This rule is discretionary with the court and should be applied according to the circumstances of each case, taking care not to jeopardize the welfare of the minor child. Leathers v. Leathers, supra; Perrenoud v. Perrenoud, 206 Kan. 559, 480 P.2d 749 (1971); Staedler v. Staedler, 6 N.J. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951); B. v. S., 99 N.J. Super. 429, 240 A.2d 189 (1968). The Justice below found that:

Since Wells, courts have occasionally declined to raise recrimination as a bar to a divorce in an uncontested case. E.g., X. v. Y., 103 N.J. Super. 218 ( Ch. Div. 1968); cf.B. v. S., 99 N.J. Super. 429 ( Ch. Div. 1968). As was demonstrated by the trial court here, however, the practice has not been universal. Today, we hold that in an uncontested case, absent extraordinary circumstances, a trial court should not on its own motion raise a recriminatory defense.

Div. 1973); concealment of a drug addiction, Costello v. Porzelt, 116 N.J. Super. 380, 388-89 (Ch. Div. 1971); concealment of pregnancy by another man, B. v. S., 99 N.J. Super. 429, 432 (Ch. Div. 1968); concealment of a mental condition, Houlahan v. Horzepa, 46 N.J. Super. 583, 588-89 (Ch. Div. 1957); concealment of impotence, Steerman v. Snow, 94 N.J. Eq. 9, 12-13 (Ch. 1922); concealment of a hereditary chronic medical condition, Davis v. Davis, 90 N.J. Eq. 158, 161-63 (Ch. 1919); and concealment of venereal disease, Crane v. Crane, 62 N.J. Eq. 21, 26 (Ch. 1901).

It is the duty of the trial judge, even in an uncontested case, to see to it that the severance is not granted except where warranted under the applicable statutes or the general equity jurisdiction of the court [citations omitted]. [ B. v. S., 99 N.J. Super. 429, 433 (Ch.Div. 1968), emphasis supplied] It has further been held indirectly or by implication that the new Divorce Act has not abrogated this state interest:

Hansen v. Fredo, 123 N.J. Super. 388, 391 (Ch.Div. 1973). As pointed out, however, in B. v. S., 99 N.J. Super. 429 (Ch.Div. 1968): "Unclean hands" is not a doctrine to be applied automatically and mechanically; it allows room for equitable considerations arising out of time, place and circumstance.

Following that rather vague standard, New Jersey courts have granted annulments, under general equity jurisdiction, when impotence has been concealed, declaring same to constitute a fraud, Steerman v. Snow, 94 N.J. Eq. 9 (Ch. 1922); suppression of knowledge of venereal disease, Crane v. Crane, 62 N.J. Eq. 21 (Ch. 1901); suppression of the fact that a spouse was afflicted with hereditary chronic tuberculosis, notwithstanding consummation of the marriage, Davis v. Davis, 90 N.J. Eq. 158 (Ch. 1919); concealment of a fixed determination not to have children, notwithstanding consummation, Williams v. Witt, 98 N.J. Super. 1 (App.Div. 1967); concealment of pregnancy by another man, notwithstanding consummation, B. v. S., 99 N.J. Super. 429 (Ch.Div. 1968). The cases confirm the proposition that any physical or mental condition or behavior which strikes against the central purpose of marriage, namely its sexual aspect culminating in procreation, goes to the essence of the marital relation.