Avakian v. De Los Santos

34 Citing cases

  1. New York City Housing Authority v. Fountain

    172 Misc. 2d 784 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1997)   Cited 13 times

    In at least two departments, appellate courts have recognized the importance of zip codes. ( See, Avakian v De Los Santos, 183 A.D.2d 687 [2d Dept 1992]; Lawrence v Ellis Agency, 138 A.D.2d 980 [4th Dept 1988].) In addition, appellate courts have recognized the necessity of mailing to a correct and complete address.

  2. Stair v. Calhoun

    12-CV-6121 (SJF)(SIL) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015)   Cited 6 times
    Refusing to consider supplemental affidavit of service obtained in response to R & R

    "In the absence of any supporting testimony or affidavits from local postal officials or any other nonhearsay evidence establishing that mail sent to [Fresh Meadows, N.Y. with no zip code] will reach [Jamaica, NY 11439]," U.S. Bank, 24 A.D. 3d at 908; cf. Brownell, 82 A.D.2d at 844, 440 N.Y.S.2d 57, plaintiff has failed to establish that he met the mailing requirement of CPLR 308(2) and, thus, that service was properly effected upon Parella within the sixty (60)-day limitations period provided by CPLR 205(a). See, e.g. Avakian v. De Los Santos, 183 A.D.2d 687, 688, 583 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding that "the evidence presented by the plaintiff was insufficient to demonstrate that a proper mailing occurred withing the meaning of [CPLR 308(2)]" where the process server's affidavit of service reflected a mailing address containing an incorrect city and omitting a zip code); Foster v. Cranin, 180 A.D.2d 712, 712-13, 579 N.Y.S.2d 742 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding that the complaint was properly dismissed for improper service of process where "it was mailed to an incorrect and incomplete address[.]")

  3. American National Property Casualty Co. v. Duque

    Case No. 6:07-cv-959-Orl-22KRS (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2008)

    There also is some question whether the correct city was identified . See Booker, 752 N.Y.S. 2d at 522 (zip code required); Avakian v. De Los Santos, 583 N.Y.S. 2d 275, 276 (N.Y.App.Div. 1992) (finding service under section 308(4) insufficient due to issues of fact regarding city and zip codes to which summonses were mailed). Plaintiff's motions for default against Angeline and Leila are premature, because Plaintiff has not established that they were been properly served.

  4. Italian Elegant Jewelry, LLC v. Fteha

    2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 3967 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)   Cited 5 times

    The Ftehas rebutted the presumption of proper service by averring that service was effectuated at the wrong address (e.g. Chaudry Constr. Corp. v James G. Kalpakis & Assoc., 60 A.D.3d 544, 545 [1st Dept 2009]). The process server's subsequent affidavit did not establish proper service as a matter of law, because that affidavit, among other things, did not specifically confirm that the follow up mailings had been sent to the correct address (see Avakian v De Los Santos, 183 A.D.2d 687, 688 [2d Dept 1992]). Accordingly, a traverse hearing is required to determine whether personal jurisdiction was obtained over the Ftehas via service pursuant to CPLR 308(4).

  5. Gray-Joseph v. Shuhai Liu

    90 A.D.3d 988 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)   Cited 31 times
    Stating that "[j]urisdiction is not acquired pursuant to CPLR 308 unless both the delivery and mailing requirements have been strictly complied with"

    CPLR 308(2) authorizes service of process to be made by delivery to a person of suitable age and discretion at the defendant's actual place of business, dwelling place, or usual place of abode, and by mailing process to the defendant at either his or her last known residence or actual place of business. Jurisdiction is not acquired pursuant to CPLR 308(2) unless both the delivery and mailing requirements have been strictly complied with ( see Ludmer v. Hasan, 33 A.D.3d 594, 821 N.Y.S.2d 661; McCray v. Petrini, 212 A.D.2d 676, 622 N.Y.S.2d 815; Avakian v. De Los Santos, 183 A.D.2d 687, 688, 583 N.Y.S.2d 275). However, a minor error in the address to which a summons is mailed will not render service of process void where “it is virtually certain that the summons will arrive” at its intended destination ( Brownell v. Feingold, 82 A.D.2d 844, 844, 440 N.Y.S.2d 57; see Ludmer v. Hasan, 33 A.D.3d 594, 821 N.Y.S.2d 661; Donohue v. La Pierre, 99 A.D.2d 570, 471 N.Y.S.2d 396).

