B-T Two v. Bennett

9 Citing cases

  1. Whitfield v. Tequila Mexican Rest. No. 1.

    323 Ga. App. 801 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 12 times

    See also Snellgrove, 277 Ga.App. at 124, 625 S.E.2d 517 (quoting Cook); Rappenecker v. L.S.E., Inc., 236 Ga.App. 86, 88(2), 510 S.E.2d 871 (1999) (“The basis of liability is a proprietor's superior knowledge of the existence of a condition that may subject an invitee to an unreasonable risk of harm.”). As recently explained in B–T Two, Inc. v. Bennett, 307 Ga.App. 649, 706 S.E.2d 87 (2011) (physical precedent only), these two principles of reasonable foreseeability and the proprietor's superior knowledge “guide our consideration of the question [of whether an owner or occupier has breached its duty to keep an invitee safe from the criminal act of a third party] and limit the circumstances in which the law imposes liability for the failure to protect against such criminal act.” Id. at 654–655, 706 S.E.2d 87.

  2. Shadow v. Fed. Express Corp.

    359 Ga. App. 772 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 4 times

    First, the shooting at the Bedford Park facility involved a targeted domestic violence attack, the shooter was not a Ground employee, and he did not injure anyone except himself despite having the opportunity to do so. See B-T Two, Inc. v. Bennett , 307 Ga. App. 649, 655 (3), 706 S.E.2d 87 (2011) (physical precedent only) (attack was not foreseeable where there was no evidence of similar crimes and no evidence that attacker would be at the premises and had a history of violence); Brown , 265 Ga. App. at 896 (1) nn. 6-7, 595 S.E.2d 517 (compiling cases and concluding that day trader's murderous rampage was not foreseeable). Although Shadow argues that the Bedford Park shooting put Services and Express on notice, she acknowledges that a targeted attack like the one that occurred in Bedford Park is distinguishable from Kramer's acts.

  3. Padgett v. Kmart Corp.

    CV 315-48 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 15, 2016)

    "[A]n owner or occupier must protect an invitee against the criminal act of a third party only to the extent that the criminal act is reasonably foreseeable." B-T, Two, Inc. v. Bennett, 706 S.E.2d 87, 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). The burden of proving foreseeability lies on Plaintiffs. Gordon v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1313 (N.D. Ga. 2011).

  4. Gordon v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.

    821 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2011)   Cited 7 times
    In Gordon v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts, 821 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1313 (N.D.Ga. 2011), the court stated that in order to be substantially similar, the prior crimes must (1) occur in comparable locations, (2) under similar physical circumstances and conditions, (3) be of similar type, and (4) not be too remote in time.

    With respect to the duty of a property owner to keep an invitee safe from the criminal act of a third party, there are two principles of law that govern the imposition of liability for the failure to protect against such a criminal act. B–T Two, Inc. v. Bennett, 307 Ga.App. 649, 654–55, 706 S.E.2d 87 (2011) (citations omitted).

  5. Blake v. Tribe Express, Inc.

    360 Ga. App. 874 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)

    "Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master is liable for the tort of its servant only to the extent that the servant committed the tort in connection with his employment by the master, within the scope of his employment, and in furtherance of his master's business." B-T Two, Inc. v. Bennett , 307 Ga. App. 649, 652 (1), 706 S.E.2d 87 (2011). "[T]he general rule for determining whether the master is liable for the acts of an employee is not whether the act was done during the existence of the employment, but whether it was done within the scope of the actual transaction of the master's business for accomplishing the ends of his employment."

  6. Morgan v. Am. Airlines

    Civil Action 1:21-cv-04449-SDG (N.D. Ga. Sep. 29, 2022)   Cited 1 times

    This obligation cannot, however, be used to turn property owners into insurers of the safety of their invitees. B-T Two, Inc. v. Bennett, 307 Ga.App. 649, 654 (2011) (collecting cases) (physical precedent only). “[I]t is a well-settled principle of negligence law that ‘the occurrence of an unfortunate event is not sufficient to authorize an inference of negligence.'” Stadterman v. Southwood Realty Co., 361 Ga.App. 613, 615 (2021) (quoting Wilson v. Guy, 356 Ga.App. 509, 511 (2020); citing Wolfe v. Carter, 314 Ga.App. 854, 859 (2012)).

  7. Sharpe v. Miller

    Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-03878-SDG (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2020)

    (citation omitted); B-T Two, Inc. v. Bennett, 307 Ga. App. 649, 653-54 (2011) ( "a negligence claim . . . premised on the service of alcohol at the party fails as a matter of law"); Hansen v. Etheridge, 232 Ga. App. 408, 408 (1998) ("[T]here is no proximate cause" because O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 "insulates providers of alcohol from third-party claims of negligence" "even if the killer were an underage drinker at the party").

  8. AXA Corp. Solutions Assurance v. Great Am. Lines, Inc.

    Civil Action No. 10-2023 (MAS) (TJB) (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2015)

    With respect to the duty of a property owner like Pilot to "keep an invitee safe from the criminal act of a third party," the following two principles of law govern the imposition of liability: "[1] an owner or occupier must protect an invitee against the criminal act of a third party only to the extent that the criminal act is reasonably foreseeable[,]" and "[2] even when a criminal act is reasonably foreseeable, an owner or occupier is not liable for injuries resulting from the criminal act of a third party unless he had superior knowledge of the danger." Id. at 1313 (quoting B-T Two, Inc. v. Bennett, 706 S.E.2d 87, 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)). In its Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also asserts a bailment claim against Pilot. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54-58.)

  9. Carlson v. Brga Associates, LLC

    82 F. Supp. 3d 1333 (S.D. Ga. 2015)

    Id. This question informs the legal analysis for determining whether a premises occupier exercised ordinary care in keeping the premises safe from the criminal acts of third parties. See B–T Two, Inc. v. Bennett, 307 Ga.App. 649, 706 S.E.2d 87, 92 (2011) (holding that an owner or occupier must protect invitees from the reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third parties, but only when the owner or occupier has superior knowledge of that danger). Here, though, Plaintiffs are applying Wilks's discussion of “superior knowledge” to an assumption of the risk context to argue that a plaintiff cannot be said to have assumed the risk where he did not have as complete an understanding of that risk as the defendant, whose failure to mitigate that risk was allegedly negligent.