) In finding that plaintiff and Monterra LLC could "agree to allocate or limit allocation of a lien claim to a specific lot or lots," the trial court relied on three cases: B. & J. Const. Co. v. Spacious Homes, Inc. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 216, 22 Cal.Rptr. 41 ( B. & J. ); Rodeffer Industries, Inc. v. Chambers Estates, Inc. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 116, 69 Cal.Rptr. 551 ( Rodeffer ); and Baxter, supra , 7 Cal.App.3d 725, 86 Cal.Rptr. 854. We will briefly summarize the cases and explain why the trial court's decision must be reversed.

At first blush, it may appear that some California decisions have conflated section 1193.1(k) with section 1196.1 by requiring intent to defraud in both sections. See, e.g., Distefano v. Hall, 218 Cal. App. 2d 657, 32 Cal. Rptr. 770 (Ct. App. 1963); B. & J. Constr. Co. v. Spacious Homes, Inc., 204 Cal. App. 2d 216, 22 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Ct. App. 1962); Henley v. Pac. Fruit Cooling & Vaporizing Co., 19 Cal. App. 728, 127 P. 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 1912). However, a closer examination of these cases reveals that—where an intent to defraud standard was required—did not involve a claimant willfully including work not performed or materials not furnished for a property.

( J.S. Schirm Co. v. Rollingwood Homes Co., 56 Cal.2d 789, 795 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 1, 366 P.2d 444].) Whether a joint check constitutes payment of the materialman's bill represents a question of fact based upon the intention of the parties. ( B. J. Constr. Co. v. Spacious Homes, Inc., 204 Cal.App.2d 216, 223 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 41].) [4] In the case under review, the evidence demonstrates that although the plaintiff supplied concrete to 146 lots owned by the defendant, the checks of July 1 and July 16, and the vouchers in support thereof, represented payment for materials delivered to 33 lots only.

The words "separate residential units," as they appear in section 3131 of the Civil Code do not fit units which are not self-contained, but merely areas within walls and under a roof not owned by the residents. But if there were doubt about the meaning, it should be resolved in favor of the lien claimant, first, because of the policy to construe the mechanic's lien law with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice ( Hendrickson v. Bertelson, 1 Cal.2d 430, 432-433 [ 35 P.2d 318]; B. J. Constr. Co. v. Spacious Homes, Inc., 204 Cal.App.2d 216, 222 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 41] ); and second, because to require a separate lien procedure on each unit would result in a multiplicity of potential lawsuits, a result to be avoided if possible ( Schulte v. Buben, 215 Cal. 172, 174 [ 8 P.2d 843, 81 A.L.R. 764]). The claim was timely filed; the lien is valid, and the work having been commenced before the construction loan was made, as was known to the bank, the lien is prior to that of the deed of trust.

Furthermore, as they showed the intention of the owner, as to the application of the funds, the expressed intention would govern rather than the statute. ( B. J. Constr. Co. v. Spacious Homes, Inc., 204 Cal.App.2d 216, 223 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 41].) In the case of payment by the contractor to the materialman where the contractor is "under several obligations" to the materialman, section 1479 would, on the face of the statute, be applicable.

By analogy, the object of the lien conferred by section 1184.1 is the "tract of land" graded or otherwise improved; is the entire tract; and is not a part of the tract ( Warren v. Hopkins, 110 Cal. 506 [42 P. 986]). The right of a contractor to claim a lien upon an entire tract may be limited by his waiver of the lien upon a portion of the tract ( B. J. Constr. Co. v. Spacious Homes, Inc., 204 Cal.App.2d 216, 222 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 41]). The application of equitable principles dictates such a result.

(2) The right of a contractor to claim a lien upon an entire tract may be limited by his waiver of the lien upon a portion of the tract. ( B. J. Constr. Co. v. Spacious Homes, Inc., 204 Cal.App.2d 216, 222 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 41].) The application of equitable principles dictates such a result.

" (See Callahan v. Chatsworth Park, Inc., 204 Cal.App.2d 597, 608 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 606].) Section 1193.1, subdivision (k), deals with two kinds of false claims only, i.e., claims for work not performed on the property and claims for materials, appliances or power not furnished for the property, while errors and mistakes consisting of demands for an excessive price or the failure to give credits for all payments made on account are covered by section 1196.1 ( B. J. Constr. Co. v. Spacious Homes, Inc., 204 Cal.App.2d 216, 220 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 41].) [11b] The two sections apply only where there is an actual intent to defraud. ( B. J. Constr. Co. v. Spacious Homes, Inc., supra; Henley v. Pacific Fruit etc. Co., 19 Cal.App. 728, 734 [ 127 P. 800]; Callahan v. Chatsworth Park, Inc., supra; Blanck v. Commonwealth Amusement Corp., 19 Cal.App. 720, 724 [ 127 P. 805].)

However, the intention of the parties is a question of fact, and it is not necessarily improper for the contractor to retain the proceeds of such a joint check, keeping alive the materialman's claim. B. J. Constr. Co. v. Spacious Homes, Inc., 204 Cal.App.2d 216, 22 Cal.Rptr. 41 (1962). A purchaser of goods immediately owes the price of the goods, but the debt is not due until the day arrives that has been agreed upon as the date of payment.