Opinion
SP 4571.
Decided March 18, 2009.
Law Offices of George M. Gavalas, P.C., Mineola, New York, Attorney for Respondent.
George Karavias, Esq., New York, Attorney for Petitioner.
Respondent, Bashirul Haque, moves for an order granting a stay of all further proceedings and vacating the stipulation of settlement entered into by the parties on September 29, 2008. Petitioner, Iftekharul Awal, opposes this motion and respondent served a reply.
The petitioner commenced this holdover proceeding to recover possession of 2187 Jeffrey Drive, Bellmore, New York. On September 29, 2008 the parties, both of whom were represented by counsel, entered into a stipulation which provided:
1. Respondents consent to the entry of a judgment of possession and the issuance of a warrant of eviction with the execution thereof stayed to 11-15-08 for the respondents to vacate the premises in broom clean condition, free of all occupants, turning keys over by 5pm on said date for which receipt will be given.
2. Any items left after said date will be deemed abandoned and petitioner may dispose of same without incurring any liability.
3. In consideration of respondents timely vacatur all arrears/use and occupancy will be waived.
4. A facsimile shall be deemed an original.
5. Bashirul Haque states authority to sign and bind his wife Shameen Ahmed. Petition is amended to delete "John Doe" and "Jane Doe"
A stipulation of settlement entered into in open court has the binding effect of a contract ( Furgano v. Epstein, 106 AD2d 609 [2d Dept 1984]). It is well settled that a stipulation of settlement will not be set aside unless there is a cause sufficient to invalidate a contract, such as fraud, collusion, mistake or accident ( Hallack v. State of New York, 64 NY2d 224; Katz v. Village of Southampton, 244 AD2d 461 [2d Dept 1997]).
The respondent asserts that the motion should be granted and the stipulation of settlement voided because of the petitioner's misrepresentation, failure to cooperate, and breach of promise. Mr Haque states that he purchased the premises in his nephew's name because the nephew had good credit. However, respondent maintains that he paid his nephew $10,000.00 to help him, in addition to paying the deposit, the closing costs, and all mortgage payments. When the respondent ran into financial difficulties, he submitted a short sale application to the bank and was approved. Included in the respondent's papers is a copy of the short sale agreement with Litton Loan Servicing which states that the closing and funding must take place no later than August 18, 2008, or that the approval was void. According to the agreement, the borrower was Iftekharul Awal and the buyer, Bashirul Haque. Also annexed to the order was a copy of the contract of sale dated January 28, 2008. An amendment dated October 28, 2008 stated that closing was expected on or before November 15, 2008. Said amendment also provided a short sale price of $381,000.00. All other provisions of the original contract of sale were reaffirmed.
Respondent further claims the petitioner commenced this proceeding for the sole purpose of pressuring the lender to speed up the process. Additionally, Mr. Haque maintains that he appeared in court and executed the agreement with the understanding and contemplation that he would be closing by November 15, 2008.
This is the second case that has recently come before this Court wherein the parties provide the Court with a stipulation of settlement but allegedly have side dealings which directly impact the terms of the agreement submitted to the Court ( see Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. DeBonis, 2009 NY Slip Op 50322(U) [Nassau Dist Court 2009]).
The Court will not be used as a pawn in ongoing disputes by parties who represent to the Court that the stipulation of settlement ends the ongoing litigation. This Court refuses to recognize alleged collateral agreements between the parties which are hidden from the Court.
The stipulation of settlement presently before the Court is clearly written and complete on its face. Respondent's contention that it should be vacated because of misrepresentations is inconsistent with its terms and barred by the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule bars outside evidence of agreements between the parties when same directly contradicts the intent of the parties expressed in the stipulation of settlement. Respondent agreed to vacate by November 15, 2008, and this was not subject to any contingency or any other agreement.
In Charter Realty Development Corp. v. New Roc Associates, L.P., 293 AD2d 438 (2nd Dept 2002), the Second Department clearly laid out the principles of law which bar introduction of extrinsic evidence to vary a complete and final document submitted to the Court.
"Stipulations of settlement are essentially contracts and will be construed in accordance with contract principles and the parties' intent" ( Serna v. Pergament Distribs., 182 AD2d 985, 986, 582 NYS2d 550). When an agreement between parties is clear and unambiguous on its face, it will be enforced according to its terms and without resort to extrinsic evidence ( see W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157, at 163, 565 NYS2d 440, 566 NE2d 639). Accordingly, a court "should not, under the guise of contract interpretation, `imply a term which the parties themselves failed to insert' or otherwise rewrite the contract" ( Lui v. Park Ridge at Terryville Association, 196 AD2d 579, 581, 601 NYS2d 496, quoting Mitchell v. Mitchell, 82 AD2d 849, 440 NYS2d 54).
See also, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, 2009 NY Slip Opposes 50322(U), supra, applying the above rules, barring extrinsic evidence to undermine a complete and final legal settlement which terminates an ongoing legal dispute.
Attorneys and parties are hereby given notice that this Court will not be used as an instrument in parties' power struggles. Stipulations of settlement submitted to the Court are expected to be complete and incorporate all terms and conditions agreed upon. Adoption of a policy which allows introduction of extrinsic evidence and or "side deals" to undermine stipulations of settlement will cause havoc and add needless work to a Court already burdened each day with heavy calendars.
CONCLUSION
The order to show cause is denied. Petitioner may proceed to evict respondents as of May 2, 2009.
So Ordered.