B., C. A. Ry. Co. v. Twilley

6 Citing cases

  1. B, C. A. Ry. Co. v. Ennalls

    69 A. 633 (Md. 1908)   Cited 12 times

    We say that it should not, under Steinmeir's Case, 72 Md. 313. The lower Court thought that it should under Scharnagl's Case, 105 Md. 199; Twilley's Case, 106 Md. 445. These cases involved the wrongful arrest of passengers.

  2. St. Michelle v. Catania

    252 Md. 647 (Md. 1969)   Cited 15 times

    Some of our prior decisions in this area have turned on the question of whether the assault on the passenger occurred before or after the contract for safe carriage had ended. For example, in Central Ry. Co. v. Peacock, 69 Md. 257, 14 A. 709 (1888), the carrier was held not to be liable for an assault by its driver on a passenger who had alighted from a streetcar to report the driver for misconduct. Other cases holding that where the offending employee occupied a dual capacity, i.e., an employee of the carrier who was also a private policeman or peace officer, the determination of which role he was assuming being for the jury, are not germane to the issue before us. See Balto., C. A. Ry. Co. v. Ennalls, 108 Md. 75, 69 A. 638 (1908); Balto., C. A. Ry. Co. v. Twilley, 106 Md. 445, 67 A. 265 (1907); Tolchester Beach Imp. Co. v. Scharnagl, 105 Md. 199, 65 A. 916 (1907); Balto. Ohio R.R. Co. v. Deck, 102 Md. 669, 62 A. 958 (1906); Deck v. Balto. Ohio R.R. Co., 100 Md. 168, 59 A. 650 (1905); Tolchester Beach Imp. Co. v. Steinmeier, 72 Md. 313, 20 A. 188 (1890). In denying liability, this Court cited New Jersey Steamboat Co. v. Brockett, 121 U.S. 637 (1887) as authority for the proposition that a carrier must protect his passengers from the violence of the carrier's employees and from that of other passengers but added that to bring a case within the operation of the Brockett rule, it must appear that the claimant was a passenger, and that the employee was executing the contract of transportation at the time of the assault.

  3. Riegger v. Brewing Company

    16 A.2d 99 (Md. 1940)   Cited 26 times
    In Riegger the court held a wife could not sue her husband's employer for injuries resulting from her husband's negligence because (1) at common law a wife could not maintain an action against her husband for a personal tort; and (2) if the suit were maintained against the employer, the employer in turn would have a cause of action against the husband, thus permitting the wife to do indirectly what she could not do directly.

    Professor Casner, annotating the Restatement of the Law of Agency, section 217, Comment "b", while conceding that this court has not extensively discussed the problem, states that indications from existing decisions are "in accord" with the principles of the Restatement ( Md. Annot. Restatement Law of Agency, page 123), but the decisions cited and discussed by him would not seem to justify his conclusion, for generally speaking they are assault and battery cases involving railroad companies, and in all of them this court held it to be the duty of the trial court to determine whether the servant was acting solely as a police officer or solely as a servant of the carrier. See Balto. O.R. Co. v. Deck, 102 Md. 669, 62 A. 958; Tolchester Co. v. Scharnagl, 105 Md. 199, 65 A. 916; Baltimore C. A.R.R. Co. v. Twilley, 106 Md. 445, 67 A. 265; and Baltimore C. A.R.R. Co. v. Ennalls, 108 Md. 75, 69 A. 638. The court, in Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, supra, construing Code, art. 45, sec. 5, held that a wife could not maintain an action against her husband for a personal tort.

  4. P.B. W.R. Co. v. Crawford

    112 Md. 508 (Md. 1910)   Cited 4 times

    We therefore deem it unnecessary to again review the law upon the subject. Green's Case, supra; Central Railway Co. v. Peacock, 69 Md. 263; Deck v. B. O.R.R. Co., 100 Md. 168; B.C. A.R.R. Co. v. Twilley, 106 Md. 445; Tolchester Co. v. Scharnagl, 105 Md. 199; B.C. A.R.R. Co. v. Ennalls, 108 Md. 199. The first three of the plaintiff's prayers deal with the legal principles affecting the equitable plaintiff's relation of passenger to the defendant if they found the facts to be as therein stated, as well as the nature and extent of its liability for the acts of Baldwin as its employee, in accordance with the views expressed by us in the cases to which we have referred.

  5. Balto. Ohio R. Co. v. Strube

    111 Md. 119 (Md. 1909)   Cited 34 times
    In Baltimore Ohio R.R. Co. v. Strube, 111 Md. 119, 73 A. 697, where a prayer somewhat similar to the damage prayers in these cases was granted, this Court pointed out that there was some evidence in the case that the plaintiff had provoked the special officer of the defendant to arrest him and had started an altercation with the officer, and provoked the assault by resisting arrest, and therefore the prayer was not drawn with sufficient accuracy to submit the question of punitive damages properly to the jury.

    We must hold therefore that defendant's first special exception was properly overruled, and the plaintiff's second prayer properly granted. The defendant's objection to this prayer, based on the instruction taken from Twilley's Case. 106 Md. 445, cannot be sustained, because that was a prayer offered by the defendant and presents a counter proposition to that contained in the plaintiff's second prayer. It would have been entirely proper for the Court below to have granted a prayer concluding for the defendant, modelled after the one referred to in the Twilley's Case, supra, but no such prayer seems to have been offered, and as we have said we see no objection to the form of plaintiff's second prayer as granted.

  6. P., B. W.R. v. Green

    110 Md. 32 (Md. 1909)   Cited 13 times

    These principles are too firmly settled by the decisions in this Court to admit of dispute. Carter v. The Howe Machine Company, 51 Md. 290; Central Railway Company v. Peacock, 69 Md. 263; Deck v. B. O.R.R. Co., 100 Md. 168; B.C. A. Ry. Co. v. Twilley, 106 Md. 445; Tolchester Co. v. Scharnagl, 105 Md. 199; B.C. A. Ry. Co. v. Ennalls. 108 Md. 75. It has become a common practice for certain corporations to have some of their employees appointed as special officers to protect their property and to maintain order upon trains and around the station.