Further, "the denial of plaintiff's motion is warranted based on principles of international comity since the underlying dispute did not originate in the United States, the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters provides an alternative recourse, and ordering compliance raises the risk of undermining important interests of other nations by potentially conflicting with their privacy laws or regulations" (Ayyash v Koleilat, 115 A.D.3d 495, 495 [1st Dept 2014], citing Orlich v Helm Bros., 160 A.D.2d 135, 143-144 [1st Dept 1990] [noting that in "civil law" countries, "nonjudicial taking of evidence located within their territory is regarded as an affront to their sovereignty"]; see also Motorola Credit Corp. v Standard Chartered Bank, 24 N.Y.3d at 162).

Indeed, even if HSBC Holdings plc, as the indirect parent of HSBC and its foreign affiliates, were able "as a practical matter ... [to] secure the documents from [its] subsidiar[ies]" ( Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 2013 WL 6098388, *3 [S.D. N.Y.2013] ), it is based overseas and was not served with the subpoena. Further, "the denial of plaintiff's motion is warranted based on principles of international comity since the underlying dispute did not originate in the United States, the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters provides an alternative recourse, and ordering compliance raises the risk of undermining important interests of other nations by potentially conflicting with their privacy laws or regulations" ( Ayyash v. Koleilat, 115 A.D.3d 495, 495, 981 N.Y.S.2d 536 [1st Dept. 2014], citing Orlich v. Helm Bros., 160 A.D.2d 135, 143–144, 560 N.Y.S.2d 10 [1st Dept. 1990] [noting that in "civil law" countries, "nonjudicial taking of evidence located within their territory is regarded as an affront to their sovereignty"]; see alsoMotorola Credit Corp. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 24 N.Y.3d at 162, 996 N.Y.S.2d 594, 21 N.E.3d 223 ).

Although Parnes acknowledged that he had not yet looked for responsive documents, he offered to do so, and it is unclear why this was not a viable option. In addition, neither the Referee nor the court determined the extent to which any resulting search would comply with Israeli law (see Ayyash v. Koleilat, 115 A.D.3d 495, 981 N.Y.S.2d 536 [1st Dept.2014] ). Accordingly, the May 7 order should be vacated.

Mega does not claim that compliance with the information subpoena would be onerous or unduly expensive or that the requested information is not available in New York. Thus, the court's general personal jurisdiction over the bank's New York branch permits it to compel that branch to produce any requested information that can be found through electronic searches performed there (compare Ayyash v. Koleilat, 115 A.D.3d 495, 495, 981 N.Y.S.2d 536 [1st Dept.2014] [affirming denial of motion to compel where, among other things, it “would likely cause great annoyance and expense” to the New York branch of the financial institution]; see also CPLR 5223 ).

In Ayyash v Koleilat, the court used its discretion to deny an enforcement procedure that would have caused "great annoyance and expense" to the other party. (115 A.D.3d 495, 495 [1st Dept 2014].) In Davis-Delaney-Arrow, Inc. v Gerson-Ogden, Inc., Supreme Court held that a court's discretionary power can protect "persons from unreasonable annoyance and abuse in enforcing judgments."

Indeed, even if HSBC Holdings plc, as the indirect parent of HSBC and its foreign affiliates, were able "as a practical matter... [to] secure the documents from [its] subsidiar[ies]" (Motorola Credit Corp. v Uzan, 2013 WL 6098388, *3 [SD NY 2013]), it is based overseas and was not served with the subpoena. Further, "the denial of plaintiff's motion is warranted based on principles of international comity since the underlying dispute did not originate in the United States, the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters provides an alternative recourse, and ordering compliance raises the risk of undermining important interests of other nations by potentially conflicting with their privacy laws or regulations" (Ayyash v Koleilat, 115 A.D.3d 495, 495 [1st Dept 2014], citing Orlich v Helm Bros., 160 A.D.2d 135, 143-144 [1st Dept 1990] [noting that in "civil law" countries, "nonjudicial taking of evidence located within their territory is regarded as an affront to their sovereignty"]; see also Motorola Credit Corp. v Standard Chartered Bank, 24 N.Y.3d at 162).

