No. 01-10-00049-CR
Opinion issued March 17, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 232nd District Court Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Case No. 1216920.
Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices ALCALA and BLAND.
SHERRY RADACK, Chief Justice.
Appellant Jason Graham Ayles was charged by indictment with "Aggregated Sexual Assault — Child." He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. In his sole point, appellant requests that the judgment be reformed to reflect a conviction for "Aggravated Sexual Assault" rather than "Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child Under 14." We overrule appellant's point of error and affirm the judgment.
REFORMATION OF JUDGMENT
The judgment in a criminal case "shall reflect . . . [t]he offense or offenses for which the defendant was convicted." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.01 § 1(13) (Vernon Supp. 2010). Section 22.021 of the Texas Penal Code, under which appellant was convicted, provides in relevant part that a party commits the offense of aggravated sexual assault if he "causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means" and "the victim is younger than 14 years of age." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i) (2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2010). The indictment to which appellate pleaded guilty alleges that appellant did "unlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly cause the penetration of the FEMALE SEXUAL ORGAN of . . . the Complainant, a person younger than fourteen years of age and not the spouse of the Defendant, by placing HIS SEXUAL ORGAN in the FEMALE SEXUAL ORGAN of the Complainant." Appellant does not argue that the allegations are incorrect. He does not dispute that the complainant was under the age of fourteen, nor does he contend that a victim under the age of fourteen is not an element of the offense to which he was charged and pleaded guilty. Rather, appellant asserts that the judgment should be "modified to reflect that [a]ppellant was convicted of `Aggravated Sexual Assault," rather than "Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child Under 14" because the "remaining descriptive language, `of a child-under 14' is not part of the name of the Penal Code section in question, and should be deleted from the judgment." The Court of Criminal Appeals has addressed this issue in the burglary context and admonished that judgments should be descriptive enough to describe the actual offense. Davis v. State, 501 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). For example, rather than use the term "burglary, as charged in the indictment," judgments should state "`burglary with intent to commit theft' or `burglary with intent to commit rape.'" Id.; see also Garcia v. State, 453 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (not error to enter "judgment reciting that the conviction was for `Burglary PRNT'" because "indictment alleged and the jury found that appellant committed the offense of burglary of a private residence at night."). Appellant cites no authority for requiring judgments to characterize offenses by reference to only the title, rather than the text, of the relevant Penal Code section. This Court has previously rejected the argument that the judgment must "reflect the offense identified in the title of the relevant section of the Penal Code." Torres v. State, No. 01-09-00936-CR, 2011 WL 148055, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 13, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that trial court did not err by entering judgment for "Burglary of a Habitation with Intent to Commit Theft" rather than "Burglary"). As required by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court's judgment here accurately reflects the "offense or offenses for which the defendant was convicted." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.01 § 1(13). Finding no error, we overrule appellant's sole point of error. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.