Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 26371-01
DAVIS, Acting P.J.
Autumn H. (petitioner), the mother of Dominik H. (the minor), seeks an extraordinary writ to vacate the orders of the juvenile court terminating her reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Petitioner contends the implementation of her case plan was inadequate. We shall deny the petition.
Hereafter, undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Facts and Procedural History
In May 2006, a petition was filed by the Shasta County Department of Social Services (the Department) regarding the newborn minor based on the parents’ mental health problems and parenting deficits, which had led to petitioner previously losing parental rights to two children based on severe neglect and two other children being made dependents of the court based on physical abuse. The minor’s father had been convicted of child endangerment based on his physical abuse of the minor’s sibling, who (at four years old) reported “‘daddy spanked me’” when asked about deep bruising and abrasions observed on her buttocks.
A psychological assessment conducted about a month before the filing of the petition found petitioner to be preoccupied with her own needs and lacking insight into her behavior and its impact on others. This, combined with her tendency “to externalize blame and responsibility, ” had “undoubtedly contributed to the difficulties she has had in appropriately parenting her children.” The evaluator recommended parenting education, although there was a concern that petitioner’s personality type would make it difficult for her to integrate and practice what she learned. The evaluator also recommended individual psychotherapy, which would be challenging for petitioner “based on her defensiveness and lack of insight.” The evaluation recommended that any therapy be “very concrete and direct, such as cognitive-behavioral therapy.”
In June 2006, the juvenile court sustained the allegations in the petition and continued the matter for a dispositional hearing.
According to the social worker’s dispositional report, petitioner had completed a parenting class, but the instructors could not determine the depth of her understanding of the material and skills presented. Although petitioner was an active participant in the class, she stated on numerous occasions when a skill was being discussed: “‘We already do that.’” She also “made statements regarding her aversion to corporal punishment” and stated, “‘We never spank our children.’” The instructor reported that petitioner did not “express ownership of any of the issues that brought her family into the system, ” and blamed the instructors for her services being discontinued (presumably with the minor’s siblings).
Although the social worker recommended that no reunification services be offered either parent, in September 2006, the juvenile court ordered that services be provided and continued the matter to November 2006 for a six-month review hearing. Petitioner’s case plan included individual counseling as recommended in her psychological evaluation (i.e., treatment to be concrete and direct, such as cognitive-behavioral therapy) and the assistance of a visit supervisor to help her to apply the strategies and skills learned in her parenting classes.
In a report for the six-month review hearing, the social worker recommended termination of reunification services. According to the report, petitioner had attended individual counseling and “at least one conjoint counseling session” with the minor’s father. The therapist found that petitioner “appear[ed] to codependentally [sic] support” the father’s violent behavior and disavowed any responsibility for his abuse of the minor’s sibling. On one occasion, the parents had a loud argument in the waiting room of the therapist’s office, yet they “seemed assertively oblivious” when questioned about it later. The therapist felt that the minor’s father was “socialized to violent norms” and “function[ed] as a naïve menace to family members.” As for petitioner, she “seem[ed] inducted into maintaining her husband’s world view” and appeared “to unconsciously and consciously minimize, normalize, and deny menace within her environment.” The therapist “question[ed] her ability to recognize menace and protect her children.”
With regard to visits, the social worker reported that petitioner was inconsistent in demonstrating and applying parenting skills, with “tensions and disagreements” occurring between the parents as to the minor’s care.
In later addenda, it was reported that the quality of visits was “poor, ” with the parents’ arguments and self-absorption interfering with their ability to attend to the minor’s needs. They also “talked fairly non-stop about matters irrelevant to [the minor], ” which “distracted them from their attention to [him].”
At the review hearing, which went forward in May 2007 and was denominated a six-month and 12-month review, the social worker testified she had been present during visits in part to provide the parents guidance and direction on parenting. As recommended by the psychological evaluation, the social worker provided “very concrete direction” during visits. The social worker made suggestions to petitioner, which she would initially follow until she again “distract[ed] herself with some subject matter that is important to her.” According to the social worker, petitioner missed the minor’s cues that he was ready for more food when she fed him. This was a concern because the minor was “very slender” and one of the minor’s siblings had been diagnosed with “failure to thrive.”
Regarding counseling, the social worker testified that petitioner had had two phone sessions with the therapist and one office session, as well as a couples session. In October 2006, the therapist informed the social worker that petitioner felt she did not need further services from him. According to the social worker, when she spoke to petitioner about what the therapist had told her, petitioner confirmed that she felt she did not need any more counseling, although the social worker acknowledged she did not make reference to this in her reports. The social worker testified: “[Petitioner] has been very firm from the beginning of this case that she didn’t feel that she needed anything, that she felt she knew how to parent. She’s consistently said she knows how to parent, and that she doesn’t have any issues to address.”
Both parents testified that they tried unsuccessfully to contact the therapist after their initial sessions to schedule further appointments. The minor’s father testified that they told the social worker they were having trouble making an appointment, although the social worker testified to the contrary. Petitioner denied she told the therapist or the social worker that she did not need any more counseling. However, when asked what she thought “need[ed] help” through therapy, petitioner testified: “[W]ell they think that mainly that I could benefit from counseling because my father just passed away a year and a half ago, and I’m going through everything with losing my kids and stuff like that. So that is the main reason they wanted me to take counseling in the first place.”
