Opinion
CIVIL 3:21-CV-01106
10-10-2023
RANDY AUSTIN, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER THOMAS MCDONALD, et al., Defendants.
Mariani, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Susan E. Schwab, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction.
Plaintiff Randy Austin contends that the defendants violated his rights in connection with state criminal proceedings. The claims against one of the two defendants were dismissed, leaving only one remaining defendant, who has filed a motion for summary judgment. Because the facts are not in dispute and the remaining defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we recommend that the court grant the pending motion for summary judgment.
II. Background and Procedural History.
Austin began this action by filing a complaint naming two defendants: Thomas McDonald, a detective/police officer, and Andrew Krowiak, an assistant district attorney. See doc. 1. Although the factual allegations of the complaint are not entirely clear, construed liberally, the complaint alleges that on March 5, 2019, defendant McDonald arrested and imprisoned Austin based on fabricated evidence involving a confidential informant. Id. at 2. Austin does not specify what the fabricated evidence was or whether it was McDonald or the confidential informant who fabricated it. Id. Nonetheless, Austin alleges that McDonald presented the fabricated evidence to defendant Krowiak, who having knowledge of the fabricated evidence, approved a criminal complaint and instituted criminal proceedings in court against Austin. Id.
Austin attached to his complaint, a copy of the criminal complaint. See doc. 1 at 5-9. The affidavit of probable cause attached to the criminal complaint sets forth facts regarding a controlled buy of crack cocaine through a confidential informant and involving Austin as the supplier (through a third party) of the crack cocaine. Id. at 6-9.
On or about December 30, 2019, the state court approved the prosecution's petition to Nolle Prosequi the charges against Austin without prejudice pursuant to Pa. R. Crim. P. 585. See doc. 1 at 4 (Order of December 30, 2019, of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County). According to Austin, he was wrongfully accused and wrongfully incarcerated in the Lackawanna County Prison from March 6, 2019, through November 20, 2019. Id. at 2.
The complaint presents four claims: (1) a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment based on fabrication of evidence; (2) a claim for false arrest; (3) a claim for false imprisonment; and (4) a claim for malicious prosecution. Id.
When setting forth his claims, Austin does not specify that his Fourteenth Amendment claim is based on the fabrication of evidence, see doc. 1 at 2, but that is how he characterizes his Fourteenth Amendment claim in his prayer for relief, see id. at 3.
Austin does not assert whether he is bringing these latter three claims under the Fourth Amendment, under state law, or under both the Fourth Amendment and state law. Construing the complaint liberally since Austin is proceeding pro se, we construe the complaint as raising these claims under both federal and state law.
Austin seeks declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Id. at 3. Although Austin mentions injunctive relief in the opening section of his complaint, he does not request injunctive relief in his prayer for relief, and he has not specified the nature of any injunctive relief that he may be seeking. Id. at 1-3.
Austin filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which we granted. See docs. 2, 5. After waiving service, Defendant Krowiak filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him. See doc. 8. Concluding that Austin's claims against Krowiak were barred by prosecutorial immunity and the complaint otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Krowiak, we recommended that the court grant defendant Krowiak's motion to dismiss. See doc. 18. Judge Mariani adopted that recommendation, granted Krowiak's motion to dismiss, and remanded the case to the undersigned for further proceedings. See doc. 19.
That left defendant McDonald as the only defendant. After some issues with service of process, defendant McDonald eventually waived service, and filed an answer to the complaint. See docs. 14, 17, 24-29. Because Austin failed to appear at a case management conference and failed to respond to an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed, we concluded that he had abandoned the case, and we recommended that the case be dismissed. See doc. 39. Austin then filed objections to that report and recommendation. See doc. 40. Although Judge Mariani agreed that at the time of the report and recommendation it appeared that Austin had abandoned the case, given Austin's objections to the report and recommendation, Judge Mariani concluded that Austin should be afforded a final opportunity to pursue this action. See doc. 43. Thus, he rejected the report and recommendation, and remanded the case to the undersigned for further proceedings. Id.
After the deadline for discovery had passed but with the deadline for filing dispositive motions, defendant McDonald filed a motion for summary judgment and a brief in support of that motion. See docs. 49, 50. He also filed a document titled “Statement of Uncontested Facts in Support of Thomas McDonald's Motion for Summary Judgment.” See doc. 49-2. This latter document contained only one paragraph: “ 1. There are no facts of record in this matter.” Id. By an Order dated April 4, 2023, we explained why this document did not comply with the rules of court, and we ordered it stricken from the record. See doc. 51. But we granted McDonald leave to file a proper statement of material facts in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1) and M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. Id. And because a proper brief relies on the statement of material facts, we also ordered that McDonald shall file another brief in support of his motion for summary judgment. Id. We further ordered that within 21 days of McDonald filing a proper statement of material facts and another brief in support of his motion, Austin shall file a brief in opposition to McDonald's motion, a response to McDonald's statement of material facts, and any transcripts, affidavits, or other relevant documentation in accordance with Local Rules 7.6 and 56.1. Id.
