Summary
In Y. M.V.R. Co. v. Claiborne County, 191 Miss. 277, 2 So.2d 548 (1941) we noted that, before 1932, the legislature at each session imposed a limitation on the amount of tax which a county could levy.
Summary of this case from Wilson v. Jones Cty. Bd. of SupervisorsOpinion
No. 34432.
May 26, 1941. Suggestion of Error Overruled July 11, 1941.
1. STATUTES.
The chapter limiting power of counties to impose taxes and the chapter restricting power of counties and municipalities to borrow money and levy taxes for payment thereof, which were enacted by Legislature at same session, are parts of same legislative plan, without either of which such plan would be incomplete, and, therefore, must be construed together (Laws 1932, chaps. 104, 235).
2. COUNTIES.
Under statute limiting amount of money which county boards of supervisors were permitted to borrow in anticipation of collection of taxes and to levy a special tax therefor to 25 per cent of estimated amount of taxes collected "under the last preceding annual tax levies," where fund from which general county expenses were paid was insufficient for that purpose, board of supervisors, in borrowing money to cover maturing obligations payable out of such fund, was limited to 25 per cent of amount of taxes collected for such fund under last preceding levy therefor, and not to 25 per cent of amount of taxes collected under all of levies for all purposes (Code 1930, secs. 251, 252; Laws 1932, chap. 235, sec. 16).
ANDERSON, J., dissenting.
APPEAL from the circuit court of Claiborne county, HON. R.B. ANDERSON, Judge.
A.S. Coody, Jr., and May Byrd, all of Jackson, and W.P. Martin, Jr., R.C. Beckett, and E.C. Craig, all of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
The fundamental rule in the construction of statutes is to maintain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the statute.
Darnell v. Johnson, 109 Miss. 570, 68 So. 780; Roseberry v. Norsworthy, 135 Miss. 845, 100 So. 514; White v. Miller, 162 Miss. 296, 139 So. 611; Chassanoil v. City of Greenwood, 166 Miss. 848, 148 So. 781.
The title of Chap. 235, Laws 1932, in part is as follows: "An act prescribing restrictions upon the issuance of bonds, etc. . . . prescribing restrictions upon the power of counties and municipalities to borrow money in anticipation of taxes and to issue negotiable notes or evidences of indebtedness therefor and providing for the ley of a special tax." The title of the act speaks for the Legislature and evidences its intention far clearer than any argument we might advance.
The statute must be reasonably interpreted with reference to the evil it was intended to remedy and the dangers and liabilities it was intended to prevent.
Wm. R. Moore Dry Goods Co. v. Rowe and Carrithers, 97 Miss. 775, 53 So. 626; Phillips, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Perkins Elmore, 53 So. 628.
The appellee contends that the language of the act of 1932, wherein the word "levies" is used, must be construed to mean all of the levies and not the levy for the particular fund for which the money is being borrowed. The court is not bound to hold that all of these "levies" are included simply because the Legislature used the plural "levies" instead of the singular "levy." In construing the statute and undertaking to ascertain the intention of the Legislature the court will, we submit, construe the statute as containing the word levy, if necessary, to effectuate the purpose of the Legislature.
Sec. 1395, Code of 1930.
In construing statutes the court must seek the Legislature's intention and adopt an interpretation giving effect thereto, though the interpretation may be beyond the mere letter of the statute.
Ingraham v. Speed, 30 Miss. 410; J. G.R.R. Co. v. Hemphill, 35 Miss. 17; Gunter v. City of Jackson, 130 Miss. 637, 94 So. 844; Gandy v. Public Service Corp., 163 Miss. 187, 140 So. 687.
The Legislature, by the enactment of Chapter 104, Laws of 1932, provided definite limitations on the levy that could be made for various county and district expenses. Section 2 of this statute sets out definitely the limit on the levy for general county expenses. It was evidently the intention of the Legislature that each county should pay its general expenses from the proceeds of the levy authorized in this chapter.
Attala County v. I.C.R.R. Co., 186 Miss. 294, 190 So. 241.
