In the second of these federal actions, Willis similarly asserted, among other claims, that the state trial judge and PSO had violated Willis' First Amendment right to free speech when the court, in 1997, held Willis in contempt for violating the injunction precluding Willis from interfering with PSO's use of the easement while the state condemnation proceedings remained ongoing. See B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. Goodpaster, 183 F.3d 1231, 1233-34 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1046, 120 S.Ct. 581, 145 L.Ed.2d 483 (1999). The contempt citation resulted when, after the Oklahoma Supreme Court remanded the condemnation proceedings to the state trial court, Willis' attorney wrote PSO and BNSF and demanded that they cease running trains across Willis' property until the second condemnation hearing was completed.
United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 484 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Kaun, 827 F.2d 1144, 1150, 1151-1152 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. White, 769 F.2d 511, 517 (8th Cir. 1985). See also B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. Goodpaster, 183 F.3d 1231, 1233-1234 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1046, 120 S. Ct. 581, 145 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1999). A defamatory statement of fact not touching a matter of public concern or a public figure does not enjoy the First Amendment protection identified in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964).
The Plaintiff's First Amendment rights are not infringed by the proposed restraining order. See B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. Goodpaster, 183 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999). If future suits raise new issues of merit, the approval of the Court may be anticipated. In regard to the third Dataphase factor, it is likely that Defendants will succeed on the merits.
(Citation omitted.) B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc . v. Goodpaster , 183 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Willis v. Goodpaster , 528 U.S. 1046, 120 S. Ct. 581, 145 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1999) ; see D'Agostino v. Lynch, 382 Ill. App. 3d 960, 970, 320 Ill.Dec. 446, 887 N.E.2d 590 ("harassing the court and the litigants appearing before it" was "calculated to disrupt court proceedings and bring the administration of law into disrepute"), appeal denied, 229 Ill. 2d 619, 325 Ill.Dec. 2, 897 N.E.2d 250 (2008) ; Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. of New York v. Intercounty National Title Ins. Co. , supra, 2002 WL 1433717, at *11 ("A party's use of anonymous letters to opposing counsel to sabotage the litigation is an abuse of the judicial process.