Opinion
No. 3-301 / 02-1401
Filed August 27, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, James E. Kelly, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from judgment entered in favor of defendant on his wrongful death and loss of consortium claims. AFFIRMED.
James Pillers of Pillers Law Offices, P.C., Clinton, for appellant.
Eric Knoernschild of Knoernschild, Conway Reidel, Muscatine, for appellee.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Plaintiff Fazal Mehmood Awan, as Administrator of the Estate of Shahana T. Aleemudin, deceased, appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendant Jodi Albers on his wrongful death and loss of consortium claims. Awan contends the district court erred in precluding his accident reconstruction expert from testifying. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On August 31, 1999, Shahana Aleemudin was driving west on Cragmor Drive in a vehicle owned by her husband, Fazal Mehmood Awan. Jodi Albers was driving her pickup truck north on North 3rd Street. As Aleemudin turned left into the southbound lane of North 3rd Street, the vehicles collided. Aleemudin was killed in the collision, and Albers sustained serious injuries.
On March 20, 2000, Albers sued Awan, as fiduciary of the estate of Aleemudin and individually, for damages incurred in the collision. On September 11, 2000, Awan counterclaimed, contending Albers was liable for wrongful death and loss of consortium for spouse and child. Albers's claim was settled and dismissed.
Awan named Thomas Merritt as an accident reconstruction expert witness. His deposition was taken in May 2001. Awan's claims were tried to a jury in August 2002. Before trial, Albers made an oral motion in limine seeking a determination whether Merritt was qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction. The trial court, citing its role as gatekeeper, found Merritt was not a qualified accident reconstruction expert. The court further found a proper foundation for his testimony was not provided, and his testimony was excluded. The jury returned a verdict finding defendant Albers thirty-two percent at fault, and Aleemudin sixty-eight percent at fault. The district court entered judgment in favor of Albers.
II. Scope of Review. Our scope of review is for the correction of errors of law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. Admissibility of expert testimony is discretionary. Wheeler v. Dental East, P.C., 494 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992). We are loath to interfere unless a manifest abuse of discretion has resulted in prejudice to the complaining party. Id. An abuse of discretion exists where the court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Id. III. Admissibility of Expert Testimony. The Iowa Rules of Evidence provide:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Iowa R. Evid. 5.702. The district court concluded Merritt was not qualified as an accident reconstruction expert.
There are no precise rules governing how a witness may acquire the requisite qualifications to be considered an expert witness. State v. Belken, 633 N.W.2d 786, 800 (Iowa 2001). The witness need not be considered a specialist in the particular field as long as the testimony is within the general area of expertise. Id. Furthermore, the witness need not possess a particular license, certification, or educational degree. Id. On the contrary, witnesses may acquire expert knowledge through practical experience and training, as well as through formal education. Id.
Merritt applied the theory of conservation of momentum in arriving at his conclusions regarding the speeds of the Aleemudin and Albers vehicles. He trained in the use of this theory during two two-week courses at the Northwestern University Traffic Institute between 1989 and 1993. Merritt applied this theory while employed in the Accident Investigation Unit of the Davenport Police Department. Since Merritt left the department in 1999, he has worked as a collision reconstructionist, performing private consultations. In this capacity, Merritt performed approximately fifty private consultations and accident reconstructions between 1993 and August 1999. He attended technical accident investigation training seminars in 1991, 1992, 1998, 1999, and 2002 where he received ninety-four hours of additional instruction. Given our court's liberal view on the admissibility of expert testimony, In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa Ct.App. 2002), we conclude Merritt is a qualified expert witness. However, we further conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of Awan's expert witness. It is not enough that a witness be generally qualified in a certain area; a proper foundation for his opinion must be established. Tiemeyer v. McIntosh, 176 N.W.2d 819, 824 (Iowa 1970); see also Karr v. Samuelson, Inc., 176 N.W.2d 204, 209-10 (Iowa 1970). Merritt testified that in order to apply the theory of conservation of momentum, he had to know the approach angles of the vehicles, the departure angles of the vehicles, the post-impact speed of the vehicles, and the weight of each vehicle. In order to determine the approach angle of the Aleemuddin vehicle, Merritt had to identify where her vehicle was when it stopped at the stop sign. Merritt testified he had no physical evidence to rely on regarding that factor. Instead, he made an assumption based on his observations of other drivers at the intersection. Although we are committed to a liberal rule on the admission of opinion evidence, liberality does not mean an expert opinion may be admitted if it is based on nothing more substantial than conjecture or guess. Tiemeyer, 176 N.W.2d at 824. Because Merritt's opinion was based on speculation regarding the location of where Aleemuddin's vehicle stopped before entering the intersection, the exclusion of his testimony was well within the proper exercise of the trial court's discretion. We find no error in the district court's conclusion Merritt failed to lay the proper foundation for use of the theory of conservation of momentum.