If the construction sought by the appellee in this case is applied to Section 16 of Chapter 235, then the extent to which the limitations of said Chapter 104 may be avoided by such indirect taxation for general county expenses will be very pronounced. Take the present case for example. Chapter 104 limits Claiborne County to a levy of 8 mills for general county expenses. It levied this tax of 8 mills, and in addition a special levy of 12 mills to pay the tax anticipation notes here in question. The notes were issued to raise money for current general county expenses so the total levy made by this county for general county expenses was really 20 mills, even though the limit provided by aforementioned Chapter 104 is only 8 mills. Thus this county indirectly levied more than twice as much as it could levy directly. Such a construction would nullify the purpose and effect of said Chapter 104. E.S. J.T. Drake, of Port Gibson, for appellee.
Appellant, in its brief, contends that the words "annual tax levies," as used in the act, as set out above, mean, in effect, annual tax levy for general county purposes. We can see nothing in the act, or in anything surrounding or connected with it, which would justify this broadening of the language used by the statute. It will be noticed at a glance, that this very radical and limited interpretation of the statute, reads into it a limitation which is not set out therein. As the court construes the act to reach the intention of the Legislature, we cannot see how this interpretation can be given to the words used in the Act, as the Legislature is presumed to use words in their usual and ordinary sense, unless it clearly appears that they intended that the words should mean something else.
Chattanooga Sewer Pipe Works v. Dumler, 153 Miss. 276, 120 So. 450; State v. J.J. Newman Lbr. Co., 103 Miss. 263, 60 So. 215; Peeler v. Peeler, 68 Miss. 141, 8 So. 392; McIntyre et al. v. Ingraham et al., 35 Miss. 25; Green v. Waller, 32 Miss. 650.
We think the only reasonable construction to be put upon this statute is the one that tax levies mean tax levies in and for the county, including not only county wide levies, but district levies, state levies, and even municipal levies are included in the letter of the law. It will be noted that the statute speaks of tax levies in the plural, rather than in the singular. In the construction of a statute, the exact scope of which is not clear, it will not be inferred that the Legislature in passing the statute intended a drastic limitation upon the powers formerly granted by it, which was not expressed clearly in the statute. With this in mind we do not see how this statute could be restricted or limited to the levy made for the general county fund or for any other special fund, but it must be extended to cover all taxes levied and collected by the county.
Counsel for appellant, in his brief, quotes Section 1395 of the Code of 1930 to support the proposition that the word "levies" as used in the 1932 Act should be construed to mean "levy." This Section is clearly intended only to provide for a case where the use of words in their usual sense or number would not arrive at a clear meaning, or would distort the obvious intention of the Legislature.
Alexander Satterfield, of Jackson, for appellee.
When the Legislature was carrying out its general purpose as stated in the title of Chapter 235 of the Laws of 1932, whereby it was "prescribing restrictions upon the power of counties and municipalities to borrow money in anticipation of taxes and to issue notes or evidence of indebtedness therefor," such restriction was stated to be "twenty-five per cent of the estimated amount of taxes collected and/or to be collected under the last preceding annual tax levies." The only logical construction from the language used is that the Legislature meant what it said and was referring to the annual tax levies fixed by the Board of Supervisors at its regular October meeting each year, and the annual tax levy collected by the tax collectors of the counties for state purposes and the annual tax levy of poll taxes for the common school fund of the county. We admit that we fail to see why these annual tax levies should not be construed to be "annual tax levies." There is no limiting clause restricting the description of the levies to those for general county purposes or excluding levies made by the board of supervisors for district or state purposes. In order to construe the statute as contended by the appellant, it would be necessary to add the words "for general county purposes only."
Attala County v. I.C.R.R. Co., 186 Miss. 294, 190 So. 241; State ex rel. Capitol Commission v. Connelly, 46 P.2d 1097, 100 A.L.R. 878.
The Legislature intended to use words or clauses in their usual or ordinary sense.
Town of Union v. Ziller, 118 So. 293, 151 Miss. 467; Texas Co. v. Wheeless, 187 So. 881, 888, 185 Miss. 799.
