Reversed. See 187 Minn. 169, 224 N.W. 681, and 189 Minn. 90, 248 N.W. 749. F.W. Root, C.O. Newcomb, A.C. Erdall, and Catherwood, Hughes Alderson, for appellant.
Upon appeal to this court by the railroad company there was a reversal of the order denying its motion for a new trial. 187 Minn. 169, 244 N.W. 681. In the meantime judgment against plaintiff in favor of Beckel was entered pursuant to the verdict.
See, King v. International Lbr. Co. 156 Minn. 494, 497, 195 N.W. 450, 451; Thomas v. Murphy, 87 Minn. 358, 361, 91 N.W. 1097, 1098. Ayer v. Chicago, M. St. P. P. R. Co. 187 Minn. 169, 244 N.W. 681; Tiedje v. Haney, 184 Minn. 569, 239 N.W. 611; Booth v. Spindler, 261 Minn. 79, 86, 110 N.W.2d 889, 894. In June 1963, the plaintiffs, Frank and Marjorie Viebahn, consulted defendant Gudim Realty, Inc., with a view to purchasing a motel.
Obviously, if the rental value of his lease before the taking was $16,000 and that amount represented the value after the taking, the lessee would have sustained no damages. If the jury's answer to special interrogatory 2 is taken at its face value, it would follow that the full $20,000 award should have been for the benefit of the feeholders, but in the answer to interrogatory 1-b, the jury determined that the damage to the feeholders was $12,000. These inconsistencies are irreconcilable and render the verdict perverse and inconsistent. Ayer v. Chicago, M. St. P. P. R. Co. 187 Minn. 169, 244 N.W. 681. Accordingly, under Rule 49.02, a new trial must be granted. 3. The state contends that the trial court erred in receiving in evidence expert testimony as to valuations which admittedly were based upon improvements to the premises then in contemplation but not actually completed at the time of the trial; and in receiving in evidence on the issue of valuation exhibits indicating the increase in lessee's gross sales during its occupancy of the premises.
In essence we have an absolute finding that plaintiff-husband was contributorily negligent and with respect to this finding there is no inconsistency between the two verdicts. For examples of truly perverse verdicts, see Ayer v. Chicago, M. St. P. P. R. Co. 187 Minn. 169, 244 N.W. 681; Tiedje v. Haney, 184 Minn. 569, 239 N.W. 611; Begin v. Liederbach Bus Co. Inc. 167 Minn. 84, 208 N.W. 546. In each of these cases suit was brought against a corporation and also against its employer-agent upon whose negligent acts was predicated the asserted liability of the corporation.
However, where a master and servant are sued jointly, a verdict against the master only is in effect a verdict for the servant. 57 C.J.S., Master and Servant, ยง 619, p. 423; Begin v. Liederbach Bus Co., 167 Minn. 84, 208 N.W. 546; Ayer v. Chicago, M., St. P. P. R. Co., 187 Minn. 169, 244 N.W. 681. See Sibley v. Odum, 257 Ala. 292, 58 So.2d 896; Richardson v. Stinson, 211 Ala. 254, 100 So. 209; Handley, Reeves Co. v. Lawley Co., 90 Ala. 527, 8 So. 101.
To return a verdict against the corporation, based on Gifis's negligence, without returning a verdict against Gifis would render the verdict perverse. Bell v. N. P. Ry. Co. 112 Minn. 488, 128 N.W. 829; Begin v. Liederbach Bus Co. Inc. 167 Minn. 84, 208 N.W. 546; Tiedje v. Haney, 184 Minn. 569, 239 N.W. 611; Ayer v. C. M. St. P. P. R. Co. 187 Minn. 169, 244 N.W. 681. In the absence of a verdict against Gifis, in order to support the verdict of the jury the record must disclose negligent conduct on the part of someone and, furthermore, it must disclose that that someone was, at the time of the accident, the servant of the Hennepin Wheel Goods Company so as to impose vicarious liability on the company for that negligence. Under the evidence, that someone would have to be Ranum. Although there was the other unidentified employee of the Hennepin Wheel Goods Company in the basement, the evidence is so vague as to his conduct that any finding of negligence on his part could not be sustained.
Id. An internally inconsistent verdict is perverse and cannot stand. See Ayer v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R. Co., 187 Minn. 169, 172, 244 N.W. 681, 682 (1932) (granting railroad company new trial after jury verdict finding railroad company liable but railroad employee alleged to be negligent not liable). The district court granted JMOL to the county, concluding that there was no evidentiary basis for holding the county vicariously liable for false imprisonment.