  6. Ludmer v. Hasan

    33 A.D.3d 594 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 19 times

    CPLR 308 (2) authorizes service of process to be made by delivery to a person of suitable age and discretion at the defendant's actual place of business, dwelling place, or usual place of abode, coupled with mailing process to the defendant at either his or her last known residence or actual place of business. Jurisdiction is not acquired pursuant to CPLR 308 (2) unless both the delivery and mailing requirements have been strictly complied with ( see McCray v Petrini, 212 AD2d 676; Avakian v De Los Santos, 183 AD2d 687; Foster v Cranin, 180 AD2d 712; Brownell v Feingold, 82 AD2d 844). However, a minor error in the address to which a summons is mailed will not render service of process void where "it is virtually certain that the summons will arrive" at its intended destination ( Brownell v Feingold, supra at 844; see Donohue v La Pierre, 99 AD2d 570).

  7. Montoya v. Richmond County Ambulance Service

    30 A.D.3d 385 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 6 times

    Moreover, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was to vacate the individual defendant's default in appearing or answering the complaint since it lacked personal jurisdiction over the individual defendant ( see CPLR 5015 [a] [4]). Service of process upon the individual defendant, which was effected pursuant to CPLR 308 (2) by delivering process to a person of suitable age and discretion at the individual defendant's actual place of employment and by purportedly mailing a copy thereto, was improper since it was mailed to an incorrect address ( see Avakian v. De Los Santos, 183 AD2d 687, 688; Foster v. Cranin, 180 AD2d 712).

  8. U.S. Bank National Association v. Vanvliet

    24 A.D.3d 906 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 42 times

    Although the mailing requirement of CPLR 308 (2) does not mandate that "the exact mailing address pursuant to the regulations and organization of the United States Postal Service" be used, the requirement is not satisfied unless "it is virtually certain that the summons will arrive at defendant's last known residence" ( Donohue v. La Pierre, 99 AD2d 570, 570; see Taft v. Lesko, 182 AD2d 1008, 1009). In the absence of any supporting testimony or affidavits from local postal officials or any other nonhearsay evidence establishing that mail sent to "Monroe, NY 10950" will reach "Chester, NY 10918," a hearing is required to determine whether personal jurisdiction was obtained over defendant ( see Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. MacPherson, supra at 418; Avakian v. De Los Santos, 183 AD2d 687, 687-688; see also Citibank v. Harris, 264 AD2d 377, 377; Matter of Connolly [Allstate Ins. Co.], 213 AD2d 787, 788; cf. Taft v. Lesko, supra at 1009; Brownell v. Feingold, 82 AD2d 844, 844). In light of our decision, it is not necessary for us to reach defendant's remaining procedural challenges to the foreclosure sale ( see generally CPLR 317, 5015 [a] [1]; Siegel, NY Prac § 108, at 187 [3d ed]).

  9. Rochdale Holding Corp. v. Neuendorf

    2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 50184 (N.Y. App. Term 2004)   Cited 5 times
    In Rochdale Holding Corp. v. Neuendorf, 784 N.Y.S. 2d 924 (2004), the court held "the fact that the mail was addressed to zip code 10022, rather than zip code 10021, did not render service defective" where the correct street address and county were set forth.

    Although the traverse court incorrectly stated that there is no mailing requirement where "substituted service" is employed (see, RPAPL § 735), landlord made a sufficient showing that a mailing in compliance with the statute had been made based upon the process server's testimony and tenant's failure to introduce into evidence the process he received, which he had brought to court. The fact that the mail was addressed to zip code 10022, rather than zip code 10021, did not render service defective where the correct street address and county were set forth (see, Donohue v. LaPierre, 99 AD2d 570; cf., Avakian v. De Los Santos, 183 AD2d 687). Finally, since tenant has abandoned possession and the service was at least sufficient to support a money judgment (see, CPLR 308, no jurisdictional infirmity is presented.

  10. Rue v. Hill

    287 A.D.2d 781 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 8 times

    The record establishes that Miller and Rieber were in fact served by the mode of service provided for in the order to show cause — namely, first class mail (see, Matter ofWolfe v. Acito, 64 A.D.2d 948, lv denied 45 N.Y.2d 708) — notwithstanding the claimed defects in their respective addresses. As there is nothing in the record to suggest that such irregularities rendered the relevant documents undeliverable (compare, Avakian v. De Los Santos, 183 A.D.2d 687), we conclude that petitioner complied with the service requirements set forth in the order to show cause and, as such, Supreme Court acquired personal jurisdiction. As recited in respondents' answer, service was made upon Miller at "124 Gregory Road, Monticello, New York 12701" when the address for such candidate as set forth in the independent nominating petition was "124 Gregory Road, PO Box 1126, Monticello, New York 1270[1]" (emphasis supplied).