From 1892 to 1920, the amount of loan warrants which could be issued under this statute was restricted in two distinct ways. The first was an arbitrary restriction of $100,000 for counties having more than 30,000 inhabitants and since 1904 a restriction of $50,000 in counties having less than 30,000 inhabitants; the second was the general restriction on all bonded indebtedness, including such loan notes, to a certain per centum of the assessed valuation of the county.
From 1920 to 1932 the only restriction was the fixed maximum above stated; therefore, for forty years the smaller counties in Mississippi had based their annual fiscal set up upon an authorization to issue loan notes up to $50,000 and for the last twelve years this had been without any other restriction. For the preceding thirty years the additional restriction applied only to counties which were bonded almost to the limit.
Was it the intention of the Legislature to reduce the amount of loan notes which might be issued from $50,000 to an average of approximately $5,000, an arbitrary reduction of ninety per cent of the customary authorization? Or was it the intention of the Legislature to use a basis of restriction reasonably proportionate to the resources of the county resulting in a reduction reasonably proportionate to the usual and customary fiscal set up which had been used for the preceding forty years?
The effect of appellant's construction of the statute is unreasonable and clearly contrary to the reasonable intent of the Legislature.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Noble, 188 So. 289, 185 Miss. 360; Brown v. Reeves, 92 So. 825, 129 Miss. 755; Dow v. Town of D'Lo, 152 So. 474, 169 Miss. 240; Knox v. Southern Paper Co., 108 So. 288, 143 Miss. 870; Railroad v. Adams, 38 So. 348, 85 Miss. 772; Y. M.V.R.R. Co. v. Grenada County, 76 So. 154, 115 Miss. 238.
Argued orally by A.S. Coody, Jr., and R.C. Beckett, for appellant, and by J.T. Drake, Jr., and John C. Satterfield, for appellee.
The appellee, the defendant in the court below, demurred to the appellant's declaration. This demurrer was sustained, the appellant declined to plead further, and its action was thereupon dismissed. The declaration alleges in substance that between June 5th and September 4, 1939, the appellee's board of supervisors borrowed the sum of $50,000 to defray the general expenses of the county in anticipation of taxes to be collected for the next fiscal year, for the payment of which the board levied on November 9, 1939, a special ad valorem tax of twelve mills, on all property in the county, this levy being illegal to the extent of ten mills thereof. The tax collector insisted on the payment by the appellant of the full amount of this tax on its property, and it paid the same under protest, thereby paying the sum of $4,489.88 in excess of the tax of two mills, which the board of supervisors had the right to levy and for which amount a judgment against the county was sought.
According to the declaration, Claiborne County "has a population of less than thirty thousand persons, and has a total assessed valuation (of property) for purposes of taxation of $3,646,617 in 1939." Section 251, Code of 1930, which appeared in the Code of 1906 as Section 334, provides that counties having less than thirty thousand inhabitants may borrow money not exceeding "$50,000.00 in one year, in anticipation of taxes, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the county, and may issue their negotiable notes therefor maturing not later than February 15th of the year succeeding the year in which they are issued." Section 252 provides that a special tax may be levied for the payment of the money borrowed. By Section 16, Chapter 235, Laws of 1932, the amount of money which boards of supervisors were permitted, by Sections 251, 252 of the Code, to borrow in anticipation of the collection of taxes and to levy a special tax therefor was limited to "25 per cent of the estimated amount of taxes collected, and/or to be collected, under the last preceding annual tax levies."
According to the declaration, the $50,000 here borrowed was within the twenty-five per cent of the aggregate of all taxes collected by the county for all purposes under the levies therefor in 1938. The taxes collected for general county purposes amounted to only $28,536.70, twenty-five per cent thereof is $7,134.17, to cover which only, the appellant says, the county was here authorized to borrow money. The question for decision then is: When a particular fund in the county treasury, for instance as here, the fund from which the general county expenses must be paid, is insufficient for the funds' purpose, is the county limited by Section 16, Laws of 1932, in borrowing money to cover its maturing obligations payable out of that fund to twenty-five per cent of the amount of taxes collected for that fund under the last preceding levy therefor, or only by the amount of taxes collected under all of the levies for all purposes? To express it differently, do the words "under the last preceding annual tax levies" in that section refer to taxes collected for all purposes, or only to the taxes collected for the particular purpose for the accomplishment of which it has become necessary for the county to borrow money?
