In any event, the documents submitted on reply did not utterly refute the allegations that certain purported construction concessions were in fact not to reimburse the tenants for inconveniences arising from construction work, but rather, were part of a fraudulent scheme to register the initial rents charged at inflated amounts (see CPLR 3211[a][1] ; Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 N.Y.2d 314, 326, 746 N.Y.S.2d 858, 774 N.E.2d 1190 [2002] ).
The "mere hope that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to [deny such a motion for summary judgment]" (Nervaev v Solon, 6 A.D.3d510, 510-511 [2d Dept 2004]; see also Flores v The City of New York, 66 A.D.3d 599 [1st Dept 2009]). That is particularly true here, where plaintiff has failed to "[show] that discovery might lead to relevant evidence" (Bacchus v Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 192 A.D.3d 553, 554 [1st Dept 2021]). In light of the foregoing, it is
Furthermore, plaintiffs' claim that defendants filed the motion without the aid of any discovery is meritless. Defendants' motion was not premature, as plaintiffs failed to demonstrate "that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify their opposition to the motion were exclusively within defendants' knowledge and control" (see Bacchus v Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 192 A.D.3d 553, 554 [1st Dept 2021] [citations omitted]). "The mere hope that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny such a motion" (Laporta v PPC Commercial, LLC, 204 A.D.3d 538, 539 [1st Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
Champion s Motion for summary judgment is premature. The First Department has held that a party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that "discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within [the movant's] knowledge and control" (Bacchus v Bronx Leb. Hosp. Ctr. 192 A.D.3d 553 [1st Dept 2021]).
"[E]vidence otherwise excludable at trial may be considered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment as long as it does not become the sole basis for the court's determination" (In re New York City Asbestos Litig.. 7 A.D.3d 285, 285 [1st Dept 2004]). Nor has plaintiff or the 1325 Fifth Defendants established "that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify their opposition to the motion [are] exclusively within [City's] knowledge and control" (Bacchus v, Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr,, 192 A.D.3d 553, 554 [1st Dept 2021]). Plaintiff s argument that the City's motion is premature because she has yet to receive a response to her FOIL request "only expresses a mere hope or speculation that discovery might turn up some evidence giving rise to a triable issue of fact," which is insufficient to preclude summary judgment (DaSilva v Haks Engrs., 125 A.D.3d 480, 482 [1st Dept 2015]).
Finally, neither E-J, Nico, Restani, or plaintiff has demonstrated "that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify their opposition to the motion [are] exclusively within [Welsbach's] knowledge and control" (Bacchus v. Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr,, 192 A.D.3d 553, 554 [1st Dept 2021]). Instead they make entirely speculative arguments that additional discovery is necessary to confirm the scope of Welsbach's work as set out by Harrington (See DaSilva v Haks Engrs., 125 A.D.3d 480, 482 [1st Dept 2015] ["[plaintiffs argument, that he had no access to vital information about defendants' actual roles and duties at the job site, or that he was deprived of an opportunity to elicit material facts, only expresses a mere hope or speculation that discovery might turn up some evidence giving rise to a triable issue of fact"]).
Plaintiffs contention that summary judgment is premature is also without merit. None of plaintiff s three central arguments in this regard are sufficient to "[show] that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify their opposition to the motion were exclusively within defendants' knowledge and control" (Bacchus v Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 192 A.D.3d 553, 554 [1st Dept 2021] [internal citations omitted]). First, plaintiff argues that the motion is premature because she has yet to receive a response to her Freedom of Information Law requests for the production of any written notice of the sidewalk defect that the City received prior to her accident.