Austin then filed a motion for recusal of the undersigned. See doc. 52. We denied that motion on April 27, 2023. See doc. 57. In the meantime, defendant McDonald filed an amended statement of material facts and a supplemental brief in support of his motion for summary judgment. See docs. 53, 54. And Austin filed a response to McDonald's amended statement of materials facts and a brief in opposition. See docs. 55, 56. Defendant McDonald has not filed a reply brief.
For the reasons discussed below, we recommend that the court grant defendant McDonald's motion for summary judgment.
III. Summary Judgment Standards.
Defendant McDonald moves for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a ‘genuine dispute as to any material fact' and for which a jury trial would be an empty and unnecessary formality.” Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 811 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1091 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). With respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, the moving party may discharge that burden by “‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading; rather, the nonmoving party must show a genuine dispute by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Summary judgment is also appropriate if the nonmoving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id. at 252. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248-49.
When “faced with a summary judgment motion, the court must view the facts ‘in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'” N.A.A.C.P. v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter; rather it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The proper inquiry of the court “is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250.
Summary judgment is warranted, after adequate time for discovery, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “Under such circumstances, ‘there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.'” Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). “[S]ummary judgment is essentially ‘put up or shut up' time for the non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006).
IV. Material Facts.
Local Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary judgment to file “a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. The Rule, in turn, requires the non-moving party to file “a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required [by the moving party], as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.” Id. The “[s]tatements of material facts in support of, or in opposition to, a motion shall include references to the parts of the record that support the statements,” and “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party.” Id. “Local Rule 56.1 was promulgated to bring greater efficiency to the work of the judges of the Middle District.” Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018). “[T]he Rule ‘is essential to the Court's resolution of a summary judgment motion' due to its role in ‘organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each side proposed to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence.'” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, in accordance with M.D. L.R. Pa. 56.1, defendant McDonald filed an amended statement of material facts with citations to the record, see doc.54, and supporting documents, see doc. 54-1. Austin filed a response to McDonald's amended statement of material facts, but he does not dispute any of the facts set forth by McDonald. See doc. 56. Rather, Austin requests that the court accept the undisputed facts set forth by McDonald, but he suggests that those facts support his claims. Id. We are aware of our duty to “construe all facts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party[,]” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 419 (3d Cir. 2015)), but because Austin does not dispute any of the facts set forth by McDonald in his amended statement of material facts nor has Austin cited evidence to create a genuine factual dispute, we accept the facts set forth by McDonald. Thus, the following facts are the material facts for purposes of the pending summary judgment motion.
On March 5, 2019, McDonald, who was a corporal with the Scranton, Pennsylvania Police Department, and Andrew Krowiak, Esquire, who was with the Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office, filed a criminal complaint against Austin. Doc. 54 ¶ 1. That criminal complaint included a notarized affidavit of probable cause. Id. ¶ 2. That affidavit of probable cause sets forth the following facts, among others, surrounding a controlled buy of crack cocaine.
On March 5, 2019, McDonald met with a confidential informant (“CI”) for the purpose of making a controlled buy from a suspect known as Vic. Id. ¶ 3. On that same date, McDonald drove the CI to a meeting at a location designated by Vic. Id. ¶ 4. At the meeting location, the CI entered a vehicle understood at the time and later verified to be occupied by Vic. Id. ¶ 5. The vehicle occupied by Vic and the CI was then driven to a secondary location, a convenience store. Id. ¶ 6. Once at the secondary location, Vic exited the vehicle and entered the convenience store. Id. ¶ 7. A few minutes later, Vic returned to the vehicle with another individual later identified as Austin and drove away with the CI. Id. ¶ 8. A few blocks away, the vehicle pulled over and Austin exited. Id. ¶ 9. The vehicle then pulled away again. Id.
While in transit, the CI informed McDonald, via text message, that the “buy was good” and that Austin had provided drugs to Vic. Id. ¶ 10. Other officers of the Scranton Police Department took Austin into custody at that point. Id. ¶ 11. Upon his arrest, the “buy money” that McDonald had earlier provided to the CI was found on the ground a short distance from Austin. Id. ¶ 12.
In a post operation interview, the CI stated that while in transit, Vic had informed him/her that they had to meet “his guy” to give him the “buy money.” Id. ¶ 13. The CI further stated that while in transit, Vic handed Austin the buy money and Austin then handed Vic crack cocaine. Id. ¶ 14. The substance that was purchased from Austin was later tested and confirmed to be crack cocaine. Id. ¶ 15.
After his arrest, Austin gave a statement wherein he admitted that he sold crack cocaine to Vic for $100 and that he threw that money on the ground when he saw the police. Id. ¶ 16.