Section 214, Code of 1930, which appeared in former codes, authorizes boards of supervisors "to levy such taxes as may be necessary to meet the demands of their respective counties, upon such persons and property as are subject to state taxes for the time being, not exceeding the limits that may be prescribed by law." Prior to 1932, each session of the Legislature imposed a limit on the amount of taxes which a county could levy. E.g. Chapter 268, Laws of 1930, where the limit for county purposes exclusive of road, bridge and school taxes and sinking funds, for the years 1930 and 1931 was fixed at six mills on the dollar. In 1932, this method of restricting boards of supervisors in the levy of county taxes was changed by Chapter 104 thereof of the laws of that year, which provides that after September 30, 1932, counties should not levy taxes in excess of the limitations therein provided. This limitation varied according to the assessed valuation of taxable property in the county. The taxes permitted for general county purposes in counties having an assessed valuation of less than three million dollars was fixed at ten mills on the dollar, and in counties having an assessed valuation of three million dollars and less than eight million dollars, it was fixed at eight mills on the dollar. Other sections of the statute provide limitations on the amount of taxes to be levied for roads, bridges and schools. As a part of the legislative intention set forth in Chapter 104, to limit the power of counties to impose taxes, the Legislature, at the same session, also enacted Chapter 235, Laws of 1932, the title of which declares that its purpose is to restrict the power of counties and municipalities to borrow money and to levy taxes for the payment thereof. When we remember that theretofore the Legislature had been limiting counties to the levy of a tax of six mills on the dollar (sometimes eight mills) for general county purposes, it is hardly probable that it intended by Section 16, Chapter 235, Laws of 1932, to practically abolish this limitation and permit counties, after levying the prescribed annual tax (here six mills on the dollar) to thereafter, by a special tax, increase the levy for general county purposes (as here attempted) by more than twice the original levy. Chapters 104 and 235 of the Laws of 1932 are parts of the same legislative plan, without either of which that plan would be incomplete, and therefore must be construed together. When so construed, it is clear that the words "under the last preceding annual tax levies" in Chapter 235 refer to the preceding levy or levies for the purpose for the accomplishment of which the additional special tax is permitted to be levied.
The judgment of the court below will be reversed, the demurrer to the declaration will be overruled, and the cause remanded.
So ordered.
Roberds, J., did not participate in this decision.
DISSENTING OPINION.
Claiborne County found that it needed the sum of $50,000 to tide over the general county expense funds until the taxes for the succeeding year came in. The majority opinion holds that a little over $7,000 was the limit of the borrowing authority of the county for that purpose. In other words, that the county needed the sum of $50,000, but under the law could only borrow about one-seventh of that amount.
Except for the change in Section 251, Code of 1930, made by Section 16 of Chapter 235 of the Laws of 1932, the County could have borrowed as much as $50,000 without any regard to the amount of the tax levies. That section so provides as to counties of not less than thirty thousand inhabitants. The first paragraph of Section 16 of that Act which makes the change out of which this litigation arose is in this language: "That from and after September 30th, 1932, no county or municipality shall borrow money, or issue notes, loan warrants or other interest bearing obligations, in anticipation of the collection of taxes for the next succeeding fiscal year, in excess of 25 per cent of the estimated amount of taxes collected, and/or to be collected, under the last preceding annual tax levies; and any obligations issued in excess of the amount authorized to be issued under the provisions of this Act shall be void."
The majority opinion holds that the limit was twenty-five per cent of the preceding tax levy alone for common county purposes which it states amounted to something like $7,000, which according to the finding of the board was wholly inadequate for the purpose. Section 16 expressly provides to the contrary. It is twenty-five per cent of the estimated amount of taxes to be collected "under the last preceding annual tax levies." The majority opinion has simply written in the statute the word "levy" for the word "levies."