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holding that because plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, he had not shown likelihood of success on the merits
Summary of this case from Leisure v. Franklin County Court of Common PleasOpinion
Case No: 04-71915.
June 4, 2004
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 20, 2004, Eugene Austin ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint and Application for Preliminary Injunction. With respect to his Application for Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff asked the Court to enjoin United Auto Workers International Union ("UAW") and UAW Local Union No. 594 ("Local 594") (collectively "Defendants") from conducting a meeting to recall him as Chairman of Local 594's Bargaining Committee. Because Plaintiff did not file a brief in support of his Application for a Preliminary Injunction, the Court declined to issue a preliminary injunction. However, on June 2, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Brief in Support of His Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [Doc. #4]. The parties have now fully briefed the issues. Also before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment [filed on June 3, 2004].
II. BACKGROUND
The operative facts of this matter are not in dispute: Members of Local 594 circulated a petition to recall Plaintiff as chair of Local 594's Bargaining Committee. The Recall Petition provided the following:
The charges state that [Plaintiff] has failed to perform the duties of his office.
A. Failure to work with the President of Local 594.
B. Lying to the membership concerning temporary help.
C. Racial and Ethnic discrimination.
D. Failure to organize any opposition of the movement of Engineering and Validation to Warren.
E. Failure to work with the International Union.
Pl. Br. in Support of T.R.O. and Prelim. Inj. Exh. 2.
A Special Recall Meeting was held on April 25, 2004. However, there were insufficient members in attendance to constitute a quorum. In early May, 2004, Local 594 scheduled a second Special Recall Meeting for June 6, 2004. Plaintiff asks the Court to stop this meeting by issuing a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the Sixth Circuit, when determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the Court must consider four factors:
(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the preliminary injunction will succeed on the merits of the claim; (2) whether the party seeking the injunction will suffer irreparable harm without the grant of the extraordinary relief; (3) the probability that granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest is advanced by the issuance of the injunction.Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Michigan, 11 F.3d 1341, 1348 (6th Cir. 1993)). "A district court is required to make specific findings concerning each of the four factors, unless fewer factors are dispositive of the issue." Six Clinics Holding Corp, II v. Cafcomp Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing In re Dolorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1228 (6th Cir. 1985)).
IV. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff has brought this action solely under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. Compl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff claims that if he is recalled from his position as Chairman of the Bargaining Committee for Local 594, his rights under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5), will be violated. Section 411(a)(5) provides:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.
Plaintiff claims that the Recall Petition does not comply with the "specific charges" requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)(A).
A. THERE IS NO LIKELIHOOD THAT PLAINTIFF WILL SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF HIS LMRDA CLAIM AND DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IS APPROPRIATE
Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants' position that the Seventh, Fifth, Third, Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits have held that the LMRDA does not govern the rights and privileges of elected union officers, but rather, protects the rights and privileges of union members. While the Sixth Circuit has not addressed the issue, several decisions guide the Court in its analysis.
Messina v. Local 1199 SEIU, et al, 205 F.Supp.2d 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) is on point. That court stated: "The question raised by defendant's motion, and which has not been addressed by either the Second Circuit or the Supreme Court, is whether `discipline' as used in[§§ 609 and 101(a)(5)] of the LMRDA includes a member's removal from elected office in disregard of proper procedures." Id. at 125 (citing Sheet Metal Workers' Intl. Assoc. v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 353 n. 5 (1989)). The Messina Court then noted that several Southern District of New York cases had answered the question in the negative, that is, "discipline" as used in 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5), includes a union member's removal from elected office in contravention of proper procedures. Id. The court went on to state: "Admittedly, the question is a difficult one. However, we have concluded that a close reading of Finnegan[ v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431 (1982)] and Lynn more strongly favors the conclusion that plaintiff has not stated a claim under §§ 609 and 101(a)(5)." Further, the court recognized what the Supreme Court had stated in Finnegan concerning 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5): "`[T]he prohibition on suspension without observing certain safeguards applies only to suspension of membership in the union; it does not refer to suspension of a member's status as an officer of the union.'" Id. at 126 (quoting Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 438) (emphasis in original).
In Argentine v. United Steel Workers Assoc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 808 (S.D. Ohio 1998) the plaintiffs, elected union officers, were removed from office. They brought suit alleging, among other things, violations of the LMRDA. The Argentine Court expressly considered the plaintiffs claims under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5). The court noted that in Harvey Hollenback, 113 F.3d 639 (6th Cir. 1997) the Sixth Circuit held that removal from union office of an appointed officer is not "discipline" within the meaning of "otherwise discipline" in §§ 529 or 609 of the LMRDA. 23 F. Supp. 2d at 819. Further, the Argentine Court noted that the Supreme Court has held that the term "otherwise discipline" as it is used in §§ 609 and 411(a)(5) has the same meaning in both sections. Id. (citing Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431 (1982); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Intl. Assoc. Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67 (1989)). Relying on Harvey, Finnegan and Breininger, the Argentine Court noted: "In addition, `Congress did not intend to include all acts that deterred the exercise of rights protected under the LMRDA, but rather meant instead to denote only punishment authorized by the union as a collective entity to enforce its rules.' Breininger, 493 U.S. at 91. Plaintiffs therefore have no claim under [ 29 U.S.C. § 411](a)(5) for their removal from office." 23 F. Supp. 2d at 819.
Relying on the same authority, this Court is satisfied that Supreme Court (and, indeed, Sixth Circuit) precedent require a determination that 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) provides no cause of action for the alleged harm Plaintiff will suffer if the June 6, 2004 recall vote takes place (assuming further that he is actually voted out of office). Additionally, the Court summarily rejects Plaintiff's argument that because the Sixth Circuit has not squarely addressed the issues presented here, dismissal of his Complaint would be inappropriate until discovery has taken place. See Pl. Response to Def. Mot. at 2. A legal issue is presented here, and it is answerable without discovery.
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied the likelihood of success on the merits element of the preliminary injunction analysis; Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This finding is dispositive of not only Plaintiff's Motion, but of the lawsuit in its entirety. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to consider the remaining preliminary injunction factors. Six Clinics Holding Corp, 119 F.3d at 399 (citing In re Dolorean, 755 F.2d at 1228).
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is DENIED and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.