Opinion
A150608
03-15-2017
MICHAEL D. AVILA, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 15006228) THE COURT:
Before Jones, P.J., Needham, J., and Bruiniers, J.
In this writ proceeding, petitioner Michael D. Avila contends respondent superior court erred in finding good cause to continue trial beyond the statutory speedy trial deadlines, and in thereafter refusing to dismiss the criminal action. (Pen. Code, § 1382, subd. (a)(2).) The People concede, and we agree, that petitioner is entitled to relief. We grant the petition by way of this memorandum opinion because "[t]he Courts of Appeal should dispose of causes that raise no substantial issues of law or fact by memorandum or other abbreviated form of opinion." (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
It is undisputed that for statutory speedy trial purposes, the last day for trial in petitioner's felony case fell on February 17, 2017. On February 16, 2017, the People sought a continuance of trial under Penal Code section 1050, subdivision (g), asserting the prosecutor assigned to this domestic violence case was currently involved in another domestic violence trial. Respondent continued the hearing until the following day, and the parties indicated they would submit filings regarding the motion. By the time of the February 17, 2017 hearing, trial in the prosecutor's other case had concluded. Upon learning no courtroom was available, respondent ordered the People's continuance motion granted "as of yesterday," which was the day the motion was filed and the prosecutor was engaged in another trial until 4:00 p.m., and set a new last day for trial of March 3, 2017. Petitioner's subsequent motion to dismiss under Penal Code section 1382 was denied.
" 'If the defendant is not "brought to trial" within the statutory period, dismissal is required unless the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, determines that good cause has been demonstrated. [Citations.] In order to avoid dismissal, the prosecution must meet the burden of demonstrating good cause for delay. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Thus, we review a trial court's decision to grant a continuance for good cause for abuse of discretion. [Citations.]" (Burgos v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 817, 824.)
The parties agree, as do we, that by February 17, the prosecution no longer had a good cause basis for a trial continuance. Since the jury in the prosecutor's other trial returned its verdict on February 16, the Attorney General appropriately concedes that by February 17, "the basis for the prosecution's assertion of good cause had dissipated, and the court no longer had legal justification to grant the continuance. [Footnote.]" We agree with petitioner that a defendant's statutory speedy trial rights may not be circumvented by the granting of a continuance motion retroactively to a date when good cause assertedly existed.
The People did not attempt to establish any other good cause basis for a continuance on February 17. While respondent determined no other courtroom was available, it did not base its good cause finding on that fact. (See People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1163-1164 [requiring analysis for good cause purposes of whether the lack of an available courtroom is due to chronic congestion or exceptional circumstances].)
The Attorney General further concedes, and we agree, that the lack of good cause for the trial continuance means that petitioner's motion to dismiss should have been granted, since he was not brought to trial by February 17, the last day under the statutory speedy trial period.
In accordance with our prior notification to the parties that we might do so, we will direct issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177-180.) Petitioner's right to relief is obvious, and no useful purpose would be served by issuance of an alternative writ, further briefing and oral argument. (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35; see also Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1236-1237, 1240-1241; Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1233, 1240-1244.)
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court to vacate its order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, and to thereafter enter a new order granting that motion. In the interests of justice, this decision shall be final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).) The previously issued stay is dissolved. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the remittitur shall issue immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(c)(1), 8.490(d).)