Opinion
NO. 01-2610, C/W 02-1234, SECTION "L" (2)
March 3, 2003
ORDER REASONS
Before the Court are the motions for summary judgement filed by Defendant Sammons VSC, Inc. against Plaintiffs Nanette Babin and Lisa LeBlanc, and the Plaintiffs' opposition to the summary judgment. For the following reasons, the motions for summary judgment are GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, Nanette Babin and Lisa LeBlanc, assert this action against their employer for alleged sexual harassment and hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C.A §§ 2000e et seq. Plaintiffs were originally hired by Vinson Supply Company, a company which later changed its name to Sammons VSC, Inc. According to the Plaintiff Babin, since she began her employment in 1995, she has constantly been subjected to unwanted and unconsented acts of sexual harassment by her former supervisor, Clyde Rabalais. Plaintiff LeBlanc asserts the same allegations of harassment by Clyde Rabalais, claiming such harassment has taken place since she began her employment with Vinson in 1998. Plaintiffs allege that such conduct created a hostile work environment and that despite repeated complaints to another supervisor, Darla Dufrene, no remedial action was taken. Plaintiffs assert that their employer did not have any training or information available to employees to make them aware of how to deal with sexual harassment. After an anonymous complaint was lodged against the supervisor Clyde Rabalais, Plaintiff Babin claims that she was interviewed by a human resources employee who assured her the interview would be confidential. However, Plaintiff Babin asserts that after the interview, she was retaliated against by both supervisors Clyde Rabalais and Darla Dufrene, who ignored her and refused to communicate with her. Plaintiff Babin claims that these actions made it difficult if not impossible to perform her job duties because of the small number of employees in the office.
Plaintiffs originally filed separate suits in this district, and the two cases were recently consolidated and are now both before this Court.
On March 18, 2001, Vinson Supply Company sold substantially all of its assets to Hunting Vinson, Inc. According to Defendant, as of March 18, 2001, Vinson terminated its employment relationship with Nanette Babin, Lisa LeBlanc, and Clyde Rabalais as a result of this sale of assets to Hunting, who then hired these former employees. After the asset sale, on March 19, 2001, Vinson Supply Company changed its name to Sammons VSC, Inc.
Plaintiffs Babin and LeBlanc filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in May and June of 2001 respectively, naming "Hunting Vinson" as the discriminating employer. According to the EEOC charges of discrimination, Plaintiff Babin alleged the discrimination took place from August of 2000 to May of 2001 and Plaintiff LeBlanc alleged that the discrimination took place from December of 1998 to May of 2001. Neither of the Plaintiffs named Vinson Supply Company or Sammons VSC, Inc. in their EEOC complaint.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against Sammons Company, Sammons VSC, Inc., and Hunting Vinson, Inc. seeking damages based on their alleged severe depression, anxiety, emotional distress, and physical symptoms which have interfered with their lives. Defendant Sammons VSC, Inc., formerly Vinson Supply Company, filed these motions for summary judgment arguing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it was not named in the EEOC complaint filed by Plaintiffs and, therefore, Plaintiffs cannot state a claim against Defendant because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. According to Defendant, Vinson Supply Company hired Plaintiffs originally; however, on March 18, 2001, Vinson Supply Company sold its assets to Hunting Vinson, a separate and autonomous company, and Vinson Supply Company then changed its name to Sammons VSC, Inc. According to the Defendant, Vinson Supply Company and what later became Sammons VSC, Inc. have no identity of interest with the purchaser of the business, Hunting Vinson, and, therefore, had no notice of the charge filed with the EEOC such that it is a proper Defendant in this lawsuit.
Sammons Company has been dismissed from the case.
In support of Defendant's motions for summary judgment, John A. Washburn filed an affidavit attesting that he held the position of vice president of Sammons, VSC, Inc. (formerly Vinson Supply Company), before and after the March 18, 2001 asset purchase between the Sammons, VSC and Hunting Vinson, and has been president of Sammons VSC, Inc. since February 28, 2002. Mr. Washburn asserts that on March 18, 2001, Vinson sold certain assets Hunting Vinson, Inc. pursuant to an agreement and that at all times, Vinson and Hunting were two separate, autonomous and unrelated business entities. According to Mr. Washburn, "substantially all of the assets of Vinson were sold to Hunting Vinson, Inc. on March 18, 2001" and in connection with the asset purchase, Hunting was authorized to use the marks VINSON, Vinson Supply, and V Design for a period of twelve months thereafter. Mr. Washburn attests that there was no interrelation of operations or management between Hunting and Vinson. Finally, Mr. Washburn attests that neither Vinson Supply Company nor Sammons VSC, Inc. were ever named as or made a party to the EEOC charges filed by Babin and LeBlanc, neither participated in the EEOC's investigation of the charges, and Defendant Sammons VSC had no notice of Babin or LeBlanc's EEOC charge until after Babin and LeBlanc filed suit against it.