V. Discussion.
Austin's federal claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). Section 1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” Id. To establish a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
As set forth above, Austin brings four claims: (1) a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment based on fabrication of evidence; (2) a claim for false arrest; (3) a claim for false imprisonment; and (4) a claim for malicious prosecution. Id. We begin with Austin's fabrication of evidence claim, and we conclude that defendant McDonald is entitled to summary judgment as to that claim because Austin has not shown that McDonald fabricated evidence. Then, because Austin has failed to show that there was not probable cause for his arrest, imprisonment, or prosecution, a necessary element of his remaining claims, we conclude that McDonald is entitled to summary judgment as to those claims as well.
A. Fabrication-Evidence-Claim.
Austin claims that defendant McDonald denied him due process by fabricating evidence against him. “Fabricated evidence is an affront to due process of law, and state actors seeking to frame citizens undermine fundamental fairness and are responsible for ‘corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.'” Black v. Montgomery Cnty., 835 F.3d 358, 370 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)); see also Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 293 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We emphatically reject the notion that due process of law permits the police to frame suspects.”). Whether a plaintiff is convicted or acquitted, he or she may have a claim based on fabrication of evidence. Black, 835 F.3d at 371. But the Third Circuit has “cautioned . . . that there are ‘hurdles facing a plaintiff alleging a due process violation for fabrication of evidence.'” Boseman v. Upper Providence Twp., 680 Fed.Appx. 65, 69 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Black, 835 F.3d at 372). “A plaintiff must demonstrate a ‘meaningful connection' between the injury and the use of the fabricated evidence.” Id. (quoting Black, 835 F.3d at 372). “There is also a requirement that the evidence be ‘so significant that it could have affected the outcome of the criminal case.'” Id. (quoting Black, 835 F.3d at 372). Further, “the standard required to demonstrate that evidence is fabricated is a ‘notable bar.'” Id. (quoting Black, 835 F.3d at 372). “[T]testimony that is incorrect or simply disputed should not be treated as fabricated merely because it turns out to have been wrong.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 295. Rather, a “fabrication-of-evidence claim requires persuasive evidence [the defendant] formulated or submitted false evidence willfully, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for its truth.” Mervilus v. Union Cnty., 73 F.4th 185, 194-95 (3d Cir. 2023).
Here, Austin has failed to present evidence that defendant McDonald fabricated evidence. As the undisputed facts show, there was a controlled buy of crack cocaine involving a confidential informant, who told McDonald that Austin supplied the crack cocaine in exchange for buy money, which buy money was later found on the ground a short distance from where Austin was arrested. Austin has not provided evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that McDonald had any reason to disbelieve the confidential information. Thus, he has failed to show that McDonald willfully, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for its truth submitted false evidence. Accordingly, defendant McDonald is entitled to summary judgment as to Austin's due process fabrication of evidence claim.
B. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and Malicious Prosecution Claims.
Austin brings false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth Amendment. But because Austin has failed to show that defendant McDonald lacked probable cause to arrest, imprison, or prosecution him, those claims fail.
The Fourth Amendment states, in pertinent part, that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons .. against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause....” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. “To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.” James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). And ‘“where the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest.'” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 202 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995)). Thus, ‘“[t]o state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that she was detained; and (2) that the detention was unlawful.'” Id. (quoting James, 700 F.3d at 682-83). And to state a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must “show that: ‘(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendants initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) he suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.'” Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 2017)).
To survive summary judgment as to his false arrest claim, his false imprisonment claim, and his malicious prosecution claim, Austin must present evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that defendant McDonald lacked probable cause. Austin has failed to do so.
“The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). “Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). In other words, ‘“[p]robable cause exists if there is a fair probability that the person committed the crime at issue.'” Williams v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 967 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 467 (3d Cir. 2016)).
Here, the undisputed facts here show that there was a controlled buy of crack cocaine involving a confidential informant, who told McDonald that Austin supplied the crack cocaine in exchange for buy money, which buy money was later found on the ground a short distance from where Austin was arrested. And Austin has not provided evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that McDonald had any reason to disbelieve the confidential information. These undisputed facts show that McDonald had probable cause to arrest, imprison, and prosecute Austin. Moreover, the undisputed facts also show that after his arrest, Austin gave a statement wherein he admitted that he sold crack cocaine to Vic for $100 and that he threw that money on the ground when he saw the police. This further supports the conclusion that McDonald had probable cause, and he is entitled to summary judgment as to Austin's false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims.
As noted above, in addition to federal claims, we construe the complaint as raising state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. But such claims also fail because under Pennsylvania law-as under federal law-false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution require lack of probable cause. See Alleyne v. Pirrone, 180 A.3d 524, 528 n.3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018). And, here, for the reasons discussed above, a reasonable factfinder could not conclude the defendant McDonald lacked probable cause.
VI. Recommendation.
Based on the foregoing, we recommend that the court grant Defendant McDonald's motion for summary judgment (doc. 49), enter judgment in favor of Defendant McDonald, and close the case.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive
further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 10th day of October, 2023.