In a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Valtierra v. State , 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ; Aviles-Barroso v. State , 477 S.W.3d 363, 380 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd). The trial court is entitled to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness's testimony, even if that testimony is uncontroverted, because the trial court has the opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor and appearance.

When determining the admissibility of a pre-trial identification, we use a two-step analysis to determine whether: (1) the pre-trial procedure was impermissibly suggestive; and (2) the suggestive pre-trial procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See Loserth v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex Crim App 1998); Fisher, 525 S.W.3d at 762; Aviles-Barroso v State, 477 S.W.3d 363, 381 (Tex App-Houston [14th Dist] 2015, pet ref'd); see also Coleman v State, No 14-18-00816-CR, __ S.W.3d__, __, 2020 WL 1921976, at *2 (Tex App-Houston [14th Dist] Apr 21, 2020, pet ref'd) (mem op) The appellant has the burden of proving both prongs by clear and convincing evidence State v Ibarra, 953 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Tex Crim App 1997) (citing Tex Const art I, § 9); see also Aviles-Barroso, 477 S.W.3d at 381 "Clear and convincing evidence" means "that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established" Ex parte Mello, 355 S.W.3d 827, 831 n10 (Tex App-Fort Worth 2011, pet ref'd); see Ex parte Navarijo, 433 S.W.3d 558, 567 (Tex Crim App 2014) (Price, J, concurring) ("Clear and convincing evidence is defined as that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to

In a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Valtierra v. State , 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ; Aviles-Barroso v. State , 477 S.W.3d 363, 380 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd). The trial court is entitled to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness's testimony, even if that testimony is uncontroverted, because the trial court has the opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor and appearance.

In a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Aviles-Barroso v. State, 477 S.W.3d 363, 380 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd). The trial court is entitled to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness's testimony, even if that testimony is uncontroverted, because the trial court has the opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor and appearance.

When determining the admissibility of a pretrial identification, a two-step analysis is applied: the first step asks whether the pretrial procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and the second step focuses on whether the suggestive pretrial procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See Aviles-Barroso v. State, 477 S.W.3d 363, 381 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd). Thus, if the pretrial identification is determined to be impermissibly suggestive, the next step is to assess the reliability of the identification by looking at the totality of the circumstances to see if the identification gave rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment because the State did not seek the death penalty. Aviles-Barroso v. State, 477 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Tex. App.-Hous. (14 Dist.), 2015). In the appeal from Aviles-Barroso's subsequent prosecution, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained:

He also stated that he has "never testified or been qualified as an expert on the issue of memory when it comes to auditory identification;" he "never testified on issues in memory for witnesses, only on matching of voices from an unknown to a known."Aviles-Barroso v. State, 477 S.W.3d 363, 386 (Tex. App. 2015) (emphasis added). Thus, while he is qualified to opine on the scientific aspects of voice analysis and audiology (e.g., the auditory impact of heavy traffic noise behind the voice exemplar; or how people generally hear and recognize vocal patterns or signatures), he is not qualified to opine on whether law enforcement utilized an appropriate procedure (e.g., that it is inappropriate for law enforcement to use of a traffic stop as a voice exemplar), nor is he qualified to opine on the victims' credibility or cognitive abilities (e.g., whether a victim is likely to have misidentified a voice).

Counsel asserts that "VCTM45" refers to the crime victim's compensation fund, and he argues that assessment of this fee was improper because the fee is not currently authorized by statute. See Aviles-Barroso v. State, 477 S.W.3d 363, 398 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd) ("Texas Local Government Code section 133.102 indicates that the fees for crime stoppers, criminal justice planning, officer education, compensation to victims of crime, and judicial training are not to be individually assessed but are, instead, part of the mandatory . . . consolidated fee to be assessed as a court cost upon a felony conviction."). We agree.

When determining the admissibility of a pretrial identification, we apply a two-step analysis; first asking whether the pretrial procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and then, if so, whether the suggestive pretrial procedure gave rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. E.g.,Aviles-Barroso v. State , 477 S.W.3d 363, 381 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd). The analysis under these steps requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the particular case.

When determining the admissibility of a pretrial identification, we apply a two-step analysis, inquiring (1) whether the pretrial procedure was impermissibly suggestive; and (2) if so, whether the suggestive pretrial procedure gave rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Aviles-Barroso v. State, 477 S.W.3d 363, 381 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd). The analysis under these steps requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the particular case and a determination of the reliability of the identification.