Plaintiffs filed oppositions to the motions for summary judgment and requested this Court to continue the motions for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), asserting that more discovery was needed in order for the Plaintiffs to properly oppose the motions. This Court previously granted Plaintiffs' motion to continue the motions for summary judgment for the purpose of allowing additional discovery. Plaintiffs have now filed a supplemental opposition to the motions for summary judgment.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Summary judgment will be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. If the party moving for summary judgment demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact "the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). "[A] dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. To oppose a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant cannot rest on mere allegations or denials but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-22 (1986).
The burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue is not met by "metaphysical doubt" or "unsubstantiated assertions." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). The Court must "resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contrary facts." Id. The Court does not, "in the absence of proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Id. If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, no genuine issue exists for trial. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, "the mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; Rule 56 requires that the fact dispute be genuine and material." Willis, 61 F.3d at 315. If the evidence leads to only one reasonable conclusion, summary judgment is proper. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
Defendant Sammons VSC, Inc. moves for summary judgment on the claims by the Plaintiffs on the basis that it was not named in the original EEOC complaints and, therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies against this particular Defendant. Under Fifth Circuit jurisprudence, a party not named in an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charge may not be sued under Title VII unless there is a clear identity of interests between it and the party named in the charge or it has unfairly prevented the filing of an EEOC charge. Way v. Mueller Brass Co., 840 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1988); Dunn v. Uniroyal Chemical Co., Inc., 192 F. Supp.2d 557, 561 (M.D. La. 2001); Hazeur v. Federal Warranty Serv. Corp., No. 98-2568, 1999 WL 615176, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 1999). However, this rule is tempered by the Court's understanding that "charges filed with the EEOC must be liberally construed because they are made by persons who are unfamiliar with the technicalities of formal pleadings and who usually do not have the assistance of an attorney." Dunn, 192 F. Supp.2d at 560.
To avoid summary judgment, the Plaintiffs must set forth evidence to rebut the assertion by the Defendant that the two business entities are distinct. In their oppositions to the motions for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs attempt to prove an identity of interest between Sammons, VSC, Inc. and Hunting Vinson by pointing to employee email addresses, a phone book listing, a sign near the office, and office correspondence. According to the Plaintiffs, until at least August of 2001, their office email addresses remained at Vinson addresses, such as @vinson.com or vinsonsupply.com. Plaintiffs also assert that the 2002-2003 phone book listing for Vinson Supply Company listed the office address where they worked and had no such listing for Hunting Vinson. In addition, Plaintiffs claim that a sign reading "Vinson Tubular Division," which had been posted for years prior to the sale of the company, remained posted near their office as of December 3, 2002. Furthermore, Plaintiffs claim that their paychecks came in envelopes with the name Vinson Supply Company, although they admit that the checks were from Hunting Vinson. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that they regularly sent business mail to both Sammons, VSC and Hunting Vinson at the same address.
When the Court previously granted the Plaintiffs' motions to continue the summary judgment motions, the Plaintiffs detailed discovery they sought to pursue which would enable them to properly oppose the summary judgment, including depositions of corporate officers, investigators, and relevant documentary evidence concerning the sale of the company. However, in Plaintiffs' supplemental opposition to the summary judgment, Plaintiffs' did not indicate that they conducted any of the described discovery; rather, they simply attached an affidavit of the person who took the picture of the "Vinson Tubular Division" sign mentioned above.
Aside from issues of whether the purported evidence concerning an identity of interest between Sammons VCS and Hunting Vinson is even admissible, Plaintiffs have simply failed to put forth evidence that rebuts the assertion by Defendant Sammons VSC, Inc. that it is a distinct business entity from Hunting Vinson. Even if this Court considered the evidence put forth by the Plaintiffs, it does not prove that there is an identity of interests between the companies such that notice to one of the EEOC complaint constituted notice to the other. The evidence in this case shows that Sammons VSC, Inc. was not put on notice that a charge was being filed against it nor was it afforded an opportunity to respond or otherwise resolve the charges at the EEOC level. Therefore, Sammons VSC, Inc. is not a proper Defendant because Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies against it.
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motions for summary judgment file by Defendant Sammons VSC, Inc. are GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Babin and Leblancs' claims against Defendant Sammons VSC, Inc. are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.