The juvenile court noted there had been numerous hearings at which the parents could have but did not raise any issues concerning the therapist, as the review hearing had been continued several times since the date it was originally set in November 2006. The court terminated services, finding “the evidence strongly supports the proposed findings and orders.” The court’s written order included a finding that reasonable services were offered.
Discussion
Petitioner contends the Department failed to implement the case plan in a manner tailored to address the conditions underlying dependency. Understanding her argument to be a challenge to the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were offered, we disagree.
The purpose of reunification services is to correct the conditions which led to removal so that the dependent child can be returned home. (In re Joanna Y. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 433, 438.) The social worker must make a good faith effort to provide reasonable services responding to the unique needs of each family, “in spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects of success.” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 254.) “Only where there is clear and convincing evidence [that reasonable services have been] provided or offered . . . may the court order a section 366.26 hearing.” (Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1165.)
On the other hand, “[r]eunification is not without its limits or conditions.” (In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 679.) It is subject to time constraints (§ 361.5, subd. (a)) and requires the cooperation of the parent. (In re Mario C. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 599, 604.) “Reunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent.” (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220.) In evaluating reunification services, “[t]he standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
The court’s finding regarding reasonable services is subject to review for substantial evidence. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010.) In making a substantial evidence determination, we resolve all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party and leave the resolution of issues of fact and credibility to the trier of fact. (In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.) “In the presence of substantial evidence, appellate justices are without the power to reweigh conflicting evidence and alter a dependency court determination.” (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705.)
Reviewing petitioner’s contentions in light of these principles, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were offered. Petitioner’s mental health problems had led to the removal of four children from her care prior to the minor’s removal. Two of petitioner’s children had been removed based on severe neglect, and another child was physically abused by the minor’s father, which contributed to the removal of a fourth child. Petitioner had not shown any insight regarding the reasons why her children had been removed from her custody.
Thus, the focus of services was to address petitioner’s mental health deficits such that she could protect the minor and safely care for him. Toward this end, petitioner’s case plan required her to engage in counseling to address the issues that prevented her from successfully parenting (“her narcissistic preoccupation with her own needs, which comes at the expense of a concern for the needs of others, her externalization of blame, and her lack of acceptance of responsibility for her behaviors and the impact it has had on her children”), and included the recommendations contained in her psychological evaluation regarding therapy (“concrete and direct, such as cognitive-behavioral”). Petitioner’s case plan also included assistance from a visit supervisor in applying the strategies and skills that petitioner was taught in parenting class.
Petitioner was referred for therapy and attended several sessions. The evidence is conflicting as to whether she refused further therapy or attempted to schedule additional sessions. The juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided indicates it resolved this evidentiary conflict adversely to petitioner. Supportive of this finding, the court noted that petitioner had ample opportunity to bring any problems in this regard to the attention of the court, as there had been numerous court hearings following her last therapy session before the review hearing went forward.
We also note that petitioner’s response, when asked why she “need[ed] help, ” is telling regarding her attitude toward therapy. She stated: “[T]hey think that mainly that I could benefit from counseling because my father just passed away a year and a half ago, and I’m going through everything with losing my kids and stuff like that.” (Italics added.) In other words, petitioner’s perception was that “they” (and, impliedly, not she) believed she needed therapy and that her need for therapy was unrelated to parenting issues. These statements corroborate the social worker’s testimony that petitioner did not believe she had any issues to address with regard to parenting.
It is not this court’s province to reweigh the evidence when substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided. Such is the case here.
Petitioner’s contention that the Department failed to implement the recommendations contained in her psychological evaluation and that she was offered only “boiler plate” services is without merit. Petitioner’s case plan provided for a visit supervisor to give petitioner guidance and direction on applying the skills she was taught in parenting class. The social worker testified that she offered “very concrete direction” during visits. With regard to counseling, an addendum to the therapist’s report states that he discussed the matter with the social worker prior to commencing therapy with petitioner. Presumably, during this discussion, the therapist was informed of the problems leading to the dependency proceedings and the recommendations contained in petitioner’s psychological evaluation regarding treatment. There is no evidence to suggest otherwise or that the therapist did not employ these recommendations during his brief therapeutic relationship with petitioner.
Petitioner contends the case plan was “permeated with the bias of the social worker against [her] because of her prior history, and the social worker’s perception that [petitioner] was not worth any real effort.” Petitioner provides no evidentiary support for this contention, which we reject.
Likewise, we reject petitioner’s claim that the Department “ignored and then mechanistically implemented” the recommendations contained in the psychological evaluation. This claim is based on her testimony that she tried unsuccessfully to schedule additional appointments with the therapist, a claim that, as we have already explained, was impliedly rejected by the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that petitioner was offered reasonable services to address the conditions leading to removal of the minor. Accordingly, her petition must be denied.
Disposition
The petition is denied.
We concur: ROBIE, J., BUTZ, J.