However, the burden is on the judgment creditor seeking to enforce the subpoena to show that the subpoena - or, as here, the challenged portion of the subpoena - is proper (see S.E.C. v Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 194 FRD 169, 472 [SD NY 2000] [Credit Bancorp] [under analogous federal statute]). If the request is onerous or unduly costly, or if the subpoenaed party lacks access to the information, the court should deny a motion to compel enforcement of the subpoena (see Ayyash v Koleilat, 115 AD3d 495, 495 [1st Dept 2014] [motion denied where, inter alia, compliance "would likely cause great annoyance and expense to respondents or their employees or agents"]; Gray v Giarrizzo, 47 AD3d 765 [2d Dept 2008] [defendant not in contempt for failure to provide information about former spouse as he did not have access to the information]). "[D]ocuments are considered to be under a party's control when that party has the right, authority, or practical ability to obtain the documents from a non-party to the action" (Bank of New York v Meridien BIAO Bank Tanzania Ltd., 171 FRD 135, 146-147 [SD NY 1997]).

Colonial Surety Co. v. Lakeview Advisors, LLC, 93 A.D.3d 1253, 1256, 941 N.Y.S.2d 371 (4th Dept.2012) (the decisional process invoked is the balancing of harm likely to result from execution, against the necessity of using that immediate means of attempted satisfaction). See also Ayyash v. Koleilat, 115 A.D.3d 495, 981 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1st Dept.2014) (describing when great annoyance existed); Matter of Stern v. Hirsch, 79 A.D.3d 1046, 915 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2nd Dept.2010) (unreasonable annoyance or disadvantage); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Motorola, Inc., 47 A.D.3d 293, 846 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dept.2007) (risk of double-payment as invoking CPLR 5240); Matter of Jones, 47 A.D.3d 931, 933, 851 N.Y.S.2d 216 (2nd Dept.2008) (no protective order required because applicant failed to demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right); Barrette v. Barrette, 108 A.D.3d 737, 970 N.Y.S.2d 558 (2nd Dept.2013) ( CPLR 5240 relief granted because the income execution sought to garnish certain money which did not constitute income as defined by CPLR 5241(a)).

Colonial Surety Co. v. Lakeview Advisors, LLC, 93 AD3d 1253, 1256 (4th Dept. 2012) (the decisional process invoked is the balancing of harm likely to result from execution, against the necessity of using that immediate means of attempted satisfaction). See also Ayyash v Koleilat, 115 AD3d 495 (1st Dept. 2014) (describing when great annoyance existed); Matter of Stern v Hirsch, 79 AD3d 1046 (2nd Dept. 2010) (unreasonable annoyance or disadvantage); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Motorola, Inc., 47 AD3d 293 (1st Dept. 2007) (risk of double-payment as invoking CPLR 5240); Matter of Jones, 47 AD3d 931, 933 (2nd Dept. 2008) (no protective order required because applicant failed to demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right); Barrette v Barrette, 108 AD3d 737 (2nd Dept. 2013) (CPLR 5240 relief granted because the income execution sought to garnish certain money which did not constitute income as defined by CPLR 5241(a)). CPLR 5240 authorizes the court, "in the interest of justice, and in its discretion, to reduce [an] income execution where there would be extreme hardship, taking into consideration the debtor's requirements, his or her dependents, take-home pay and other relevant factors" (54 NYJur2d Enforcement and Execution of Judgments §

Colonial Surety Co. v. Lakeview Advisors, LLC, 93 A.D.3d 1253, 1256, 941 N.Y.S.2d 371 (4th Dept.2012) (the decisional process invoked is the balancing of harm likely to result from execution, against the necessity of using that immediate means of attempted satisfaction). See also Ayyash v. Koleilat, 115 A.D.3d 495, 981 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1st Dept.2014) (describing when great annoyance existed); Matter of Stern v. Hirsch, 79 A.D.3d 1046, 915 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2nd Dept.2010) (unreasonable annoyance or disadvantage); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Motorola, Inc., 47 A.D.3d 293, 846 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dept.2007) (risk of double-payment as invoking CPLR 5240 ); Matter of Jones, 47 A.D.3d 931, 933, 851 N.Y.S.2d 216 (2nd Dept.2008) (no protective order required because applicant failed to demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right); Barrette v. Barrette, 108 A.D.3d 737, 970 N.Y.S.2d 558 (2nd Dept.2013) ( CPLR 5240 relief granted because the income execution sought to garnish certain money which did not constitute income as defined by CPLR 5241(a) ). CPLR 5240 authorizes the court, “in the interest of justice, and in its discretion, to reduce [an] income execution where there would be extreme hardship, taking into consideration the debtor's requirements, his or her dependents, take-home pay and other relevant factors” (54 N.Y.Jur.2d Enforcement