Opinion
CASE NO. 99-CV-75305-DT
September 28, 2000
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Michigan Department of Corrections' Motion to Dismiss Plaintifft's claims alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 2000e — 17 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) pursuant to FED R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff has filed a response to Defendant's motion. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the parties' briefs and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR7.1(e)(2), it is hereby ORDERED that the motion be resolved on the briefs submitted. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a complaint filed by Plaintiff on October 1, 1999 in Wayne County Circuit Court, which was properly removed to this Court on October 29, 1999. Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that, while employed by Defendant as a corrections officer, he was subject to several violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter "Title VII"), including claims of harassment, discrimination, and physical and emotional injuries sustained as a result of the alleged civil rights violations. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant discriminated against his religion and his exercise of it in violation of Title VII and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. On August 18, 1997, Plaintiff jointly filed charges containing the abovementioned allegations with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (herinafter "EEOC)
In Plaintiff's deposition of July 14. 2000, Defendant demanded that Plaintiff produce his right-to-sue letter allegedly issued by the EEOC for the discrimination charges filed by Plaintiff with the EEOC. Plaintiff failed to comply with this request. Defendant renewed its request for Plaintiff to produce his right-to-sue letter allegedly given from the EEOC on August 7. 2000. Having failed again to produce the letter, Defendant moves to dismiss on the ground that a notice of the right to sue from the EEOC is a condition precedent for Plaintiff to bring a Title VII action in this Court. Therefore, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as required under Title VII precludes this Court's jurisdiction over this matter.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion brought pursuant to FED.R. Civ.P.12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff's claims. The Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the pleadings, and any ambiguities must be resolved in Plaintiff's favor. See Jackson v. Richards Medical Co. 961 F.2d 575,577-78 (6th Cir. 1992). However, a court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. See Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d to, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). A district court may properly grant a motion to dismiss when no set of facts exists which would allow Plaintiff to recover. See Carter by Carter v. Cornwall, 983 F.2d 52,54 (6th Cir. 1993).
IV. ANALYSIS
The Sixth Circuit is abundantly clear that "receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC is a condition precedent to filing a Title VII action" in this Court. See Dixon v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, No. 97-4475, 1999 US. App. LEXIS 8384, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 1999) (citing Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 1029, 1031-32 (6th Cir. 1998)).
The facts in Dixon mirror the facts in this case. In Dixon, the plaintiff, proceeding pro se, sued the Ohio Department of Corrections for alleged violations of Title VII. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of his Title VII claims because plaintiff never produced a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Thus, plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies, a condition precedent to bringing an action in federal district court. See Dixon, No. 97-4475 at * 1-3.
As in Dixon, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, is suing the Michigan Department of Corrections alleging Title VII violations but has failed to produce right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Thus, Dixon and Rivers mandate this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claims.
Plaintiff's reliance on Truitt v. County of Wayne, 148 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 1998) is misplaced. Plaintiff cites Truitt, which relies on Rivers. for the proposition that "a right-to-sue letter is not a jurisdictional requirement for bringing a Title VII action." Truitt, 148 F.3d at 646 (citing Rivers 143 F.3d at 1031). While this is a true statement, Plaintiff fails to read the entire opinion in context to recognize that a right-to-sue letter is still a condition precedent, even if not a jurisdictional requirement, to bringing a Title VII action in this Court. See Rivers, 143 F.3d at 1031. The difference being that a condition precedent is subject to "equitable tolling and waiver" (whereas a jurisdictional requirement is not modifiable. See id. As the Sixth Circuit makes clear in Dixon, even as a condition precedent, failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC mandates this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Title VII and any remaining claims contained in his complaint with the EEOC for railing to exhaust administrative remedies.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Court need not pass on the remaining motions pending in this Court as the most recent motion granted to Defendant dismisses the entire case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.